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Abstract 
Assisted Reproductive Technology has, in the last 40 years, raised numerous 
ethical questions.  One of these ethical questions has been whether or not 
children born as a result of Assisted Reproductive Technology treatments may be 
harmed as a consequence of being brought into existence in this way.  Harm 
caused to children is quite rightly a serious concern for society and society 
expects the State to intervene to protect children from parents who pose a 
significant risk to their children.  Towards this end section 13(5) of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 requires licensed infertility treatment 
clinics to ‘take into account the welfare of the child who may be born as a result 
of treatment’ when considering whether or not to provide a woman with 
treatment services.   
 
This thesis will argue that section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 should be amended as it is acts as nothing more than an 
arbitrary and unjustified infringement on an individual’s right to reproductive 
liberty; is an ineffectual means of promoting the welfare of the child who may 
be born as a result of treatment; is philosophically incoherent; and is 
inconsistent with the law as applied in so-called ‘wrongful life’ cases.  The 
argument that section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
should be amended will be grounded upon the contention that an individual’s 
right to reproductive liberty should be accorded particular respect.  This thesis 
will argue for a right to reproductive liberty which encompasses a negative right 
of the individual to be free from unjustified interference by the State when 
making reproductive choices.  
 
The pervasive influence of the child welfare principle as applied in the context 
of decisions directly impacting upon them has, it will be argued, played a 
significant part in the inclusion and retention of section 13(5) within the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  This thesis will examine the way in which 
the child welfare principle as applied to children has grown in influence and how 
iii 
 
an unquestioning adherence to this worthy principle has led to an incongruous 
version of it being applied at the pre-conception stage.  While the State have a 
solid mandate to protect the welfare of children this thesis will argue that that 
mandate cannot realistically be extended to apply to future children, when to 
refuse an individual access to Assisted Reproductive Technology has the effect of 
preventing the child whose welfare is to be taken into account from being 
brought into existence in the first place.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
Today in the UK when patients attend a licensed treatment clinic1 seeking any 
regulated fertility treatment2 it is presumed that if the treatment results in the 
birth of a child they will be ‘supportive parents in the absence of any reasonable 
cause for concern that any child who may be born, or any other child, may be at 
risk of significant harm or neglect’.3  Nonetheless it is a statutory requirement of 
the treatment clinic’s licence that it carries out a child welfare assessment prior 
to offering treatment.4  Section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 (HFE Act 1990) as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008 (HFE Act 2008) currently reads: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be 
born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child 
for supportive parenting), and of any other child who may be 
affected by the birth. 
 
This thesis will examine the purported rationale for the inclusion of the welfare 
of the child assessment as a licensing requirement for clinics offering fertility 
                                                     
1Licences are granted to clinics by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
under authority granted to the HFEA in terms of sec. 9 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act 1990) to grant, vary, suspend and revoke a licence.  The HFEA 
1990 has been amended since enactment, most notably by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 (HFE Act 2008).  All references to the HFEA 1990 are to the provisions of 
the Act currently in force unless specifically stated or the context demands otherwise. 
2 Sec. 2 (1) of the HFE Act 1990 defines ‘treatment services’ as meaning medical, surgical or 
obstetric services provided to the public or a section of the public for the purpose of assisting 
women to carry children.  This includes in vitro fertilisation (IVF), intra-cytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI) and Intrauterine insemination (IUI). 
3 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of Practice, 8th Edition, First Published 
2009, Revised April 2010, April 2011, October 2011, April 2012 and October 2013, para. 8.11, 
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/clinicalstaff.html (accessed on 1 November 2010) 
(henceforth, HFEA Code of Practice, 8th Edition).  
4 In terms of sec. 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990. 
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treatment services governed by the HFE Acts and ask whether or not its inclusion 
can be justified on the ground that it operates to fulfil a State duty to protect 
children from the risk of significant harm or neglect.  
 
In 2010 the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) produced a pro 
forma entitled ‘Welfare of the child: patient history form’5 which the HFEA 
recommends clinics use to carry out the child welfare assessment ‘in order to 
determine whether the prospective child is likely to face serious medical, 
physical or psychological harm.’6  The patients7 are therefore required to answer 
the following questions before they will be considered as suitable candidates for 
fertility treatment: 
 
1. Do you have any previous convictions related to harming 
children? 
2. Have any child protection measures been taken regarding 
your children? 
3. Is there any serious violence or discord within your family 
environment? 
4. Do you have any mental or physical conditions? 
5. To your knowledge, is your child at increased risk of any 
 transmissible or inherited disorders? 
6. Do you have any drug or alcohol problems? 
7. Are there any other aspects of your life or medical history 
which  may pose a risk of serious harm to any child you might 
                                                     
5 A copy of this form can be downloaded at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1414.html (accessed on 12 
December 2014).  The original form issued in August 2010 was updated in June 2013. 
6 See HFEA Website: Welfare of the Child Assessment at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1414.html 
(accessed on 12 December 2013).  
7 The form states that: ‘This form should be completed by each patient requesting any fertility 
treatment regulated by the HFEA, including IUI. In surrogacy arrangements, both the 
commissioning couple and the surrogate (and her partner, if she has one) should complete this 
form’. 
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have or anything which might impair your ability to care for 
such a child? 8 
 
The licensed clinic is also asked to contribute to the form by addressing the 
question of whether there is any concern that ‘the prospective parents may not 
be supportive parents (i.e., that they show a lack of commitment to the health, 
well being and development of the prospective child)’.9  If the answer to this 
question is ‘yes’ then the licensed clinic ‘must specify if and how the wider 
family and social networks within which the child will be raised have been taken 
into account’.10  Further, if additional information was sought by the clinic they 
‘must specify: a) grounds for seeking information, b) type of information sought 
and c) source of information (GP, social services etc.)’.11  The clinic must then 
record any response received, any further action taken, the final decision, their 
grounds for refusal and inform the patients of any circumstances that may 
enable the clinic to reconsider its decision.12  This is all part of what the HFEA 
call ‘the welfare of the child assessment process’.13 
 
In UK family law the assessment of the welfare of the child is the guiding 
principle to be applied by the courts when making decisions which impact upon 
the lives of the children concerned.14  It will be argued that any question of 
                                                     
8 See fn 5. 
9 See fn 5. 
10 See fn 5. 
11 See fn 5. 
12 HFEA Code of Practice, 8th Edition, paras. 8.17 (c) 
13HFEA Code of Practice, 8th Edition, paras. 8.2 – 8.9. 
14 In relation to England and Wales sec. 1(1) of the Children Act 1989reads:- When a court 
determines any question with respect to— (a) the upbringing of a child; or (b) the administration 
of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it, the child’s welfare shall be 
the court’s paramount consideration. In relation to Scotland sec. 11(7) of the Children (Scotland) 
Act 1995 reads:- In considering whether or not to make an order under subsection (1) above and 
what order to make, the court shall regard the welfare of the child concerned as its paramount 
consideration and shall not make any such order unless it considers that it would be better for 
the child that the order be made than that none should be made at all. 
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whether the welfare of the child assessment process as applied to assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) is justified cannot be properly assessed without a 
full analysis of the scope, purpose and rationale behind the child welfare 
principle as applied in family law.  It is clear that concerns about child welfare 
have influenced decisions about access to ART treatment from the fact that 
there exists a statutory requirement that treatment clinics take into account the 
welfare of the child to be born prior to offering treatment.15  However it is the 
nature of this principle and its applicability to such treatment that will be 
examined in this thesis. 
 
What this thesis will explore in greater detail is whether the two situations:  
requiring courts to treat the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration 
when making decisions which affect the life of an existing child in cases brought 
before them16 and requiring treatment clinics to take into account the welfare 
of a child that might be born when deciding whether to grant access to 
treatment under the HFE Act 1990, are conceptually sufficiently similar to 
justify the use of the same approach.  This thesis will argue that they are not 
and that section 13(5) should be amended to remove this specific requirement.  
However, the thesis is not seeking to call for the repeal of section 13(5) in its 
entirety. 
 
The argument that section 13(5) should be completely repealed has been made 
by various authors in the past.  Emily Jackson has stated that there is ‘no 
satisfactory justification for its retention’.17  Jackson's arguments for repeal are 
three fold.  Firstly, that section 13(5) is ineffective because it is difficult to 
distinguish between adequate and inadequate parents particularly when the 
                                                     
15 See fn 4. 
16 See for example, In re G (children) (FC) [2006] UKHL 43, para. 2 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead: - 
‘In this case, as in all cases concerning the upbringing of children, the court seeks to identify the 
course which is in the best interests of the children. Their welfare is the court's paramount 
consideration’. 
17 E. Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, The Modern Law Review, 
2002, 65, 2, 176 - 203, 203.. 
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assessment is carried out in a perfunctory way; secondly, that section 13(5) is 
unfair because it discriminates against the infertile; and thirdly, section 13(5) is 
incoherent because its application supports the premise that it might not be in a 
child's best interests to be born.  Alghrani and Harris have also stated that ‘we 
believe that the welfare provision contained in section 13(5) of the HFE Act 
should be removed from the legislation’.18 Their position is rather differently 
framed as they argue that ‘The HFE Act, which determines who may be granted 
access to assisted conception services based on a speculative judgment as to 
their potential to parent, is a clear and unjustifiable violation of reproductive 
liberty.’19   
 
This work will be looked at in more detail in later chapters, but it is worth 
noting at this stage that these authors have made arguments for repeal having 
examined a number of specific aspects of section 13(5), such as the child 
welfare issues arising from the practice of pre-implantation diagnosis (PGD) and 
the creation of ‘saviour siblings’.  ‘Saviour siblings’ is a term which has arisen in 
the context of treatment governed by the HFEA Acts  ‘whereby embryos are 
selected with the same tissue type as an existing sibling who is suffering from a 
disease, so that when born, he or she can then donate umbilical cord stem cells 
or bone marrow to help treat the existing sibling’.20  This context of course 
raises the question of the welfare of an existing child in addition to that of the 
welfare of the yet to be conceived child and a number of matters arising from 
the intentions of the parents and duties owed to all their children.  While some 
of the ideas and discussion provided by this commentary are therefore of 
importance to this thesis, the centre of attention here differs.   
 
This thesis will focus instead on the parental environment aspects of the child 
welfare assessment, as applied by section 13(5), concerning the possible 
                                                     
18 A. Alghrani and J. Harris, Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be 
regulated?, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, 2006, 1 - 18, 5. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
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conception of a child, without consideration of benefit or burden to existing 
children of the family.  What is meant by the term ‘parental environment’ in 
this thesis is the environment within which the child is expected to be raised.   
 
As will be demonstrated, the child welfare principle when applied in family law 
is used by the courts to determine what course of action is appropriate in 
respect of matters brought before them under the Children Acts.21  While the 
circumstances in which such cases may arise are varied and include matters such 
as whether medical treatment may proceed in the event of disagreement 
between parents, children and healthcare practitioners, they are particularly 
frequently concerned with considering the risks posed to a child if it was to 
remain within a particular parenting environment.  Cases examining questions of 
residence, contact and State protection of children which will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Four are the leading examples of where parenting 
environment is the principal focus.  The comparison draw between section 13(5) 
and the adoption process which will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 
Five is another area where parental environment in the sense used above takes 
centre stage.  Further, the questions set out in the child welfare assessment pro 
forma of the HFEA, with the exception of question 5, all relate to parental 
environment and are thus typical of the matters which a family court tasked 
with carrying out a child welfare assessment would ask when considering an 
individual child’s welfare.  The link between the child welfare principle as 
applied in family law and the section 13(5) child welfare assessment is therefore 
particularly strong when examining the parental environment.   
 
A focus on this particular aspect of section 13(5) will add to the body of 
knowledge in this area by concentrating on the impact of the child welfare 
principle as applied in the family courts on access to ART.  Whilst previous 
authors have taken a more broad-brush approach to looking at a number of 
aspects of section 13(5), this thesis will solely be concerned with the issues 
pertaining to the welfare of the child to be born as far as they relate to being 
                                                     
21 Children Act 1989; Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
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born into a supportive parenting environment.  This will enable a detailed 
comparison of the appropriateness of applying the child welfare principle 
developed in one context of making decisions about children to what, it will be 
argued, is quite another.  
 
For the same reason, this thesis will also not concern itself with child welfare 
concerns arising out of the increased risk of transmissible or inherited disorders 
to any child that might be born as a result of treatment.  The development of 
the practice of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) now means that 
embryos free of the genetic inherited disorder can be tested, selected and 
implanted in a patent to ensure that the child to be born will not suffer from 
that particular inherited disorder.  This has led to a great deal of analysis of how 
such a practice may impact upon the welfare of the child to be born.22  Two 
particular objections have been posed. Firstly that ‘it is wrong to choose traits 
of offspring, no matter how well intentioned’23 because children would be 
harmed if ‘manufactured’ in this way.  Secondly, that PGD is a move towards 
eugenics which would create children ‘valued more for their genotype than for 
their inherent characteristics’.24  Whilst these studies are fascinating in their 
own right, this thesis will not examine them in detail as they do not relate to 
questions of parenting environment but pertain to the ‘type’ of child to be born 
which is an question exclusive to the practice of ART and not a child welfare 
issue raised in the family courts. 
 
As this thesis will come on to argue in more detail it was largely the influence of 
the widely applied and respected child welfare principle in family law which led 
to the introduction of section 13(5) in the first place.  Examining the way in 
which parental environment concerns are addressed in family law and in the 
restriction of access to treatment by section 13(5) will enable the argument to 
                                                     
22 See for example, J. A. Robertson, Extending preimplantation genetic diagnosis: the ethical 
debate Ethical issues in new uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Human Reproduction, 
2003, Volume 18, Number 3, 465 - 471. 
23 Ibid., 466 
24 Ibid. 
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be made that the simple adoption of this principle in the HFE Act 1990 has been 
inappropriate. It will be proposed that its retention in its present form is 
unjustified in so far as it has the potential to prevent access to ART on the 
grounds of the welfare of a yet-to-be-born ‘child’ being at risk from ‘inadequate 
parenting’. 
 
Whilst section 13(5) also requires clinics to take into account the welfare of any 
other existing child of the family before offering treatment, this thesis will not 
seek to examine that aspect of the licensing requirement in detail nor to make 
recommendations concerning it since the thesis takes the position that the 
welfare assessment of existing children is conceptually similar to the child 
welfare principle as it is applied in family law.  What this thesis means by 
conceptually similar is that in both cases there is a child in existence whose 
welfare can actually be assessed.  In both cases if the child is old enough their 
views can be taken into account.  Even if the child is an infant the question of 
the adequacy of parenting is not a speculative assessment when there is an 
existing child.  Further, the major difference between taking into account the 
welfare of the child to be born and the welfare of the existing child is that 
refusing access to treatment on these grounds will not prevent the child to be 
born coming into existence at all.  The focus of this thesis is to argue that the 
child welfare test as understood by family law cannot appropriately be applied 
to considerations of the welfare of a child to be born due to the inherent 
problems with carrying out a child welfare assessment in the absence of an as 
yet unconceived child.  The question of the impact allowing access to treatment 
may have on existing children does not raise these particular problems. 
 
This thesis does aim to provide an update of the contention that section 13(5) is 
an unjustified interference in individuals’ and couples’ right to procreative 
liberty.  The majority of the work in this area pre-dates the passing of the HFE 
Act 2008 which amended section 13(5) by changing the words ‘the need of that 
child for a father’ to ‘the need of that child for supportive parenting’.  
Therefore, a great deal of the work, particularly around the time of the changes 
introduced by the HFE Act 2008, focused on the ‘need for a father’ requirement 
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and how this impacted upon access to ART for single women and lesbian 
couples.25  As a result of the amendment, this is now a debate which is largely, 
though not entirely, resolved and the focus of this updated work will be whether 
the requirement to consider the welfare of the child that may be born as a 
result of treatment under the HFE Acts, in terms of parenting environment, 
remains justified. 
 
 In conclusion, what this thesis seeks to do is to make the argument that taking 
account of the welfare of the child to be born in so far as the concerns relate to 
the parental environment in which the child is to be raised is conceptually 
incoherent. In addition, assessing whether potential parents will be supportive 
parents will be contended amounts to unjustifiable discrimination and is in any 
event such a speculative enterprise that it is worthless in terms of providing 
meaningful judgements.  What will be proposed is that section 13(5) should be 
amended so as to remove reference to ‘the need for supportive parenting’ in 
relation to ‘the child to be born’ as part of a child welfare assessment.  As 
noted, a number of the arguments which will be made in support of an amended 
section 13(5) also apply to an argument for full repeal, but as the child welfare 
principle as applied in family law is principally concerned with parenting 
environment and it is the impact of this on access to ART which this thesis 
focuses on, then the argument will be that child welfare concerns relating to the 
parenting environment cannot justifiably restrict access to ART. 
 
 
1.2 The Child Welfare Principle 
The impact of the child welfare principle on access to ART cannot properly be 
understood or evaluated without a thorough analysis of how the child welfare 
principle developed into the legal concept enshrined in legislation and used in 
                                                     
25See for example, J. McCandless and S. Sheldon, “No Father Required”? The Welfare Assessment 
in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Feminist Legal Studies, December 2010, 
Volume 18, Issue 3, 201-225. 
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courts in the UK, how it is applied in practice, why its application to decisions 
which affect children is justified and what its limitations might be.   
 
The importance we place upon the welfare of children in our global society is 
well-illustrated by the fact that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC)26 is the most widely ratified human rights treaty in history.  
The UNCRC has been ratified by some 191 out of the 193 countries of the 
world.27  The UK signed the convention in April 1990 and it came into force in 
January 1992.28  While the UK does not incorporate the UNCRC directly into 
domestic law the government will seek to ensure that the principles of the 
UNCRC are given effect to within domestic legislation.  However, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 did incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) 29 directly into domestic law.  This means that whilst the UNCRC is not 
directly enforceable in UK courts, the ECHR is.  The rights within the ECHR are 
applicable to all persons within the European Union, although unlike the UNCRC, 
the ECHR is not a child specific convention.  As will come on to be discussed in 
Chapter Four, the inter-relationship between Article 3.1 of the UNCRC,30  Article 
8(1) of the ECHR31 and domestic law is important when defining the extent of 
the courts’ duty to take into consideration the best interests of the child when 
making decisions which affect the life of a child.  Article 3.1 of the UNCRC is one 
                                                     
26 A full copy of the UNCRC is available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (accessed on 25 October 
2013). 
27 The United States of America and Somalia are the only two countries in the world who have 
not ratified the UNCRC. 
28 Department of Education, Children and Young People, United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/united-nations-convention-on-the-
rights-of-the-child-uncrc-how-legislation-underpins-implementation-in-England (accessed on 12 
December 2013). 
29 A full copy of the ECHR is available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
30 Article 3.1 of the UNCRC reads ‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. 
31 Article 8(1) of the ECHR reads ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence’. 
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of the guiding principles of the UNCRC and in practical terms requires parents, 
policy makers, law makers and other adults to think about how their decisions 
will affect children and to endeavour to do what is best for them.  The 
ratification of the UNCRC by the UK set the standard which public authorities 
should strive to achieve when making decisions which impact upon the lives of 
children, although individuals cannot enforce rights set out under it.   
 
Article 9.1 of the UNCRC states ‘Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will, except when... such 
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.  Such determination 
may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of 
the child by the parents.’32  Parental responsibilities to safeguard the welfare of 
their children and corresponding parental rights to be free to raise their children 
as they wish are generally regarded as fundamentally important aspects of any 
democratic society.33  This is reflected in domestic law in the UK which gives 
parents certain rights and responsibilities in respect of their children.34  
However, these parental rights and responsibilities can only be exercised in the 
interests of the child.35  In England and Wales ‘when a court determines any 
question with respect to the upbringing of a child the child’s welfare shall be the 
court’s paramount consideration’.36  In Scotland when considering whether or 
not to make an order in relation to parental rights or responsibilities ‘the court 
shall regard the welfare of the child concerned as its paramount 
consideration’.37  The so-called child welfare principle, or paramountcy 
principle, is routinely applied in family law courts when decisions are being 
                                                     
32 See fn 17. 
33 J. Thomson, Family Law in Scotland, 7th edition, Butterworths/Law Society of Scotland, 
Edinburgh, 2014 , 192 (henceforth, Thomson, Family Law in Scotland). 
34 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 1 (1) (a)-(d) and Children Act 1989 sec. 3 (1). 
35 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 1 (1) and Children Act 1989 sec. 2(8). 
36 Children Act 1989 sec. 3 (1). 
37 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11(7). 
12 
 
made which determine a child’s future, including residence and contact38, 
adoption39 and child protection measures.40  Article 9.1 of the UNCRC is 
reflected in domestic legislation such as the Children Act 1989 and the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, although the Children Act 1989 was enacted before the UK 
signed up to the UNCRC.   
 
Likewise, it is accepted that the State has a responsibility to provide support and 
protection to children who are vulnerable to parental abuse or neglect.41  This 
duty is set out in statute - section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 (covering 
England and Wales) states: ‘It shall be the general duty of every local authority 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in 
need’.  In Scotland the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 retained 
provisions previously set out in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 which allow 
local authorities to apply for an order removing the child to a place of safety if 
they can satisfy the requirement that they have reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the child has been or is being treated in such a way that the child is 
suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm or is being neglected and as a 
result of the neglect is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm.42  The 
State’s responsibilities to protect children from serious harm provide it with a 
clear mandate to interfere with the rights of parents if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that children are at risk.  
                                                     
38 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11(2) (c) and (d) and Children Act 1989 sec. 8(1) - Child 
Arrangement Orders.  
39 Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 sec. 14(3) and Adoption and Children Act 2002 sec. 
1(2).  
40 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 37 and 38- Child Protection Orders and Children 
Act 1989 sec. 31 (1) - Care and Supervision Orders.   
41 In the case of A v United Kingdom [1998] 2 F.L.R. 959 the European Court of Human Rights 
held that as English Law put the onus on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the beating of a child went beyond the ‘reasonable chastisement’ of that child, English law as it 
stood failed to provide adequate protection for children, and the Government's failure in this 
respect constituted a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.  This case is a good example of where 
the courts have expressly stated that the State has a duty to protect children from parental 
abuse. 
42 Child Protection Orders – Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 37 and 38. 
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It is certainly the case that the welfare of the child is treated as an imperative 
consideration both in international treaties and domestic legislation.  The 
question this thesis will explore is whether the great importance placed by 
society and the law on the welfare of the child and the State duty to protect 
children from the risk of harm and neglect has had an unnecessary and 
unjustified impact upon the requirements to be met before access to ART 
services in the UK is granted.  Concerns about the welfare of the child have been 
raised in numerous areas pertaining to ART.  They include the risk that 
prospective parents might pose to their children as a result of physical or sexual 
abuse, parental conflict and substance abuse.43 These kinds of concerns are 
reflected in the questions asked within the ‘Welfare of the child: patient history 
form’ referred to above.  The concerns expressed have also extended to 
questions surrounding the welfare of the child in same-sex couple families,44 
surrogacy arrangements,45 pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD),46 sex 
selection,47 and human cloning.48  As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the 
inclusion of the licensing requirement to take account of the welfare of the child 
prior to granting access to treatment came about as a consequence of some of 
these concerns.  Its inclusion has had an impact upon treatment providers and 
those seeking their services for a variety of reasons.  It places a statutory duty 
on treatment providers to ask questions of their patients, to put their past 
conduct under scrutiny and to make judgments as to their present and future 
suitability to parent. 
                                                     
43 S. Golombok and J. Rust, The Warnock Report and single woman: what about the children? 
Journal of medical ethics, 1986, 12, 182-186, 186. 
44 G. Pennings, Evaluating the welfare of the child in same-sex families, Human Reproduction, 
2011, Vol.26, No.7, 1609–1615. 
45 E. Blyth, Children's Welfare, Surrogacy and Social Work, British Journal of Social Work, 1993, 
Volume 23, Issue 3, 259-275.  
46 S. Lavery, Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the welfare of the child, Human Fertilisation, 
2004, Dec 7(4), 295-300. 
47 J. Tizzard, Sex Selection, Child Welfare and Risk: A Critique of the HFEA's Recommendations 
on Sex Selection, Health Care Analysis, March 2004, Volume 12, Issue 1, 61-68. 
48 J. Burley and J. Harris, Human cloning and child welfare, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1999, 25, 
108-113. 
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Given the fundamental importance placed upon the welfare of children in 
society and the need for the State to protect children from the risk of harm and 
neglect, on the face of it the child welfare assessment carried out by infertility 
clinics appears a sensible and worthwhile exercise.  However, it cannot be 
ignored that this child welfare assessment has the potential to deny prospective 
parents the only opportunity they might have of conceiving a child.  It also 
cannot be ignored that this child welfare assessment is not routinely applied to 
fertile couples.  The fertile couple can generally reproduce without any State 
interference on that basis, no matter the potential risk they pose to the child as 
a consequence of previous convictions, child protection measures, serious 
violence or discord within their family environment, mental or physical 
conditions,49 or substance abuse problems. There is a caveat to this in that the 
Courts have in the past ordered the compulsory sterilisation of mentally disabled 
women, however this is justified on the basis of the best interests of the woman 
rather than the welfare of the child.50  
 
That said, as this thesis will come on to discuss in greater depth the merit of a 
system of parental licensing has been suggested in the past51 and while such a 
scheme would be extremely difficult to implement in practice it might not be 
impossible.  It certainly might be possible to dissuade people from, or encourage 
them not to, have children in circumstances which may give rise to the future 
child being exposed to a risk of harm.  However, any attempt to actually curtail 
the reproductive choice of fertile couples would likely be strongly resisted.  That 
is where lies one of the principal difficulties for those who seek to justify the 
requirement to take into account the welfare of the child in respect of ART– is it 
discriminatory to expect infertile couples to have to answer these questions 
                                                     
49 See for example, In re ZM and OS (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 523; In 
re X (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 1124. 
50  
51 See for example, H. La Follette, Licensing parents, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, (Winter 
1980), 182–197 and Licensing Parents Revisited, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 27, Issue 
4, 327 – 343, November 2010. 
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when any suggestion that fertile couples be required to do so would raise the 
prospect of strenuous objection?   
 
This thesis will examine why the statutory requirement of the treatment clinic’s 
licence that it carries out a child welfare assessment might be criticised on the 
basis that it infringes a fundamental right which is worthy of protection against 
State interference, namely, the right to procreative liberty.  The rationale, basis 
and scope of a right to procreative liberty will be examined in greater detail 
within the body of the thesis as it is important to ask whether the State in 
requiring that the parental environment be taken into account as part of a 
welfare of the child assessment when a couple attends an infertility clinic is 
failing to accord the infertile the same recognition of a right to procreative 
liberty that the fertile enjoy. 
 
 
1.3 The Importance of Procreative Liberty 
This thesis raises the question of the extent to which a person’s decision to seek 
to have a child through access to ART can be said to be worthy of protection by 
a moral or legal right which people can pray in aid if the State seeks to thwart 
that decision. In this thesis, the basis for State intervention is the legal 
regulation of access to ART through section 13(5) HFEA 1990, and the role of 
parental environment when assessing the requirement to consider the welfare of 
the child.  This thesis will claim that there is a generally a right to respect for 
decisions that individuals make about procreation which mandates non 
interference with these decisions.  It will use the term ‘a right to procreative 
liberty’ to express this concept.  This thesis proposes that the extent of a right 
to procreative liberty is a negative right to non-interference which leaves people 
at liberty to make their own decisions provided that the consequences of these 
decisions do not result in significant harm to others.  Given the focus of this 
thesis, on the regulation of access to ART, in this context a right to procreative 
liberty will be generally used to refer to that aspect of the right to procreative 
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liberty which people justifiably possess to have personal decisions to seek to 
have a child respected by non-interference in these decisions. 
 
While the next chapter will set out the arguments for such a right framed in this 
way and why the thesis uses this rather than other proposed definitions of a right 
to reproduce, some preliminary points are worth making here.  One leading 
academic in this field, John Robertson, has set out his understanding of what the 
right to procreative liberty entails in the following statement: 
 
The moral right to reproduce is respected because of the centrality 
of reproduction to personal identity, meaning and dignity.  This 
importance makes the liberty to procreate an important moral 
right, both for an ethic of individual autonomy and for the ethics of 
community or family that view the purpose of marriage and sexual 
union as the reproduction and rearing of offspring.  Because of this 
importance the right to reproduce is widely recognised as a prima 
facie moral right that cannot be limited except for very good 
reason.52 
 
The central idea in Robertson’s description of a right to reproductive liberty is 
that there is a need to respect an individual’s autonomous decision-making 
authority and the important human values which are attached to reproduction.  
A person’s right to make choices in relation to the very personal matter of 
reproduction is what must be protected.   
 
In the above quote Robertson also uses the term 'right to reproduce' and 
although this and the term ‘procreative liberty’ are generally interchangeable 
both in his work and that of others Robertson does distinguish between 
procreative liberty which ‘denotes freedom in choices related to procreation’ 
                                                     
52 J. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1994, 30 (henceforth, Robertson, Children of Choice).   
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and the mere playing of a ‘reproductive role’ by surrogates and donors who are 
not seeking to produce children that they will parent.  A right to reproduce is 
therefore arguably a broader term than a right to procreative liberty because it 
can incorporate other justifications in support of such a right beyond autonomy 
and freedom of choice considerations such as the decision to act as a donor or 
surrogate.  This thesis will use the term ‘Procreative Liberty’ as its focus is on 
regulation which potentially impacts upon a couple or individual's opportunity to 
have a child - to procreate. The thesis is not concerned with questions 
pertaining to the reproductive role of surrogates and donors who are simply 
passing on their genetic material to the next generation but are not involved in 
child rearing - the parenting environment. The term right to procreative liberty 
will be used throughout unless the context calls for a different terms to be used.   
 
In addressing the question of whether or not child welfare concerns are being 
inappropriately applied to justify State interference with access to ART services, 
Chapter Two will examine further what it means to say that a person has a right 
to procreative liberty.  If it can be said that a person does have a right to 
procreative liberty then what is the basis for such a right, what protection from 
State interference does it provide and what is its relevance to the question of 
allowing or prohibiting access to ART services?  Chapter Two will examine the 
claim that given the vital importance of pregnancy, child-birth and child-rearing 
to both individuals and societies’ value systems, a right to procreative liberty 
has to be treated with the utmost respect.  This is a particularly important 
question to address given the history of State interference in the procreative 
liberty of fertile individuals in the past based on the idea that certain individuals 
or social groups were not fit to bring children into the world.53  
 
Chapter Two will look at the eugenics programmes of a number of countries in 
the first half of the 20th century which aimed to improve society by the 
promotion of better genes through the sterilisation of individuals belonging to 
                                                     
53 S. Trombley, The Right to Reproduce: A History of Coercive Sterilization, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1988, 2. 
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certain social groups.54  However, it is useful to introduce the discussion at this 
point. The word ‘eugenic’ comes from Greek and literally means ‘well (eu) born 
(genos)’ and is the theory of improving the human race through the eradication 
of ‘poor’ genes and/or the promotion of ‘good’ genes.55  Eugenic programmes 
were implemented in a number of countries, in particular the USA and Germany 
between the 1900’s and 1940’s.56  The thinking behind eugenics is best 
illustrated in the judgment delivered by Justice Holmes' in the  1927 U.S 
Supreme Court case of Buck v Bell57 where he said: 
 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian 
tubes…Three generations of imbeciles are enough.58 
 
Eugenic programmes were public policy initiatives designed to improve the genes 
of entire populations and have been criticised as being concerned with the 
welfare of society at the expense of the individual.59  They were often used in 
the promotion of nationalistic, racial or discriminatory ideas, for example, many 
in the USA at the turn of the 19th Century were concerned with the dilution of 
the Anglo-Saxon gene pool as a consequence of large scale immigration from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, while Nazi Germany implemented eugenic 
                                                     
54 E. Jackson, Regulating Reproduction – Law, Technology and Autonomy, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2001, 43 (henceforth, Jackson, Regulating Reproduction). 
55 K. L. Garver and B. Garver, Eugenics: Past, Present, and the Future, American Journal of 
Human Genetics, 49, 1109-1118, 1991, 1109. 
56 Ibid., 1110 and 1112. 
57 274 US 200 (1927). 
58 274 US 200 (1927), 207. 
59 K. L. Garver and B. Garver, Eugenics: Past, Present, and the Future, American Journal of 
Human Genetics, 1991, 49, 1109-1118, 1109. 
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programs in the name of ‘racial purity’.60  Eugenics as a viable social policy was 
largely discredited as a result of the Nuremberg Trials which exposed the Nazi 
atrocities of the Second World War.61   
 
The conclusions of the Nuremberg Trials provided the incentive to draft the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR).62  Amongst 
proclamations advocating the right to life, education and work, the UNUDHR 
declared that; ‘men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family’.63  The 
later ECHR contained a similar provision that ‘men and women of marriageable 
age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right’.64  These international declarations also 
introduced the concept of a right to privacy and family life65 and a right to be 
free from discrimination,66 both of which have impacted upon the idea that 
procreation falls into the sphere of a fundamental human right.  
 
These international declarations were intended to provide protection to 
vulnerable individuals from interference by the State into their marital sexual 
relations and procreative liberty.  They were certainly not drafted with access to 
ART services in mind, having pre-dated the techniques by a couple of decades.  
However, the right to marry and to found a family, the right to respect for 
private and family life and the right to be free from discrimination, have  been 
                                                     
60 Ibid., 1112. 
61 Jackson, Regulating Reproduction, 43. 
62 E. Sutherland, Procreative Freedom and Convicted Criminals in the US and UK, Oregon Law 
Review, 2003, 82, 1033 - 1065, 1033. 
63 United Nations Universal Declaration Human Rights 1948, Article 16.1. A full copy of the 
UNUDHR is available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
64 European Convention on Human Rights 1950, Article 12. A full copy of the ECHR is available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
65 ECHR Article 8 and UNUDHR Article 12. 
66 ECHR Article 14 and UNUDHR Article 7. 
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used to argue for access to frozen embryos without the explicit consent of a 
deceased partner67 and access to artificial insemination services for an 
incarcerated prisoner.68  Human rights based arguments are therefore of 
importance when it comes to matters of procreation.69  Chapter Two will 
examine the impact of the eugenic programmes and the impact of the human 
rights declarations which came about as a result of the discrediting of such 
programmes on the idea that people have a right to procreative liberty.  The 
chapter will focus on the child welfare issues which were articulated as 
providing justification for eugenics and illustrate that the inappropriate 
application of apparent child welfare concerns is not an entirely new 
phenomenon.   Chapter Two will also develop the argument that the right to 
procreative liberty is a negative right allowing the individual to be free from 
interference by the State, not a positive right entitling an individual to the 
provision of services enabling them to procreate.  However, it will be argued 
that if ART services are being made available to some then the right to 
procreative liberty must be extended to all those seeking access to ART services 
unless there is sufficient justification for restrictions. 
 
The development of ART services has certainly given rise to the consideration of 
a right to procreative liberty in an interesting and novel context.  Despite the 
importance of a right to procreative liberty of fertile individuals being widely 
recognised in international human rights declarations and in decisions of the 
courts, the UK government felt it necessary to include a licence requirement 
that had the potential to deny patients access to certain kinds of fertility 
treatment.  Chapter Three will look at the development of that legislation and 
why it has persisted without serious challenge despite the difficulties it raises as 
to its impact upon the right to procreative liberty of the infertile.  The inclusion 
of section 13(5) into the HFE Act 1990 created considerable controversy at the 
                                                     
67 Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHHR 21. 
68 Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21. 
69 S. McLean, Modern Dilemmas Choosing Children, Capercaillie Books, Edinburgh, 2006, 17 
(henceforth, McLean, Choosing Children). 
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time and its continued existence in its present form requires to be questioned.70  
This thesis will contribute to the questioning of the continued inclusion of 
section 13(5) HFEA 1990 in its present form by highlighting the difficulties it 
poses if applied to prevent people having children on grounds that they may be 
unsupportive or harmful parents to a child yet-to-be-born. 
 
Before going any further it is necessary to point out as already alluded to above 
there are limitations on the arguments being made about the welfare of the 
child assessment under section 13(5).  The focus of this thesis is upon welfare 
considerations in respect of the child potentially to be born as opposed to the 
welfare of any existing children, although this forms part of the section 13(5) 
welfare assessment.  This is because the question to be addressed is about the 
justification surrounding the prevention of access to treatment which would 
potentially bring a child into existence.  Whilst there are interesting issues 
surrounding the welfare of the existing child particularly with regards to the 
ethical questions surrounding ‘saviour siblings’71, no one argues that the mere 
introduction of a sibling into a family is ordinarily a welfare concern, except for 
examples where the potential parents may already have been found to have 
previously harmed an existing child or may be incapable of coping with the 
demands of additional childcare.  So while this aspect of section 13(5) is 
interesting in its own right, when discussing child welfare this thesis will be 
concerned with children who may be born as a result of the treatment.  
Therefore this thesis is not a full examination of all aspects of section 13(5) and 
as a result will not be arguing for a repeal of the section in its entirety, but 
instead will be arguing for the removal of reference to and ‘the need for 
supportive parenting’ on relation to ‘the child to be born’ as part of a child 
welfare assessment. 
 
                                                     
70 J. Gunning and S. Holm (Eds.) Ethics, Law and Society: Volume III, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
Hampshire, 2007 - Chapter 9 - S. McLean, Assisted Reproduction and the Welfare of the Child. 
71 Children who are brought into existence using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in order that 
they can act as a donor for an unwell sibling. 
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Procreative liberty incorporates both the choice to have children through 
‘natural’ or assisted reproduction and the choice not to have children through 
the use of contraception and abortion.  This thesis will be concerned with the 
choice to have children and the State control of that on parental environment 
grounds, so will not focus on choices to avoid reproduction, such as access to 
abortion or contraception.  Therefore although Robertson uses the term ‘a right 
to procreative liberty’ when referring to both to the right to have and to not 
have children, this thesis uses the term only in the context of having children as 
that is what section 13(5) if applied prevents.   
 
In recent years a further extension of procreative liberty, to make certain 
decisions about the conception of children based on their genetic make-up, has 
become possible through the development of PGD.  The carrying out of a 
parental ability assessment as a part of the pre-conception child welfare 
assessment is a factor in PGD because PGD utilises in vitro fertilisation (IVF).  
However, this thesis will not be exploring the more specific issues which PGD 
gives rise to, such as the right of the genetically selected for child to an open 
future and the potential psychological impact of PGD on the future child.72  
These arguments will not be addressed because they are somewhat removed 
from the child welfare principle as they are most commonly applied in family 
law.  What is meant by that is questions surrounding the psychological impact 
upon a child of genetic pre-determination for example are not questions which 
arise when issues of residence, contact and protection of children from abuse 
and neglect are addressed by the family courts. 
 
 This thesis will instead confine itself to the question of whether access to ART 
can justifiably be denied on the ground that it is contrary to the welfare of the 
child that might be born as a result of considering parenting ability and 
suitability.  In focusing on this particular aspect of the child welfare issues as 
they relate to ART an argument for the full repeal of section 13(5) cannot be 
                                                     
72 See for example, S. Wilkinson, “‘Designer Babies”, Instrumentalisation and the Child's Right to 
an Open Future’ in N. Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics (Palgrave-
Macmillan 2005) at 44-6 and J.R Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 16 (1998): 17-28. 
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made since this thesis does not seek to consider other aspects of child welfare 
assessment that may be made under this section.   
 
 
1.4 The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
The current HFEA Code of Practice provides a detailed definition of the term 
‘supportive parenting’.  It states: 
 
Supportive parenting is a commitment to the health, well being and 
development of the child.  It is presumed that all prospective 
parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any 
reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be born, or 
any other child, may be at risk of significant harm or neglect.73 
 
Section 13(5) has its roots in one of the conclusions drawn by the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology,74 widely referred to as The 
Warnock Committee after the report’s principal author, when they assessed 
what the criteria for eligibility for treatment should be.  The Warnock 
Committee stated that; ‘we believe that as a general rule it is better for 
children to be born into a two-parent family, with both father and mother.’75  
This conclusion was given statutory recognition by the original wording of section 
13(5) which required treatment providers to take account of the welfare of the 
child including the need of that child for a father, although it did not form part 
of the original bill.  
 
                                                     
73 HFEA Code of Practice, 8th Edition, para. 8.11. 
74 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Embryology and Fertilisation (Warnock 
Report), London: Stationary Office, 1984, Cmnd 9314. (henceforth, The Warnock Report). 
75 The Warnock Report, para. 2.11. 
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It has been said in regards to section 13(5) that ‘since it is presumably unlikely 
that parliamentary intent was that such a consideration should have no bearing 
on the decision whether to provide treatment, it seems obvious that the 
intention was that certain welfare considerations would lead to the refusal of 
such treatment’.76  Section 13(5) stands therefore as a potential restriction on 
access to ART and therefore, this thesis will argue, amounts to interference in 
the right to procreative liberty.  In proposing that section 13(5) should be 
amended this thesis will argue that the interference in the right to reproductive 
liberty on unsupportive parenting grounds is arbitrary and unjustified.  In order 
to make that argument properly it will be necessary to examine in detail what 
the regulation says, how it operates in practice and the reasons behind its 
creation. 
 
Chapter Three will examine the HFEA regulatory framework which underpins the 
provision of ART services in the UK and question whether it meets the criteria 
for good regulation.  If people have a negative right to procreative liberty, to 
effectively be left alone to make their own autonomous decisions about whether 
they have children or not, yet the State feels it must still regulate in this area, 
then it is important to examine the quality of that regulation.  It is not enough 
for the State simply to say that it is justified in regulating access to ART services 
given its mandate to ensure that children are protected from harm or neglect.  
The State must be able to show that the regulation which has been put in place 
is proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted.77  This is 
necessary so that those who are affected by the regulation are fully aware of the 
impact it may have upon them and are in a position to challenge its 
implementation if they feel aggrieved.  The thesis will argue that section 13(5) is 
not achieving what it sets out to do and is not being applied fairly.  It will argue 
that it is in essence regulation which is not fit for purpose. 
 
                                                     
76  C. Gavaghan, Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
Generation, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007, 97. 
77 Better Regulation Commission Terms of Reference, See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Better_Regulation_Commission (accessed on 23rd June 2011). 
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The original wording of section 13(5) was later amended by Parliament in 
recognition of the fact that the previous eighteen years had ‘witnessed 
significant social change’.78  The amendment was proposed in recognition of civil 
partnerships79 and laws to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
preference.80  However, the child welfare provision itself survived the 
amendments to the HFE Act 1990 with the introduction of a supportive parenting 
requirement.  The parenting environment the child was to be born into was 
considered to be of continued relevance above and beyond the arguably 
narrower issue of a child’s need for a father.  Chapter Three will examine the 
thinking behind the original inclusion of section 13(5) within the HFE Act 1990 
which was prevalent within Parliament at the time and also the thinking behind 
its amendment to its current form.  The comment which came from politicians 
during these debates illustrates the principal concerns of the times and allows 
the decisions to include and continue with section 13(5) to be put in context. 
 
 
1.5 The Child Welfare Principle and Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Section 13(5) places a requirement upon licensed clinics to assess the fitness of 
the potential parents.  There is of course no child at the pre-conception stage.  
There is no child to be examined by medical practitioners for signs of injury or 
neglect, no parental-child bonding processes for social workers to monitor and 
no opinion of the child to take into account.  On a practical level, then, the 
child welfare assessment at the pre-conception stage is a very different process 
from the child welfare assessment post-birth.  All that a licensed infertility clinic 
can do at the pre-conception stage is look to the parents and ask if it thinks they 
will make sufficiently satisfactory parents.   
 
                                                     
78 Alan Johnson then Secretary of State for Health at Hansard HC vol 475 col 1069 (12 May 2008). 
79 The Civil Partnerships Act 2004 gave same-sex couples rights and responsibilities which are 
comparable to civil marriage. 
80 Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 made under Part 3 of the Equality Act 2006. 
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While regulation governing access to ART services contains a reference to child 
welfare, it is not clear on the face of it whether this amounts to the application 
of the child welfare principle as applied in family law cases in a legal sense.  
There are important differences in the wording of the respective laws, the most 
relevant being the absence in the HFE Act 199081 of a requirement to make this 
factor the ‘paramount consideration’ compared with the relevant statutory 
provisions in the Children Acts.82  This thesis will examine the nature of the child 
welfare principle as it applies to the regulation of ART and whether or not the 
omission of the words ‘paramount consideration’ makes the child assessment 
process at the pre-conception stage a significantly different process from that 
carried out in family law decisions.   
 
However, the parenting ability and suitability assessment at the pre-conception 
stage does mirror the application of the child welfare principle in the context of 
family law in certain other important ways.  When the court is taking decisions 
as to, for example who a child should live with or whether an adoption order 
should be granted, the question the courts invariably ask is – what is the optimal 
parenting environment for this child?83 It is widely accepted that the ability of 
the parent to care for the child is pertinent to the question of what is conducive 
to the welfare of the child.  This thesis will compare and contrast the way in 
which the child welfare principle is applied in these different situations in an 
effort to examine just how far child welfare concerns should impact upon the 
provision of ART and how much of an overlap there actually is between the two 
legal requirements. 
 
The fact that there is no child to be assessed at the pre-conception stage also 
raises an important philosophical question as to the nature of harm which might 
or might not arise by a decision not to bring a child into existence at all.  This is 
another fundamental difference between any child welfare assessment process 
                                                     
81 See fn 62. 
82 See fns. 27 and 28. 
83  
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at the pre-conception stage and post-birth stage.  The decision taken at the 
post-birth stage can only be to remove the child from the harmful environment; 
the decision taken at the pre-conception stage is to prevent a child being 
brought into existence in the first place.  The question which arises is therefore 
how a decision not to bring a child into existence can possibly be said to impact 
upon the welfare of that child.  There is no child in existence and therefore no 
child to be harmed.  As this is the case then ‘taking into account the welfare of 
the child to be born’ may appear to be devoid of any real meaning.  Chapter 
Five will examine this ‘non-identity problem’84 in greater detail.  
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
ART is a continually developing field of research where new advances in 
technology regularly throw up complex legal and ethical problems.  It has been 
said that ‘The interests or welfare of the child are rightly central to any 
discussion of the ethics of reproduction’.85  What this thesis sets out to do is to 
add to the understanding of just how central the interests or welfare of the child 
ought to be when placed beside the interests of people who have a right to 
procreative liberty and to examine whether or not the concept of the child 
welfare principle as it is applied in a family law context to assessment of the 
parenting environment is really a suitable concept to apply in the context of 
access to ART regulated by the HFE Acts.  
 
This thesis raises questions as to the suitability and fairness of section 13(5) of 
the HFA Act 1990 and the restriction of access ART to certain people who, but 
for this licensing requirement, would be provided with treatment.  It will argue 
that section 13(5) should be amended for a number of reasons which will be 
examined as the issues are developed.  In looking at these issues the thesis will 
                                                     
84 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984.  The Non-Identity 
Problem is that if someone lives a life that is worth living, then existence can never be worse 
than non-existence. 
85 J. Harris, The Welfare of the Child, Health Care Analysis 8: 27–34, 2000, 27. 
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seek to raise some further questions as to how all this may impact upon the right 
to reproductive liberty of infertile, and indeed fertile, individuals.   
 
As noted, a crucial concept to establish for this thesis is to define what is 
actually meant by the term ‘a right to procreative liberty’.  It is important to 
tackle this issue first because there is little value in arguing that a right is being 
unjustifiably interfered with by the State without a full understanding of what 
that right actually is.  The next chapter will examine all the possible sources for 
a right to procreative liberty and explain why this thesis prefers the exposition 
of such a right in these particular terms.  It will also examine in greater detail 
the history of State interference in a right to procreative liberty in an effort to 
highlight the dangers which can result when the State fails to properly respect 
this right.  It is important to highlight this history as it brings into focus the 
importance of respecting a right to procreative liberty in the ART context.  
Finally the chapter will examine the important role human rights law plays in an 
understanding the scope of a right to procreative liberty.  Once it is understood 
what this thesis argues for in regards to the scope of a right to procreative 
liberty it will be possible to set out the argument that section 13(5) as it stands 
represents an unjustified interference in the right. 
 
29 
 
CHAPTER TWO – THE RIGHT TO PROCREATIVE LIBERTY 
2.1 Introduction 
In examining the question of whether or not child welfare concerns arising from 
parental ability are being inappropriately applied to justify State interference in 
procreative liberty, it is necessary first to consider whether procreative liberty is 
of such significance as to warrant particular protection from State interference.  
In other words, is there a right to procreative liberty that mandates non-
intervention by the State as the default position?  It is important, of course, to 
address the question of what is meant by the term ‘a right to procreative 
liberty’.  Alghrani and Harris are of the view that: 
 
When people express their choices about procreation and about 
founding a family they are claiming a controversial but sustainable 
‘fundamental right’. This right or entitlement is often discussed in 
terms of ‘reproductive liberty’ or ‘procreative autonomy’. The right 
or entitlement to reproductive liberty has a number of different 
sources and justifications.  Some see it as derived from the right to 
reproduce per se, others as derivative of other important rights or 
freedoms.  Certainly there is no widespread agreement as to the 
nature and scope of this right; however, it is clear that it must 
apply to more than conventional sexual reproduction and that it 
includes a range of the values and liberties which normal sexual 
reproduction embodies or subserves.1 
 
This chapter will examine in more detail the different sources and justifications 
for a so-called right to procreative liberty.  In addressing this question an 
attempt will be made to clarify the various aspects of the right, and what is 
meant by the term in the context of the thesis.  The chapter will then go on to 
                                                             
1 A. Alghrani and J. Harris, Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be regulated?, 
18, 2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 191 – 210, 191.  
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examine situations where the State has seen fit to interfere in the exercise of 
procreative liberty both in an historical context and in the context of assisted 
reproduction.  The justifications given for these State interventions tell us a 
great deal about both the genesis and status of the so-called right to procreative 
liberty.  This chapter will pay particular attention to how child welfare concerns 
have influenced, and continue to influence, decisions on the part of the State to 
intervene in the procreative liberty of its citizens to seek infertility treatment.  
The chapter will then conclude with an examination of the impact international 
declarations of human rights, in particular the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), has had on the concept of a right to procreative liberty.  
 
The chapter will begin with examining how the development of ART has 
redefined what is understood to be involved in ‘reproduction’ and ‘parentage’.  
The questions of who has actually reproduced and who is to be treated as the 
parent(s) of the child are relevant to the question of what it is about procreation 
that is actually being protected by the claim to a right to procreative liberty.  
The development of ART has significantly widened the definition of what might 
traditionally be thought to be understood by procreation, namely the pregnancy 
of a woman brought about by sexual intercourse between a heterosexual couple.  
It has also altered thinking about the child-parent relationship beyond the 
traditional ‘biological’ mother and father model as the potential roles of the  
genetic, gestational (mothers), social and legal parent in a child’s life have been 
opened up for greater discussion and analysis.  These changes are significant 
because of their relevance to the question of whose right to procreative liberty 
the State might be interfering with in requiring that a parental suitability 
assessment be carried out, why the State believes that it is justified in doing so 
in certain situations and what aspects of parenthood are important to the 
definition and scope of a right to procreative liberty.   
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2.2 Procreation and Parentage 
Clearly the vast majority of children are still conceived the ‘natural’ way by 
their parents engaging in sexual intercourse.  However, for some, either for 
reasons of biology or sexual preference, this ‘natural’ source of human 
procreation is not available.  Since the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, as at July 
2012, there have been an estimated five million births worldwide as a result of 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) 
treatments.2  Although still a very small percentage of all births worldwide these 
figures are not insignificant, particularly given the fact that the development of 
ART has opened up a wide range of procreative choices to potential parents who 
otherwise would have been unable to have children.3  At the same time it has 
introduced certain ambiguities into the concept of procreation4 and therefore 
legal parentage also. 
 
A person does not become a legal parent of course until the birth or adoption of 
their child.  The legal rights and responsibilities accorded to parents are not in 
situ at the pre-conception stage when a couple are seeking access to ART.  
However, in requiring that clinics ask questions of patients such as are there any 
aspects of their life which may pose a risk of serious harm to any child they 
might have, or is there anything which might impair their ability to care for such 
a child, the application of section 13(5) amounts, in part at least, to an 
assessment in advance, of the patient’s abilities to fulfil their legal rights and 
responsibilities towards the future child.  Leaving aside until later the question 
of whether or not this is appropriate, this section will set out who the legislation 
accords parental status to on the birth of a child utilising ART as these rules are 
relevant to the reasons why section 13(5) was introduced in the first place.  
                                                             
2 European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, The world's number of IVF and ICSI 
babies has now reached a calculated total of 5 million, Press Release 1st July 2012, see 
http://www.eshre.eu/Press-Room/Press-releases/Press-releases-ESHRE-2012/5-million-
babies.aspx (accessed on 5 April 2013). 
3 McLean, Choosing Children, 9 - The author describes this development as ‘a revolution in 
reproductive choice’. 
4 Robertson, Children of Choice, 22. 
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Further, the changes that were introduced in the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 (HFE Act 2008) which will be set out highlight the ways in 
which societies attitudes to family and parenthood have changed and how that 
has weakened further the arguments for the retention of section 13(5).   
 
Procreation can be understood in a genetic sense where half our genes come 
from our biological father and half from our biological mother.  Procreation can 
also be understood in a gestational sense in that it involves the woman 
undergoing a pregnancy and giving birth.5  In ‘natural’ procreation the biological 
mother always procreates in the genetic and gestational senses.  However, the 
development of IVF has allowed for the separation of the female genetic and 
gestational aspects of procreation and this is where certain ambiguities have 
arisen.6  For example, some pregnancies may be established following the 
donation of eggs from one woman being used to establish a pregnancy in a 
second woman.  In that situation both women can be said to have been involved 
in the procreative process, one in the genetic sense by passing on her genes to 
the next generation, the other in the gestational sense by virtue of her 
pregnancy and giving birth. 
 
The ambiguities which ART brought about are well-illustrated by the fact that in 
drafting the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act 1990) it was 
thought necessary to set out the meaning of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ in the 
legislation.7  The legal parenthood position of the female was fairly 
straightforward in that the woman, who was carrying or had carried a child as a 
result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other 
woman, was to be treated as the mother of the child.8  It was the gestational 
                                                             
5 Robertson recognises that a surrogate mother may not reproduce genetically but describes 
gestation as ‘a central experience for women [which] should enjoy the special respect or 
protected status accorded reproductive activities’. Robertson, Children of Choice, 21. 
6 Robertson, Children of Choice, 22. 
7 HFE Act 1990 sec. 27 and sec. 28. 
8 HFE Act 1990 sec. 27(1). 
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process as opposed to any genetic relationship that determined who was the 
mother of the child, although this could be altered subsequently, by adoption 
transferring legal motherhood from a surrogate who gave the child at birth to 
another woman.9  The legal definition of the child’s mother has not been 
significantly altered since the passing of the HFE Act 1990.10  However, as will 
come on to be discussed, the HFE Act 2008 introduced provisions which 
expanded the possibilities of who might become the child’s legal mother. 
 
In relation to the male the situation was understandably more complex.  The 
simplest case was where a child was carried by a married woman as the result of 
the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs or her artificial 
insemination, using her husband’s sperm.  In such cases the husband was 
obviously treated as the father of the child.  This was an uncontroversial 
situation and the law in that regard remains unchanged.  The more complex 
situation involved the question of who was to be treated as the father of the 
child when a sperm donor had been used.  If at the time of the placing in a 
woman of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination, 
the woman was a party to a marriage, but the creation of the embryo carried by 
her was not brought about with the sperm of her husband, the husband was to 
be treated as the father of the child unless it was shown that he did not consent 
to the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or her artificial 
insemination.11  No other person was to be treated as the father of the child12 
and the donor was still protected from legal fatherhood in the case of 
withdrawal of consent by the husband.13   However, section 28(2) of the HFE Act 
1990 could be voided if the husband could show that he did not, in fact, consent 
to the procedure, although the common law principle of pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant14 was retained.15  This meant that the husband who did not consent 
                                                             
9 HFE Act 1990 sec. 27(2). 
10 It is repeated verbatim in HFE Act 2008 sec. 33. 
11 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(1).  
12 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(4).  
13 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(6)(a). 
14 Translates as ‘The nuptials show who is the father’. 
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to donor insemination still had to rebut the common law presumption by the use 
of a paternity test.16  Again these provisions have not been altered since the 
legislation was enacted, although as will be discussed later, the HFE Act 2008 
introduced provisions which expanded the possibilities of who might become the 
child’s legal father.17   
 
In regard to the situation when the couple were not married the position as set 
out in the originally enacted HFE Act 1990 was that when the embryo or the 
sperm and eggs were placed in the woman or she was artificially inseminated, in 
the course of treatment services provided for her and a man together and the 
creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of 
that man, then that man was to be treated as the father of the child.18  
 
There has been one case in the UK which illustrated the difficulties which can 
arise from these new forms of non-coital procreation when it comes to 
establishing who, if anyone, is to be treated at the legal father of the child.  In 
the case of In re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child)19 a mother appealed 
against an order declaring that her former partner was the legal father of her 
child born following IVF treatment using donor sperm.  During the relationship 
they had sought treatment for assisted conception.  By the time the woman was 
implanted with the embryos, the relationship had ended.  The woman had not 
informed the treatment clinic of this fact.  The man applied for a declaration of 
paternity, arguing that the successful implantation of the embryo had taken 
place in the context of the same course of treatment and he was therefore to be 
treated as the legal father.  The case eventually made its way to the House of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(5). 
16 J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, Ninth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 83.  
17 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(1) is reflected in HFE Act 2008 sec. 35. 
18 HFE Act 1990 sec. 28(3). 
19 [2003] EWCA Civ 182. 
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Lords20 who held that for section 28(3) to apply the embryo had to be placed in 
the mother at a time when treatment services were being provided for the 
woman and the man together; that it was important that the legal relationship 
of parenthood should not be based on a fiction, especially if deception was 
involved, and section 28(3) should only apply to cases falling clearly within the 
statutory language; and that, although treatment services had originally been 
provided for the woman and the man together, they had not been so provided at 
the relevant time, namely when the implantation had taken place that had 
resulted in the birth of the child. Therefore declaration of the man’s paternity 
was revoked. The House of Lords also commented per curiam that more reliable 
safeguards were needed in a matter directly affecting a child's parentage.  If an 
unmarried man was to become the legal father of a child of which he is not the 
biological father that must be brought home to him as clearly as possible.21  The 
difficulty for the clinic in this case was that the woman had not informed them 
that her relationship with the man had ended.  If she had been open and honest 
with the clinic they would not have treated her without obtaining up to date 
consent from the man. 
 
This case illustrates the difficulties which can occur with respect to legal 
parentage when embryos are created at one point in time but implanted at a 
different point in time when the couple who had sought treatment together are 
no longer together.  All this is very different from ‘natural’ reproduction where 
the creation of the embryo and the resulting pregnancy occur as one process.  
The focus of the legislation has been on the intention of the ‘father’ to take 
legal responsibility for a child by providing his consent to the treatment being 
provided to his wife or partner through which the status of legal fatherhood 
arises.  There has been a move away from the traditional view that the genetic 
father is the legal father in order to encourage sperm donors to come forward 
without them being subsequently faced with a claim that they have legal 
responsibilities towards a child who might come into existence as a result of 
their donation.  However, as In re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child) illustrates 
                                                             
20 In re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child) [2005] 2 AC 621. 
21 Ibid., para. 26. 
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this can lead to a situation where the child is subsequently left without a legal 
father.  As will come on to be discussed this possibility taxed the minds of 
politicians considering whether the welfare of child born as a result of treatment 
should be a factor in accepting people for treatment. 
 
The HFE Act 2008 introduced a whole raft of new provisions designed to tighten 
up the law with regards to consent to treatment and to bring parity between 
people in civil partnerships and married couples.  The legislation introduced the 
concept of agreed fatherhood conditions.22  What these provisions say is that if 
no man is treated as the father of the child by virtue of being the consenting 
husband, but the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in the woman or 
the woman was artificially inseminated, in the course of treatment services 
provided in the United Kingdom by a person to whom a licence applies, at the 
time when the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in the woman or the 
woman was artificially inseminated, the agreed fatherhood conditions are 
satisfied in relation to a man, the man remained alive at that time, and the 
creation of the embryo carried by the woman was not brought about with the 
man’s sperm, then that man is to be treated as the father of the child.23  
 
The agreed fatherhood conditions are met in relation to treatment provided to a 
woman under a licence if, but only if, the man has given the person responsible 
a notice stating that he consents to being treated as the father of any child 
resulting from treatment provided to the woman under the licence; the woman 
has given the person responsible a notice stating that she consents to the man 
being so treated; neither the man nor the woman has given the person 
responsible notice of the withdrawal of the man’s or woman’s consent to the 
man being so treated; the woman has not, since the giving of the notice given 
the person responsible a further notice stating that she consents to another man 
being treated as the father of any resulting child, or a notice stating that she 
consents to a woman being treated as a parent of any resulting child, and the 
                                                             
22 HFE Act 2008 sec. 37.  
23 HFE Act 2008 sec. 36. 
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woman and man are not within prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to 
each other.24  All this must be in writing and is a clear effort to avoid the 
situation which occurred in Re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child).25  
 
The HFE Act 2008 also now allows for a woman in a civil partnership at the time 
of treatment to be treated as the parent of her partner’s child unless it is shown 
that she did not consent to the placing in her partner of the embryo or the 
sperm and eggs or to her partner’s artificial insemination.26  The HFE Act 2008 
also introduced agreed motherhood provisions along the same lines as the agreed 
fatherhood conditions to allow for a woman not in a civil partnership at the time 
of treatment.27 
 
The HFE Act 2008 further introduced a provision where, on an application made 
by two people, the court may make an order providing for a child to be treated 
in law as the child of the applicants if the child has been carried by a woman 
who is not one of the applicants, as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or 
sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination; the gametes of at least one of the 
applicants were used to bring about the creation of the embryo, and the 
applicants are husband and wife, civil partners of each other, or two persons 
who are living as partners in an enduring family relationship and are not within 
prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each other.28  This provision 
allows for homosexual male couples ‘living as partners in an enduring family 
relationship’ to become the legal parents of a child carried by a surrogate. 
 
What these provisions do is set out who can become the legal parent of a child 
with the full range of parental rights and responsibilities in relation to the child 
and in what circumstances.  The intention of Parliament in extending legal 
                                                             
24 HFE Act 2008 sec. 37.  
25 [2005] 2 AC 621. 
26 HFE Act 2008 sec. 42.  
27 HFE Act 2008 sec. 44. 
28 HFE Act 2008 sec. 54.  
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parentage to people in civil partnerships and unmarried same-sex couples was to 
ensure equality.  What they have also done is strengthen the importance of 
social parenting – the intention and wish to parent a child – when traditionally it 
was the genetic link between parent and child that was viewed as the 
determinative factor.  It is the fact of a person’s intention to parent with the 
agreement of the woman being treated to that intention, rather than any 
genetic relationship with the child, which in these new family units is now 
considered determinative of parental status. 
 
As will come on to be discussed in Chapter Four, being accorded the legal status 
of a parent gives rise to certain rights and responsibilities in regards to the child 
and the preceding discussion is of relevance to the question of child welfare 
concerns because it is fundamental in family law that it is the legal parents who 
are ultimately responsible for the child’s welfare by warrant of their legal 
status.  However, the relevance of the preceding discussion to this chapter is 
that it highlights the different individuals29 who might be said to have a right to 
procreative liberty in the context of ART because they may be accorded parental 
status in relation to a child conceived through ART.  Whether these individuals 
are one part of a heterosexual couple, one part of a homosexual couple, or 
single they all enjoy a right to procreative liberty and in seeking access to ART it 
will be argued should be afforded respect for their procreative choices.   
 
One final comment to make is that whilst the question of whether gamete 
donors and surrogates might be said to have a right to reproductive liberty30 in 
the context of ART is an interesting question, it is not one which is pertinent to 
this thesis because surrogates and donors are not people who will be raising the 
                                                             
29 Robertson has pointed out that although a right to procreative liberty is often expressed or 
realised in the context of a couple (for obvious reasons), it is first and foremost an individual 
interest -  Robertson, Children of Choice, 22.  This thesis will seek to express a right to 
procreative liberty by reference to the individual and not the couple although it is not necessary 
to stick slavishly to this distinction. 
30 As discussed in Chapter One a right to reproductive liberty is the more appropriate term to be 
used when referring to donors and surrogates as they are involved in the reproductive process 
but are not intending to play a parental role.   
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children and creating the parenting environment for them.  It is the persons who 
would be accorded legal parental status whose parenting ability is being 
assessed by the clinic as part of the child welfare assessment process.  The 
persons who this thesis views as being relevant to the discussion of a right to 
procreative liberty thus identified, this chapter will now move on to look in 
more detail at the concept of procreative liberty itself. 
 
 
2.3 The Right to Procreative Liberty 
John Robertson in his book ‘Children of Choice’ sets out a liberal defence of 
procreative liberty.  He defines procreative liberty as an individual’s freedom of 
choice to have children or not.  He is of the view that a right to procreative 
liberty must be given presumptive priority when there is a conflict between 
respect for it and respect for other rights, although he does not take the view 
that a right to procreative liberty cannot be defeated in any circumstances.  
Robertson gives the example of where ‘the danger to offspring or others from a 
particular activity may be patently obvious’31 as a situation which might give rise 
to the defeat of a claim to a right to procreative liberty.  He accepts that: 
 
Recognition of the primacy of procreation does not mean that all 
reproduction is morally blameless, much less that reproduction is 
always responsible and praiseworthy and can never be limited.32 
 
However, Robertson proposes that: 
 
...procreative liberty be given presumptive priority in all conflicts, 
with the burden on opponents of any particular technique to show 
that harmful effects from its use justify limiting procreative choice. 
With this presumption as a standard, there is a consistent way for 
                                                             
31 Robertson, Children of Choice, 17. 
32 Robertson, Children of Choice, 30. 
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resolving the conflicts and controversies that arise with new 
reproductive technologies.33 
 
Robertson does not argue for an absolute right to make procreative choices but a 
presumptive negative right to be left free from State interference to do so.  He 
also argues that the burden is upon the State of showing that it is justified in 
interfering with procreative decision-making if it seeks to do so.  Robertson’s 
book has been described as ‘providing the infertility industry with its first 
coherent philosophy’.34  It thus represents a good starting point for a definition 
of procreative liberty.   
 
Robertson makes the point that a married couple’s decision to have children by 
engaging in sexual intercourse is regarded as a fundamental right: the right to 
marry and found a family as set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR).35  Any interference with that right by the State could only be in 
extreme cases where significant harm to others would arise if the right was to be 
exercised.36  He then poses the question, what of married couples who cannot 
procreate without the assistance of ART?  Robertson considers that their desire 
to form a family is no less strong than the fertile couple’s desire and the simple 
fact that the couple may require assistance does not mean that they would be 
inadequate parents.  In Robertson’s view the burden on the State of showing 
that interference in the interests of the infertile couple is justified can be no 
less than that required in the situation of the fertile, namely evidence of serious 
                                                             
33 Robertson, Children of Choice, 16. 
34 Robertson, Children of Choice, - Book Jacket quote accredited to George Annas. 
35 This would also apply to Article 12 of the ECHR.  Robertson discussed the UNDHR as he is 
writing from an American and not a European perspective. 
36 J. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof in Regulating Noncoital 
Reproduction, Law, Medicine and Health Care, 16, 18 - 26, 1988, 18. 
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harm to others.37  Robertson’s views are described by Steinbock as a strong 
procreative liberty view.38      
 
Robertson’s views are supported by Alghrani and Harris39 who believe the key to 
the idea of procreative liberty to be ‘respect for autonomy and for the values 
which underlie the importance attached to procreation and the acquisition of 
children broadly conceived’.40  They draw a comparison between freedom of 
religion and freedom to make procreative choices as both involve freedom to 
chose one’s own way of life and to live according to one’s own beliefs.41  They 
also support Robertson’s view, that like other liberties, there should be a 
presumptive primacy in favour of respect for procreative liberty.   
 
A quote from Feinberg illustrates the basis for the presumption in favour of 
liberty:  
 
Whenever a legislator is faced with a choice between imposing a 
legal duty on citizens or leaving them at liberty, other things being 
equal, he should leave individuals free to make their own choices.  
Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special 
justification.  It is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that 
causes serious private harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm, 
or harm to important public institutions and practices.  In short, 
state interference with a citizen's behaviour tends to be morally 
justified when it is reasonably necessary (that is, when there are 
reasonable grounds for taking it to be necessary as well as 
                                                             
37 Ibid. 
38 B. Steinbock, A Philosopher Looks at Assisted Reproduction, Journal of Assisted Reproduction 
and Ethics, 1995, Vol. 12, No. 8, 543-552, 548. 
39 A. Alghrani and J. Harris, Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be 
regulated?, 18, 2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 191 – 210. 
40 Ibid., 193. 
41 Ibid., 193. 
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effective) to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk of harm to 
parties other than the person interfered with.42 
 
The question of to what extent people had a right to liberty was addressed by 
the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill in his work On Liberty.43  
Mill recognised that infringements of liberty came not only from tyrannical 
despots but also from what he called:  
 
The tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling...the tendency of 
society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own 
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them.44   
 
According to Mill respect had to be given to a right to liberty in order to avoid 
individual freedoms being trampled upon by the ‘tyranny of the majority’.45  Mill 
recognised that there had to be a limit placed upon the ‘interference of 
collective opinion with individual independence’.46  The question for Mill was 
where to place that limit.  In his view: 
 
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others...the only part of the conduct of any one, for which 
he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the 
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute.47 
 
                                                             
42 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, 9. 
43 J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, 8.  (henceforth, 
Mill, On Liberty). 
44 Mill, On Liberty, 8. 
45 Mill, On Liberty, 14. 
46 Mill, On Liberty, 11. 
47 Mill, On Liberty, 14. 
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Mill believed that a person’s ‘own mode of laying out his existence is the best, 
not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.’48  In other 
words, people are free to make choices about their own lives even when others 
might view these choices as unwise or undesirable.   
 
In a paper setting out a defence of a deaf lesbian couple’s choice to have a 
genetically deaf child using PGD, Julian Savulescu expresses the opinion that 
Mill’s philosophy justifies the extension of liberty to reproductive choice.49  Mill 
asserts that in situations where our actions affect only ourselves we should be 
free to act provided that these actions do not cause harm to others.  Savulescu 
is of the view that this philosophy can apply to reproductive choice.50  As 
Savulescu points out, while Mill did not believe that freedom was solely valuable 
for its own sake, he believed that freedom was important for people to discover 
for themselves what kind of life is best for them.  In Mill’s view it was only 
through ‘experiments in living’51 that people discover what works for them.  In 
applying Mill’s philosophy to reproductive choice concerning selection of 
embryos for particular characteristics Savulescu states that: 
 
Reproduction should be about having children who have the best 
prospects.  But to discover what are the best prospects, we must 
give individual couples the freedom to act on their own value 
judgment of what constitutes a life of prospect.  ‘Experiments in 
reproduction’ are as important as ‘experiments in living’ as long as 
they don't harm the children who are produced.  For this reason, 
reproductive freedom is important.  It is easy to grant people the 
freedom to do what is agreeable to us; freedom is important only 
                                                             
48 Mill, On Liberty, 15. 
49J. Savulescu, Deaf lesbians, “designer babies,” and the future of medicine, British Medical 
Journal, 2002, October 5; 325(7367): 771–773.  The term 'reproductive choice' is more 
appropriate to the argument Savulescu makes because he is discussing more than a simply 
straight forward procreative choice to seek assistance to have a child to raise, he is discussing a 
broader choice to chose the genetic make-up of the child to be born. 
50 Ibid., 773. 
51 Mill, On Liberty, 14. 
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when it is the freedom for people to do what is disagreeable to 
others.52 
 
These comments can be applied more broadly to other decisions about 
reproduction, such as the use of ART, and at a much broader level still it has 
been said that Mill’s philosophy underpins the concept of liberal democracy 
which has been prevalent in the West for over a century.53  Liberal democracy is 
a political system marked by fair and free elections, the rule of law and the 
protection of basic liberties.54  It is founded upon the argument that human 
beings have certain inalienable rights and that governments must accept 
limitations on their own powers in order to secure these inalienable rights.55  For 
these reasons, Mill’s philosophy is a sound basis on which to argue for respect to 
be given to a right to procreative liberty in Western liberal democracies.  This 
thesis will argue that a right to procreative liberty should be recognised in 
Western liberal democracies given the presumption in favour of liberty on which 
these democracies depend.  It is in broad agreement with the claim of Dworkin 
that: 
 
The right to procreative autonomy has an important place...in 
Western political culture...The most important feature of that 
culture is a belief in individual human dignity: that people have a 
moral right - and a moral responsibility – to confront the most 
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own 
lives for themselves, answering to their own consciences and 
                                                             
52 J. Savulescu, Deaf lesbians, “designer babies,” and the future of medicine, British Medical 
Journal, 2002, October 5; 325(7367): 771–773, 773. 
53 F. Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs, 1997, 22(6), 22-43, 22.  
54 Ibid., 22. 
55 Ibid., 26. 
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convictions...The principle of procreative autonomy, in a broad 
sense, is embedded in any genuine democratic culture. 56 
 
However, there is some difficulty in defining what is incorporated in a right to 
procreative liberty which is made clear in the following passage from Shanner: 
 
The area of procreative rights is itself in need of greater conceptual 
clarity, as it has been asserted to include a right to make 
procreative decisions without governmental restriction or force; a 
right to procreate without discrimination by doctors or others; an 
equal right of infertile people to procreate when fertile people can 
do so; a right to be assisted in procreating; a right to engage in 
reproductive contracts or multiple-party interventions; and a right 
to have procreative assistance funded.57 
 
Shanner uses the term ‘a right to procreate’ in the title of her work and does 
provide a definition of what she believes is encompassed within this phrase: 
 
I will reserve the phrase ‘procreative rights’ to refer more 
specifically to initiating a pregnancy and bringing children into the 
world.  Procreative rights are thus literally rights to have children 
at all, as distinguished from reproductive rights that concern the 
timing and manner in which one reproduces.58  
 
This thesis does not follow Shanner's distinction completely as this thesis uses 
the term ‘procreative liberty’ because its’ focus is upon patients seeking access 
to ART services for the purpose of initiating a pregnancy and bringing their own 
children into the world to raise and nurture as parents, it is less concerned 
                                                             
56 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, 
Vintage, New York, 1994, 166-167. 
57 L. Shanner, The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong, McGill Law Journal, 
1995, 40, 823 – 874, 826.  
58 Ibid. 
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about wider issues such as the availability of contraception, the right to chose to 
acts as a surrogate or donor, the right to access an abortion or the right to 
choose the genetic make-up of the child.  So whilst Shanner sees procreative 
rights as rights to have children at all, this thesis takes the view that procreative 
rights are about the rights to have children and to subsequently parent these 
children.  However, both this thesis and Shanner share the view that 
reproductive rights are a broader concept. 
 
This thesis takes the position that a right to procreative liberty can consist of a 
right to make decisions about whether to seek to become parents without 
governmental restriction or force, a right to procreate without discrimination in 
their treatment by doctors or others and a right of infertile people to access 
available means to procreate. These rights should be respected unless there are 
sufficiently clear and strong justifications for restricting them.  However, a 
distinction will be drawn between these rights and a right to be assisted in 
procreating.  This chapter will come on to discuss that distinction in more detail 
in looking at the distinction between negative and positive rights. 
 
Suzanne Uniacke is of the view that the literal meaning of a right to reproduce is 
simply the right to have children.59  As Uniacke points out it is commonly 
assumed that people have a right to have children.60  She makes the point that 
the assumption that people have a right to have children is one of the objections 
most likely to be made against any suggestion that requiring prospective parents 
to be licensed would be theoretically desirable.61  With a few exceptions such as 
age of consent and consanguinity, we generally do not accept that the State has 
a right to interfere when a consenting couple decide to engage in sexual 
                                                             
59 S. Uniacke, In Vitro Fertilization and the Right to Reproduce, Bioethics, Vol. 1, Issue 3, 1987, 
241 – 254, 241.  Uniacke uses the term 'a right to reproduce' and not 'a right to reproductive 
liberty' or a 'right to procreative liberty'.  She defines a right to reproduce simply as a right to 
have children. {yes – and you need to do the same kind of thing with other authors eg algrhani 
and harris earlier] 
60 Ibid. 
61 Uniacke is referring to the suggestion of Hugh Lafollette in Licensing Parents, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 9 (1980), 182-97. 
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intercourse with the goal of having a child.  However, whether or not the 
assumption that people have a right to have children is well-founded depends 
upon how such a right is explained and defined.  A great deal of the legal and 
ethical discussion surrounding the regulation of access to ART does indeed 
centre upon a claim that people have a right to have children, or a right to 
reproduce or to procreate.62  However, as Uniacke rightly says few people would 
argue that a right to reproduce, for example, entitles a person to the gametes of 
a non-consenting person.63  Uniacke recognises that any right to reproduce is 
subject to limitation.64   
 
This thesis will use the term procreative liberty rather than a right to reproduce 
because, it is suggested that the term ‘right to reproduce’ may be linked with 
the existence of a claim-right. There is a problem with thinking of reproduction 
as a claim-right which might entail significant duties of assistance on the part of 
the State and conflict with the reproductive rights of others.  While an individual 
may be at liberty to seek to fulfil a particular reproductive choice, it is difficult 
to argue that this choice is necessarily the ground of other people’s duties to 
assist her in her acting.  This could create a situation where, for example, a 
single woman was entitled to demand that she be provided with means to fulfil 
her wish to have a child, for example through being provided with an embryo.  It 
is difficult see that an obligation could lie upon the State to compel a couple 
who had created embryos for their own treatment to donate any spare embryos 
for this purpose, thereby overriding their right to consent to the use of their 
embryos.  Furthermore, an obligation to provide every infertile person with 
unlimited access to ART would be likely to pose practical difficulties not just in 
terms of access to gametes, embryos but the facilities and the costs involved.  
 
                                                             
62 L. Shanner, The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong, McGill Law Journal, 
1995, 40, 823 – 874, 825. 
63 S. Uniacke, In Vitro Fertilization and the Right to Reproduce, Bioethics, Vol. 1, Issue 3, 1987, 
241 – 254, 240. 
64 Ibid., 247. 
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This thesis takes the view that seeking to have children should be regarded as 
simply a liberty which implies non-interference on the part of others, and so 
approaches the issue in terms of procreative liberty. The thesis will not argue 
that the current regulation governing access to ART services is inappropriate 
since it fails to create a duty on the State to provide assistance to people trying 
to have children.  Instead it will argue that the current legislation infringes 
procreative liberty since it permits interference with a couple or individual’s 
liberty to act with medical assistance, and the consensual involvement of a third 
party donor or surrogate if need be.  The question whether there us a sufficient 
justification for this interference then arises.   
 
Adopting this position, a single woman would be entitled to try to become 
pregnant through IVF using a donated embryo with the donor’s consent and the 
State would have no basis on which to interfere unless the State can show that 
there is a sufficient justification: that significant avoidable harm would result 
from such an undertaking.  Chapter Five will look at the arguments surrounding 
harm to a child born as a result of ART in respect of potential parenting 
environment and examine in detail whether any harms do exist which may 
justify State interference in access to ART services on the basis of child welfare 
concerns.  However, having established that the approach to be used to examine 
the regulation of ART in this thesis is based on the concept of a right to 
procreative liberty, the next section will examine two leading theories of rights 
in an effort to provide some further understanding as to how a right to 
procreative liberty might be framed.  While Robertson’s justification for a right 
to procreative liberty has been set out, the next section will examine in more 
detail the ethical grounds for such a right, namely a respect for the autonomous 
decision-making of the individual.  
 
 
2.4 Protection of Interests or Respect for Choices?  
Again the terminology employed by commentators is not always consistent with 
each other when representing similar ideas, and for the following authors a 
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‘right to reproduce’ is used rather than my preference for procreative liberty. In 
an attempt to examine the possible justifications for a right to reproduce, 
Muiranne Quigley analyses the concept within the two main theories of rights: 
interest theory and choice theory.65  Quigley makes the point that these two 
theories each represent a different conception of the function of rights and, as 
such, different justifications underpin the existence of rights depending on 
which theory of rights is proposed.  The distinction according to Quigley is that 
‘Interest theory would justify a right to reproduce on the grounds of overriding 
interests, while choice theory, would justify it on the grounds of the necessity to 
protect personal autonomy.’66  A closer examination of these two different 
theories of rights will assist in explaining why this thesis comes down in favour of 
a right to procreative liberty grounded in the importance of respect for personal 
autonomy when making choices fundamental to the life of the individual. 
 
Joseph Raz, a major proponent of the interest theory, argues that an ‘interest’ 
should be seen as an aspect of a person’s well-being.67  Furthermore, to ground 
a right, this interest must be ‘a sufficient reason for holding some other 
person(s) to be under a duty’.68  According to the interest theory the strength of 
the interest, how fundamental it is to a person’s well-being, determines the 
strength of the claim.  Quigley points to two reproductive interests, which she 
claims, might ground sufficient reason for holding a person to a duty, namely, 
genetic reproduction (passing on genes to the next generation), and the 
subsequent child rearing.69  Quigley rejects the idea that an interest in passing 
on ones genes to the next generation provides an adequate justification for a 
                                                             
65 M. Quigley, A Right to Reproduce?, Bioethics, Volume 24, Number 8, 2010, 403–411, 404.  
Quigley is another commentator who uses the broader term of a right to reproduce.  She does so 
in the context of looking at the foundation for the right in the context of two different rights 
theories, so again her discussion is broader than the foundation of the right based on liberty and 
autonomy.  It is clear though that when she talks about a right to reproduce she is referring to a 
right to have children. 
66 Ibid., 404. 
67 J. Raz, ‘On the Nature of Rights’, Mind, 1984, Vol. 93, No. 370, 194-214, 195. 
68 Ibid. 
69 M. Quigley, A Right to Reproduce?, Bioethics, Volume 24, Number 8, 2010, 403–411, 406. 
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right to reproduce.70  While she acknowledges the truth in Robertson’s view that 
‘whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to dignity, and to 
the meaning of one’s life’71 she makes the point that taking this to the extreme 
would lead to morally questionable practices such as a man claiming he had a 
right to ‘the unfettered distribution of his sperm’ on the basis that the passing 
on of his genes was what afforded his life meaning.72  The problem in Quigley’s 
view is that it is somewhat overstating the case to attribute the passing on of 
your genetic material as being central to one’s life, particularly if this male in 
question has no intention of child rearing but simply wishes to have as many of 
his progeny walking around as possible.73 
 
Quigley then goes on to look at the interest in rearing a child.  She accepts that 
an interest in child rearing, or the intention to rear, is strong enough to ground a 
right to reproduce.74  The opportunity to experience raising one’s own child is 
absolutely central to many people’s lives.  Bonnie Steinbock is of the view that a 
right to reproduce is best interpreted as a right to have one’s own children to 
rear and where there is no intent or ability to rear, there is no fundamental right 
to reproduce.75  Quigley asks the question – how do we assess the ability to rear?  
She then goes on to highlight the fact  that ‘In the United Kingdom, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) appears to think that such an 
assessment is not only possible but also ethical’76 by the application of section 
13(5).  What Quigley points out though is that: 
 
The practical implications of a right to reproduce deriving from an 
interest in having and raising a child and formulated as Steinbock 
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71 Robertson, Children of Choice, 24.  
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73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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would want are apparent from the above look at the HFEA 
guidelines. Practically speaking fertile individuals might have a 
right to reproduce (or at least be able to exercise it), while 
infertile individuals might not. This is because the distinction 
between these two categories is not in the ability of the individuals 
to hold an interest in having and raising a child, but the practical 
ease of regulating the ensuing right.77 
 
Quigley is making a very similar point to that of Robertson and alluded to above, 
that the desire of the infertile couple to form a family is no less strong than the 
fertile couple’s desire and the simple fact that the couple may require 
assistance does not mean that they would be inadequate parents.   
 
Quigley is of the view that the two principal interests people have in 
reproduction – passing on genes and child rearing - do not provide a basis for 
grounding a right to reproduce.  In the case of the first of those interests it is 
not what gives reproduction meaning.  The prolific sperm donor does not have a 
right to act in this way because his actions are not sufficiently meaningful.  He is 
reproducing but only it would seem for somewhat selfish reasons.  In the case of 
child rearing the difficulty is that this interest may vary with different people at 
different times.  This would lead to the situation where Quigley explains that a 
number of questions arise: 
 
 
However, how could a right, thus derived, account for the fact that 
interests change? There are two aspects to this. The first is that 
different people will have different interests. And the second is 
that the strength of those interests will vary between people, and 
over time.  Given that this is true, are we to infer that a particular 
person, X, might have a right to reproduce, whereas another 
person, Y, might not, simply because, at this point in time, all else 
being equal, the comparative strength of Y’s wish to rear a child is 
not great enough to constitute an interest of sufficient strength to 
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ground the right in question?  Or does it mean that today Y does not 
have a right to reproduce because it does not represent a 
significant enough aspect of her well-being, but in five years when 
her interests have grown she will possess this right?  This does not 
appear to be either a sensible or a plausible contention and, as 
such, cannot provide justifiable grounds for a right to reproduce.78 
 
On these grounds Quigley rejects the interest theory as providing a sufficient 
basis to justify the existence of a right to reproduce.  Likewise this thesis does 
not argue for a right to reproduce on the basis that people have interests in 
reproduction relating to their well-being that provide sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty to assist them.  As Quigley 
points out this would not provide for a sensible approach.  What is argued for 
instead is a right to procreative liberty which the choice theory of rights 
provides support for.  The choice theory of rights understands a right as existing 
to promote and protect an individual’s autonomy and liberty.79  The choice 
theory of rights would justify a right to procreative liberty on the grounds of the 
necessity to protect personal autonomy.80  A right to procreative liberty of this 
sort would be concerned with the promotion of the freedom or autonomy of the 
right-holder with regard to procreative matters.   
  
Under the choice theory of rights H.L.A. Hart defined a right as follows: 
 
Any adult human being capable of choice (i) has the right to 
forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or 
restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (ii) is 
at liberty to do (i.e., is under no obligation to abstain from) any 
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action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure 
other persons.81 
 
For the reasons set out in this section and the last this thesis prefers the 
characterisation of a right to procreative liberty in terms of the freedom to 
make procreative choices over the concept that it is grounded upon interests 
which hold other people to be under a duty.   
 
The next section will come on to analyse in greater detail the extent and 
limitations upon a right to procreative liberty grounded upon what Quigley refers 
to as: 
 
...the protection of an individual’s liberty and autonomy with 
regard to reproductive matters...not derive[d] from an unrestricted 
general right to liberty...[but] within a narrow interpretation where 
the right is only a negative right of non-interference in 
reproductive choices rather than a positive right to the help and 
resources needed to reproduce.82 
 
The next section will address the following question: if it is recognised that 
people have a right to procreative liberty then what correlative duties does such 
a right impose upon those who must respect such a right?  It is important to note 
that in Quigley’s view a right to reproduce is restricted in the extent to which it 
can entitle a person to make demands of others. This is also my position, 
although I prefer to see this in terms of procreative liberty. This is where the 
concept of positive and negative rights plays an important part in our 
understanding of what constitutes a right to procreative liberty. 
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2.5 Positive and Negative Rights 
As explained by Beauchamp and Fadden: 
 
Rights claims, whether legal or moral, are commonly divided into 
two types: positive and negative.  This distinction is based on the 
difference between the right to be free to do something (a right to 
non-interference) and the right to be provided by others with a 
particular action, good or service (a right to benefits).83 
 
Shanner provides a description of what amounts to a negative right and a 
positive right in the following: 
 
A negative right is essentially a right of forbearance, entailing an 
obligation upon others to leave the claimant alone.  Negative rights 
thus include the right to bodily integrity, the right not to be killed, 
the right not to be touched in any manner without permission, and 
the right to choose one's own beliefs.  In addition, the notion is 
commonly, but more controversially, extended to include freedom 
to pursue freely chosen goals without interference by governments 
or others, as long as the exercise of one's liberty does not infringe 
upon the liberty of others. 
 
In contrast, a positive right is a claim to some form of assistance or 
positive support, which entails an obligation on someone else to 
provide the goods or services required for a person to exercise the 
right.  For example, a right to life is a negative right when it 
prevents someone from killing another without strong justification, 
but access to lifesaving medical resources is a positive rights 
claim.84  
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It is possible to find support for the validity of a negative right in Mill’s theory of 
liberty referred to earlier: that the State may intervene to infringe the liberty of 
an individual only if the action of that person is causing harm to others.  The 
State is permitted to limit freedom of action when that action causes harm to 
those who deserve protection from harm.  This thesis will come on to discuss in 
more detail the difficulties created by the question of whether a yet-to-be-
conceived ‘child’ can be said to be deserving of protection from harm.  Clearly 
an existing child is a person deserving of protection but the child welfare 
principle as applied by section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 raises the questions of 
what stage, present or future, a child or future child can or should be protected 
and what it might actually mean to say that a future child can be harmed.  
 
The distinction between a positive right and a negative right is of relevance to 
the definition of what constitutes a right to procreative liberty.   
 
John Robertson claims that:  
 
...‘liberty’ as used in procreative liberty is a negative right.  It 
means that a person violates no moral duty in making a procreative 
choice, and that other persons have a duty not to interfere with 
that choice.85  
 
Robertson proposes, therefore, that ‘procreative liberty’ is a right in so far as 
the individual has a right against the State to seek to fulfil a procreative choice, 
while the State has a correlative duty not to interfere with that choice.  
However, this right does not go so far as to impose upon the State a duty to 
provide assistance to the individual to enable him to fulfil his or her procreative 
choice.  In essence, a negative right entails an obligation upon others to leave 
the claimant of the right alone.86  Negative rights have been explained by 
Robertson to have included the freedom to pursue freely chosen goals without 
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interference by governments or others, as long as the exercise of one's liberty 
does not infringe upon the liberty of others.87  A positive right on the other hand 
entails an obligation on someone else to provide the goods or services required 
for a person to exercise the right.88   
 
However, it is questionable whether or not such a neat distinction can be drawn 
between negative rights and positive rights in the context of access to ART.  In 
such a situation the negative right to be free from unjustified State interference 
when making the choice to access treatment can on one view be seen to also 
consist of a positive rights component in the sense that what the prospective 
patient is actually insisting on is a right to be provided with the services 
available.  As Shanner puts it: 
 
Asserting the right of non-interference fails to describe the reality 
of ARTs, which by necessity require assistance and resources in the 
pursuit of the claimant's reproductive goals.  As with other claims 
for medical care, there is little about the request for infertility 
treatment that involves mere liberties...assisted reproduction, by 
its very nature, is a positive rights claim because it necessarily 
requires assistance.89 
 
Whilst this observation is sound this thesis proceeds on the basis that a right to 
procreative liberty is best characterised as a prima facie right for people to be 
left alone to make their own procreative choices.  This thesis recognises that 
there are situations where access to treatment may be denied since people do 
not have a positive right to insist on access to treatment (for example, where 
resources in terms of gametes or funding of treatment are in short supply and do 
not permit universal access), but they do have a right to have their decision to 
seek access not interfered with on spurious grounds and for speculative reasons.  
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Nevertheless, it would be wrong to regard someone as having an absolute right 
to procreative liberty.  There are clearly cases where that right can be 
justifiably defeated. 
 
The concept of personal autonomy, that a person has a right to self-
determination, is central to any right to procreative liberty.90  The freedom to 
choose how an individual lives his or her life underlies the importance that is 
attached to issues surrounding reproduction.  The ruling in the American case of 
Casey v Planned Parenthood91 outlined what the court saw as the significance of 
procreative choice with the statement: 
 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, childrearing and education...matters involving the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.92 
 
Given a right to procreative liberty’s relationship to self-determination and self-
identity it should be afforded the utmost respect.93  Emily Jackson is of the view 
that: 
 
When we disregard an individual's reproductive preferences, we 
undermine their ability to control one of the most intimate spheres 
of their life. Our reproductive capacity or incapacity indubitably 
has a profound impact upon the course of our lives, and decisions 
about whether or not to reproduce are among the most momentous 
choices that we will ever make...I would argue that reproductive 
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freedom is sufficiently integral to a satisfying life that it would be 
recognised as a critical ‘conviction about what helps to make a life 
good’. Insofar as it is now possible for individuals to decide if, 
whether or when to reproduce, depriving them of this control 
significantly interferes with their capacity to live their life 
according to their own beliefs and practices.94 
 
This statement goes to the heart of why procreative liberty is seen as a valuable 
concept and something which should be regarded as a right.  To deprive people 
of their procreative choice interferes with their freedom to engage in 
‘experiments in living’, as Mill put it, as they so desire.95  For many people 
procreative choices involve a number of important human interests such as 
needs for love, purpose and belonging as well as feelings of esteem and self-
respect.  However, for others the choice not to have children involves interests 
of a different kind such as not wanting to be tied down or diverted from a life 
plan which does not involve children.96  It is not so much the actual procreative 
choices to be made that are of importance in themselves, but the ‘fostering of 
human needs’97 that procreative choices engender which are critical.  It is for 
this reason that procreative choice has value to human existence and deserves 
respect.  However, it is also this very value which is attached to procreative 
choice which gives rise to criticisms of the liberal theory of a right to 
procreative liberty.  
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2.6 Criticism of a Right to Procreative Liberty 
Robertson acknowledges that a rights-based approach to procreative liberty is 
open to criticism on the basis that it is ‘individualistic and insensitive to the 
community’.98  He acknowledges that a rights-based perspective views 
procreation as an isolated act when in actual fact it is never exclusively a 
private matter between two people.  One of the difficulties with the rights 
based approach to procreative liberty has is that the effects of procreative 
choice on children, women, society or the family are treated as irrelevant, while 
procreation will inevitably have  consequences for others than those making such 
choices.99   
 
However, Robertson still seeks to defend his rights-based approach to 
procreative liberty.  Firstly, he makes the point that the recognition of 
procreative liberty can encourage community interaction.  He points to the fact 
that IVF, embryo donation and surrogacy encourage cooperation and the 
formation of families.100  Secondly, Robertson claims that a rights-based 
approach does not ignore other interests so much as judge them against the 
importance of procreative liberty.101  A right to procreative liberty allows 
possible harms to be judged against the right and if these harms are established, 
then justification exists to interfere with the right.  Thirdly, Robertson contends 
that without rights the important values attached to reproduction are not 
protected.102  An approach which is based not on rights but on proper 
consideration of social justice overlooks the fact that: 
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Rights are essential precisely to guard against discriminatory 
agendas that deny dignity and integrity to women and men.  They 
are responses to failures of social responsibility, not the causes of 
them.103 
 
Robertson further acknowledges that:  
 
A major problem with a rights-based approach is that it ignores the 
social and economic context in which exercise of rights is 
embedded. Procreative rights are negative in protecting against 
private or state interference, but they give no positive assistance 
to someone who lacks the resources essential to exercise the 
right.104 
 
Robertson acknowledges the views of Copelon who writes: 
 
The negative theory of privacy is...profoundly inadequate as a basis 
for reproductive and sexual freedom because it perpetuates the 
myth that the ability is effectuate one’s choices rests exclusively 
on the individual, rather than acknowledging that choices are 
facilitated, hindered or entirely frustrated by social conditions.  In 
doing so negative privacy theory exempts the state from 
responsibility for contributing to the material conditions and social 
relations that impede, and conversely, could encourage 
autonomous decision-making.105 
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Robertson is writing in a USA context where all infertility treatment must be 
paid for privately.  In the UK, issues of access to IVF on the basis of income are 
to a certain extent addressed by the policy that all couples meeting certain 
clinical criteria should have up to three complete cycles of IVF free on the 
NHS.106  That said the successful implementation of this policy has very much 
depended upon which part of the UK the couple reside in.107  However, if a 
wealthy couple were to continue to seek private treatment following the failure 
of these three cycles, Robertson is of the view that it does not follow that such 
social inequality justifies denying access to IVF for those who can pay.  While 
acknowledging that issues of social justice do arise Robertson states ‘it does not 
follow that society’s failure to assure access to reproductive technologies for all 
who would benefit justifies denying access to those who have the means to 
pay.’108  
 
However, Roberts is of the opinion that John Robertson’s view that procreative 
liberty is of such importance means that any view of procreative liberty must 
include the eradication of social inequality.109  The principal concern for critics 
of a liberal negative rights-based approach is that it accepts social inequality as 
an inevitable consequence of upholding individual rights.110  Roberts is critical of 
Robertson’s negative right based-approach to procreative liberty on the basis 
that Robertson treats social justice as a separate issue when in actual fact, 
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according to Roberts it is intertwined with the meaning of reproductive 
liberty.111 
 
While this thesis acknowledges that it is desirable that social inequality in the 
provision of ART services is addressed as far as possible, it does not proceed on 
the view that the presence of social inequality is a sufficient basis for State 
interference in procreative choice to prevent such choices being made at all.  
While a negative rights-based approach may have its limits, the fact that there 
are inequalities in the distribution of ART services, does not justify limiting the 
rights of people who can afford to access these services. 
 
The second part of this chapter will look at past examples of State interference 
in procreative choice and examine the justifications put forward for such 
interference.  There is no question that the right to procreative liberty cannot 
be a completely unfettered right, with every procreative choice given absolute 
respect.  In line with the purpose of this thesis there will be a particular focus 
on examples of situations where child welfare was used, either implicitly or 
explicitly, as justification for State interference in procreative choice.  The 
purpose of looking back at this point is to illustrate the consequences of the 
State failing to respect people’s right to procreative liberty and the way in 
which such a failure, as Robertson’s argument contended, led to greater social 
injustice. 
 
While there is a strong argument for a presumption in favour of a right to 
procreative liberty and non-interference when harm to others is not in 
contemplation or evident, the State has always been interested in the 
procreative behaviour of its citizens.112  John Harris has said that:  
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Reproductive choice is an idea that is respected more in the breach 
than in the observance.  It is when people, particularly women, 
actually want to exercise choice that the trouble starts.113   
 
The next section will therefore consider the way in which reproductive choice is 
respected more in the breach than in the observance and examine the problems 
which can arise when procreative liberty is denied.  
 
 
2.7 Historical State Intervention 
The State has always seen fit to place certain prohibitions upon marriage, 
thereby placing restrictions on procreative choice.  For example, in AD 342 the 
Roman Codex Theodosianus contained a strict prohibition of marriage on the 
ground of consanguinity: 
 
If anyone should be so abominable as to believe that the daughter 
of his brother or sister should be made his wife, or should fly to her 
embrace not as her parental or maternal uncle, he shall be liable to 
a penalty of capital punishment.114  
 
In the Middle Ages, the Church in England continued to refer to the laws of 
Ancient Rome when determining questions concerning the degrees of 
relationship within which marriage was prohibited on grounds of consanguinity.  
Pope Gregory I forbade marriages between persons closer than the third or 
fourth generation, step-mothers or sisters-in-law.115  However, the Reformation 
saw the relaxation of Roman Canon law as the new Protestant Church passed 
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laws permitting marriage between first cousins to take place.116  The current law 
governing marriage and civil partnerships renders marriage between certain 
relatives void and makes sexual intercourse between these relatives a criminal 
offence.117 
 
Throughout the ages incest has been a particularly serious social taboo and the 
State has legislated accordingly.  However, overly stringent regulation of such 
matters in medieval times was not always met with widespread approval and 
acceptance.  Kinship marriage often played an important part in ensuring that 
estates remained within a family, or within the aristocracy, as a means of 
consolidating political and economic power.118  Interestingly in the context of 
this thesis, in commenting on the various taboos that society has placed around 
marriage and sexual intercourse Jacqueline Laing and David Oderberg are of the 
opinion that: 
 
The stigmatisation and/or legal prohibition of incest, adultery, 
fornication, and in certain ways even rape, arguably had - and 
continues to have, in many cultures - its roots in a generalised 
concern for the welfare of children generated by these means. 
Moreover, for children so conceived these practices go to their very 
identity.  In concrete terms, the means of conception will 
determine a child's grandparents, aunts and uncles, siblings and 
cousins.  Hence these practices bear on their race, ancestry, 
heritage, and medical inheritance.119 
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The law against marriage and sexual intercourse on grounds of consanguinity is a 
good example of a long-standing and widely accepted State interference in the 
right to procreative liberty.  The potential for children to be harmed, together 
with an almost instinctive revulsion towards such relationships, provides 
adequate justification in the vast majority of people’s eyes for State 
interference and it is not intended to debate the merits or otherwise of this 
restriction in this thesis. 
 
Incest and rape have always been, and continue to be, treated as criminal 
offences.  It is possible to argue that the reason for these offences is based, at 
least in part, on welfare of the child concerns.  If that is accepted, they do raise 
the issue of restricting behaviour which may result in pregnancy where there is 
no child in existence and indeed, in order to prevent the birth of children 
because of the fear of future harm to them.  While these specific offences will 
not be considered further, using child welfare concerns to place restrictions on 
procreative liberty in the context of ART raises similar issues.  The next example 
of State interference, more than any other, highlights what can go wrong when 
respect for procreative choice is disregarded by the State.  The State-sponsored 
eugenics programmes of the first half of the twentieth century saw widespread 
and systematic abuse of an individual’s right to procreative liberty that has 
consequences to this day.  
 
 
2.8 Eugenics 
In 1904 Francis Galton defined eugenics as ‘the science which deals with all 
influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also those that develop 
them to the utmost advantage.’120  Galton was of the view that eugenic 
practices could reflect an entirely and self-evidently preferable state of affairs 
in humankind where ‘it was better to be healthy than sick, vigorous than weak, 
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well-fitted than ill-fitted for their part in life’.121  Galton believed that ‘the aim 
of eugenics is to represent each class or sect by its best specimens’.122    
 
To say that Galton was a proponent of eugenics is perhaps an understatement 
best summed up by his view that eugenics had ‘strong claims to become an 
orthodox religious tenet of the future, for eugenics co-operate with the workings 
of nature by securing that humanity will be represented by the fittest races.’123  
However, whilst evangelical in his support of eugenics, Galton was perhaps also 
prophetic in his warning that ‘overzeal [in eugenic practices] leading to hasty 
action would do harm, by holding out expectations of a golden age, which will 
certainly be falsified and cause the science to be discredited.’124   
 
The term eugenics is also commonly understood, not in a purely scientific sense, 
but to refer to the social movement and policy initiatives which strove to 
‘improve the biological character of a breed by deliberate methods to that 
end’.125  In relation to policy, Galton was a proponent of ‘positive eugenics’ and 
called for a regulated marriage licensing process to facilitate and encourage 
biologically acceptable marriages.126  However, his ideas soon developed into the 
more coercive system of ‘negative eugenics’, which sought to use marriage 
prohibition, compulsory sterilisation and segregation to achieve its aims.127  
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2.9 Justifying Eugenics 
2.9.1 Protecting Society from the ‘Unfit’ 
One of the principal aims of the eugenicists was to prevent persons they 
considered to be ‘unfit’ from reproducing.  While this aim is a million miles away 
from the efforts of those seeking to alleviate infertility through ART,128 the 
history of eugenics serves as a useful reminder of the need for caution when it 
comes to implementing regulations that impact upon procreative liberty.  The 
idea that classes of people are ‘unfit’ to procreate because of their race, 
religion, intellect or criminal record may seem abhorrent today, but in the first 
half of the twentieth century this idea justified to many influential people in the 
United States of America and Europe the compulsory sterilisation of thousands of 
individuals.  Therefore questions should be raised when patients can be denied 
access to ART (and therefore the opportunity to procreate) if there is evidence 
that they might not be ‘supportive parents’: in other words,  because they are 
not ‘fit’ to parent.   
 
Proponents of negative eugenics in both the USA and Europe were able to utilise 
the power of the law to implement their eugenic ideology.129  Legislation from 
that time illustrates who was considered ‘unfit’ to procreate.  The first ‘eugenic 
law’ in the USA was passed by the State of Indiana in 1907.130  It legalised the 
involuntary sterilisation of inmates of State institutions131 and was ‘an act to 
prevent procreation of convicted criminals, idiots, imbeciles and convicted 
rapists’.132  This legislation was followed by nearly one hundred other eugenics 
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statutes passed by over thirty different American states between 1910 and 
1970.133  The majority of these statutes focused on limiting the procreative 
capacity of certain individuals with the aim of eliminating supposed genetic 
defects such as criminality, poverty or mental illness.134  It has been suggested 
that the eugenicists were successful in getting these laws passed by portraying 
these measures as a public health initiative.135 An estimated 60,000 people were 
sterilised as part of the negative eugenics programmes in the USA over seven 
decades of the 20th Century.136 
 
The eugenics movement was not restricted to the USA and through shared 
academic knowledge the ideas of the eugenicists quickly found particular favour 
amongst the leaders of the Germanic and Nordic people of Northern Europe.  
Hitler, writing in Mein Kampf in 1925, echoed much of what was said by the 
early pioneers of eugenics in the USA when he declared:  
 
The demand that defective people be prevented from propagating 
equally defective offspring is a demand of the clearest reason and, 
if systematically executed, represents the most humane act of 
mankind.  It will spare millions of unfortunates undeserved 
sufferings, and consequently will lead to a rising improvement of 
health as a whole.137  
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The Nazi party passed its first involuntary sterilisation legislation in July 1933 
known as the Law for the Prevention of Defective Progeny.  This statute was 
based on Laughlin’s Model Eugenical Sterilization Law.138  This legislation 
allowed for compulsory sterilization in cases of ‘congenital mental defects, 
schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, hereditary epilepsy, severe 
alcoholism, hereditary blindness and Huntington's chorea’.139  It was to provide 
the legal basis for the involuntary sterilisation of more than 350,000 people140 
and paved the way for the compulsory sterilisation of thousands more healthy 
individuals on the basis of ‘racial inferiority’. 
 
2.9.2 Fitness to Parent and the Welfare of the Child 
While the Nazi ideology was based on notions of nationhood and race at the 
expense of the individual, some of the thinking behind eugenics was based on a 
concern for the welfare of the individual child.  This concern centred either on 
the idea that a degenerate and unfit parent would be unable to provide the child 
with adequate care, or that the genetic condition of the child would be so poor 
that it would be unkind to bring it into the world. 
 
It has been claimed that the eugenics programmes in the USA were as much 
about preventing child-rearing as they were child-bearing.141  In 1940 the 
Minnesota Board of Control stated that the ‘socio-economic justification of 
sterilization, that the feeble-minded parent cannot provide a stable and secure 
family life for his children, is paramount’.142  Eugenicists were happy to evoke 
the image of the irresponsible and promiscuous ‘bad’ mother who was not fit to 
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bear, never mind raise, the nation’s children.143  It has been argued that this 
apparent concern surrounding apparent lack of parenting ability was merely a 
smokescreen to limit spending on welfare benefits.144  Whatever the real reason, 
concern for the welfare of children raised by unfit parents was commonly 
evoked to justify the implementation of many compulsory sterilisation 
programmes. 
 
The other aspect of child welfare associated with promoting a justification for 
eugenics programmes was the thinking that child welfare was best served by 
ensuring that the children who were born had ‘good’ genes and children with 
potentially ‘bad’ genes should be prevented from being born.  In the view of 
Dealey, a strong advocate for eugenics, writing in 1914:  
 
Eugenics rests upon the fact that it is genetically possible to secure 
for new-born babies an innate mental and physical nature superior 
to that of the present generation of children.  Through this primary 
aim of genetically better children, resulting in increased child 
welfare and happiness Eugenics thus demonstrates that a single 
microscopic cell from which one great human being springs is of 
greater importance to the race than the painstaking efforts of a 
hundred thousand child-rearers and educators with a child-material 
below par.145 
 
The idea was that developing the genetic potential of a child would ensure that 
the child inherited all of the positive traits and characteristics necessary to 
develop into a propitious member of society.  For some, there are worrying 
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echoes of this thinking in the so-called ‘designer babies’ cases.146  The spectre of 
eugenics hangs over those scientists working in ART today. 
 
 
2.10 Opposition to Eugenics 
The eugenics statutes did face challenges in the U.S Supreme Court.  The most 
famous of these cases is Buck v Bell (1927).147  The case of Buck sought to 
challenge the Eugenical Sterilization Act148 which had been passed by the State 
of Virginia in 1924.  The challenge was unsuccessful.  In the opinion of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes ‘experience has shown that heredity plays an important 
part in the transmission of insanity and imbecility’.149  Holmes was convinced by 
the genetic determinism arguments put forward by the proponents of eugenics.     
 
Ms Buck based her case on the 14th Amendment to the USA constitution which 
states that ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’.150  
The Buck judgment is of interest as it declared that compulsory sterilisation did 
not infringe the rights enjoyed by American citizens under the 14th 
amendment.151  Justice Holmes in delivering his famous opinion gave far greater 
weight to the rights of society to promote reproduction of its fittest members 
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than any individual right to procreative liberty which may have been implied 
under the constitution.152 
 
The second Supreme Court case which challenged state legislation involved the 
involuntary sterilisation of convicted criminals.  Skinner v Oklahoma (1942)153 
saw the successful striking down of the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization 
Act 1935.  The decision of the Supreme Court in Skinner was the first time that 
reproduction was described as a right.  Justice William O. Douglas stated: 
 
This case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights. 
Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to 
the perpetuation of a race - the right to have offspring...We are 
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil 
rights of man.  Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.154 
 
The thinking of the judiciary in Skinner was that if a state sterilisation statute 
was to be considered constitutionally sound there must be a compelling and 
rational state interest in controlling procreative matters.155  This was a far more 
stringent test than was applied in Buck which had merely required that the 
interests of the state and the individual be balanced before making a decision.  
In requiring that the state interest in sterilisation had to be compelling, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the procreative rights of prison inmates 
outweighed the state’s interests in controlling their ability to procreate.156  
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While Skinner can be viewed as a victory for opponents of eugenics the fact is 
that involuntary sterilisation of people in institutions for the mentally ill and 
mentally retarded continued in the USA up until the 1970s, albeit to a much 
lesser extent.157  Many states viewed Skinner as only applying to prisoners and 
believed that their interest in sterilising ‘deficients’ was compelling.158 
 
At the end of the Second World War exposure of the Nazi compulsory 
sterilisation programmes led to widespread revulsion and extensive criticism of 
similar programmes in the USA.159  Although most USA states continued to have 
compulsory sterilisation legislation on the statute book the laws were rarely 
applied and almost all were eventually repealed between 1968 and 1975.160  In 
the USA, proponents of eugenic sterilisation laws modernised eugenic legislation 
to reflect the changing norms of the post-war era.161  In the 1950s and 1960s the 
issue of unwed mothers, considered to be unfit to raise children simply on the 
basis of their marital status, was seen by many as a growing problem which had 
to be resolved.162  Those wishing to tackle the issue of unwed mothers had to 
look to different methods from those previously used to seek to prevent 
pregnancies, such as fines, short prison sentences and making welfare benefits 
dependent upon ‘voluntary’ sterilisation.163  The proponents of these coercive 
measures sought to distinguish them from compulsory sterilisation legislation by 
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arguing that they gave notice of condemned conduct and only punished those 
who made ‘bad choices’.164 
 
 
2.11 Modern Day Eugenics 
The term ‘eugenics’ is often used today by critics of ART to evoke an emotional 
response.165  There are numerous ‘right to life’ websites which draw comparisons 
between the Nazi eugenics programmes of the 1930s and 1940s and modern 
genetic screening programmes,166 or the selection of healthy embryos for IVF 
treatment.167  Indeed, the word ‘eugenics’ has become so unpalatable that it 
may be deliberately used by critics of reproductive and selection technologies in 
an effort to associate modern day science with the negative connotations it still 
carries.168  The term eugenics now ‘suggests Nazi before we even start to 
consider the issues.’169   
 
The outrage which the eugenics programmes of the 20th century now usually 
engenders arises from the fact that people were coerced, discriminated against 
and subjected to invasive medical procedures without their consent.  While this 
outrage about the past is justified, there is an important difference between the 
eugenics programmes of the past and the ‘eugenics’ work being carried out 
today.  The eugenics programmes of the past were State sponsored programmes 
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aimed at the improvement of a group through changes to the gene pool.  The 
very different focus today is upon individual choice to select one embryo over 
another with the aim of having a healthy child. 
 
The view of the 20th century eugenicists was that improvement in a group 
through genetic change could be brought about by some sort of policy to be 
implemented on a wide scale.  This is not the same as allowing a couple to make 
a free and informed choice about which embryo they select for implantation.  
The challenge then is to ensure that ‘eugenics’ as practiced today continues to 
focus on the procreative choices of parents and keep coercion and prejudice out 
of any laws which regulate ART.  What the eugenics programmes of the past 
have shown is that even a country like the USA, with a written constitution that 
claims to afford equal rights to all citizens, can easily neglect these principles in 
the name of social improvement. 
 
Laing and Oderberg, while of the opinion that access to ART should be 
regulated, accept that:   
 
It may be wrong to disallow reproduction on the part of certain 
classes of people simply because of who they are or what their pre-
existing medical conditions might be.  It is a further step, however, 
to argue that a restriction on means employed is of itself eugenicist 
in nature.170 
 
The anti-eugenics argument is well-founded on the basis that discrimination of 
certain groups is clearly wrong.  For example, denying a Jewish couple access to 
ART services on account of their religion would be considered abhorrent.  It is 
important that regulations governing access to ART services in the UK do not 
stray from the principle that individual freedoms are protected.  To ensure that 
this does not happen the UK must show particular respect for the individuals’ 
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right to procreative liberty and be certain that any State interference in such a 
right is ethically justified.   
 
 
2.12 Restrictions on a Right to Procreative Liberty 
The unease created by these past attempts to curtail the procreative liberty of 
certain groups of people does highlight the importance of ensuring that the State 
does not once more in the field of ART unjustifiably infringe people’s rights.  
That said it would be wrong to argue that there are no situations where a right 
to procreative liberty can be justifiably defeated.  Whilst the right to proceative 
liberty cannot be ‘taken away’ from someone - they are invested with and 
possess that right - that does not mean it is an absolute right which must 
inevitably be permitted to be exercised in the manner which the individual 
chooses.  Beauchamp and Faden provide the following explanation:  
 
It is sometimes assumed, for example, that we have a right to life 
irrespective of competing claims or social conditions.  This thesis is 
implausible, as evidenced by common moral judgments about 
capital punishment, international agreements about killing in war, 
and beliefs about the justifiability of killing in self-defence.  At 
most, morality posits a right not to have one's life taken without 
sufficient justification.  Rights, then, are inalienable in that one 
always maintains them, and yet they are contingent.  Rights claims 
are thus prima facie rather than absolute — that is, they are 
presumptively valid standing claims that may be overridden by 
more stringent competing claims.  Virtually all agree that no right 
always has the right of way when rights themselves come into 
conflicting traffic.  As we shall see, many discussions about a right 
to health or health care must involve a balancing of social interests 
and individual rights.171 
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This thesis is examining whether a right to procreative liberty can be justifiably 
infringed on the basis of child welfare concerns.  Interestingly there have been 
two cases where the courts have specifically referred to child welfare concerns 
when determining the controversial question of whether prisoners and their 
partners could be allowed access to facilities for artificial insemination.  
 
In the first case of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home Department172 the 
Court of Appeal upheld the decision to dismiss the petition for judicial review of 
the decision not to allow a prisoner access to artificial insemination.  Lord 
Phillips was of the view that: 
 
A policy which accorded to prisoners in general the right to beget 
children by artificial insemination would, I believe, raise difficult 
ethical questions and give rise to legitimate public concern.173 
 
 
Lord Phillips then went on to address the argument put forward by the Secretary 
of State that to allow prisoners access to Artificial Insemination (AI) facilities 
would disadvantage the children as they would in the circumstances be born into 
single parent families.  He stated: 
 
By imprisoning the husband the state creates the situation where, if 
the wife is to have a child, that child will, until the husband's 
release, be brought up in a single parent family.  I consider it 
legitimate, and indeed desirable, that the state should consider the 
implications of children being brought up in those circumstances 
when deciding whether or not to have a general policy of 
facilitating the artificial insemination of the wives of prisoners or of 
wives who are themselves prisoners.174  
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Whilst Lord Phillips does not comment on what he feels the implications of 
children being brought up in single parent families might be it is clear from the 
context of the judgement that these implications are negative.  This is an 
example of the courts endorsing State interference in the procreative choices of 
individuals on the grounds of child welfare concerns.  It is debateable, given the 
new laws introduced in the HFE Act 2008 as to who can be appointed the legal 
parent of a child, the aim of which was partly to give legal recognition to 
alternative family structures, whether Lord Phillips’ view would be expressed by 
the Court of Appeal today.  However, in 2001 the courts were not prepared to 
recognise an absolute right to procreative liberty for prisoners.   
 
In another similar case of Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd175 which 
eventually went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
Grand Chamber176 the Court of Appeal refused to find that the Secretary of 
State’s decision to refuse the request for access to AI was unreasonable.  The 
reasons for refusing as they related to child welfare concerns were: 
 
(2) the fact that, despite their full agreement in seeking facilities 
for artificial insemination and the commitment they had so far 
shown to each other, their relationship had yet to be tested in the 
normal environment of daily life, making it difficult to assess 
whether it would continue after Mr Dickson's release; (3) the 
seeming insufficiency of resources to provide independently for the 
material welfare of any child who might be conceived; (4) the 
seeming paucity of any supportive network for mother and child 
and the fact that the child would not have the presence of a father 
for an important part of his or her own childhood.177 
 
Whilst it may be pointed out that it was the procreative liberty of prisoners that 
was being considered and that it was their incarceration which was the real 
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reason for the restriction, it has to be remembered that it was also the 
procreative liberty of the woman seeking to be inseminated that was being 
interfered with.  The prisoner access to AI cases are of interest because they 
deal with the question of a right to procreative liberty from the angle of ‘a right 
to realise or control the capacity, opportunity or ability to procreate’.178  Those 
parents seeking access to ART treatment are also seeking to exercise such a right 
and are confronted with the requirement to engage in a child welfare 
assessment. 
  
It has been argued by Professor John Williams that ‘Procreative autonomy 
imposes a heavy standard of proof on those who wish to deny prisoners (or 
others) the right to access AI.’179  However, he goes on to cite Robertson’s view 
that there are limits on the State's ability to restrict an individual's right to 
procreative liberty to situations where ‘the reproductive actions at issue would 
create such substantial harm that they could justifiably be limited’,180 although 
Robertson is not of the view that the fact that somebody is imprisoned is, in 
itself, a good reason for denying them a right to procreative liberty.181  As will 
be discussed in greater detail in what follows the fact that a child born utilising 
ART may not be born into ideal circumstances is not a good reason for denying 
anyone a right to procreative liberty. 
 
The next section will analyse the impact of human rights arguments on 
procreation as they have played an important role in the justification for the 
acceptability of using ART to assist women to have children.  As this thesis 
argues for a right to procreative liberty based on the freedom to choose without 
being subjected to unjustified State interference in the exercise of that choice it 
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will be illustrative to examine how well human rights law protects this type of 
freedom. 
 
 
2.13 Reproduction and Human Rights 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR) and the 
ECHR both include the right to marry and found a family as a fundamental 
human right.182  Both treaties also contain articles which uphold a right to 
private and family life.183  Article 12 of the ECHR reads: Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the 
national laws governing the exercise of this right while Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
reads: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.  The UNUDHR is written in terms of a right not to be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his family.  
 
In the UK the ECHR has practical utility because the Human Rights Act 1998 
formally incorporated it into UK law.  It is unlawful for a public authority to act 
in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.184  An individual can 
challenge any decision of a public authority on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with one or more of his Convention rights.  This section will 
examine case law where such a challenge has taken place. 
 
The early proponents of ART cited the human rights declarations on the right to 
found a family as providing the ethical justification for their work.  The Nobel 
Prize winner, Robert Edwards, who developed the science which led to the first 
IVF baby, said:  
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I had no doubts about the morals and ethics of our work.  I 
accepted the right of our patients to found their family, to have 
their own children...The Declaration of Human Rights made by the 
United Nations includes the right to establish a family.185 
 
References to the right to marry and found a family and a right to respect for 
family life were influential in securing research funding and approval in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, when IVF was being challenged on moral grounds by the 
Vatican, feminist critics, and people concerned about possible damage to 
offspring.186  However, the inclusion of a right to marry and found a family and a 
right to respect for family life in these international declarations had been in 
reaction to Nazi polices of eugenics and racial hygiene.187  These international 
declarations were designed to protect people from future attempts by the State 
to remove their capacity to exercise their procreative liberty through 
segregation laws or court-ordered sterilisation.  What is significant about this is 
that it was acknowledged that certain States had grossly infringed procreative 
liberty and that there are limitations upon legitimate State interference in this 
fundamental human right.  The inclusion of a right to found a family highlighted 
the importance such a decision has for the individual.  As Eijkholt has said in 
regards to the ECHR:     
 
The origins and historical interpretation of Article 12 seem logically 
to imply that Article 12 could serve as a legal ground of a right to 
procreate. The codification of Article 12, the right to (marry and) 
found a family, in the ECHR was a reaction against the Nazis’ 
racially prejudiced reproductive policies and more widespread 
eugenics practices in Europe.  Furthermore, both the concept of a 
moral right to procreate and the legal right to found a family 
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seemed a response to the involuntary sterilisation cases and the 
movement that discouraged certain groups from reproducing in the 
USA and elsewhere.  Accordingly, Article 12 shared, to a major 
extent, the same context as a right to procreate. Article 12 
illustrated that the capacity and potential to reproduce were 
considered important for the individual and should be controlled by 
each individual her/himself.  Both a right to procreate and a right 
to found a family seemed to indicate that self-determination in the 
family context would be the key factor in this matter.188 
 
Eijkholt sought to examine the grounding of a right to procreate189 in Article 12, 
and whether it is the case that Article 12 has been replaced by Article 8 as the 
more important legal principle upon which a right to procreate is now based.190  
Article 12 makes specific reference to ‘founding a family’ which would 
necessarily seem to include doing so by procreation. Article 8 on the other hand 
with its reference to a right to respect for private and family life does not 
specifically refer to founding a family or procreation so as Eijkholt points out it 
had not, in the past at least, been seen to ‘function as a basis for any aspect of 
a right to procreate’.191  This section will look at the impact which both Articles 
have had in defining the human rights law basis of a right to procreate.  Early 
cases in the ECtHR interpreted Article 12 as encompassing a right to 
procreate.192 In contrast the ECtHR held that Article 8 applied only to matters 
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where family life would already be in existence.193  In Eijkholt’s analysis, 
however, that situation has changed as she highlights:  
 
Yet by 2010, despite the fact that Article 12 linguistically and 
traditionally may have been seen as the key ground for the right to 
procreate, Article 12 has become barren soil for the development 
of a fully evolved concept of a right to procreate. The 
interpretation and application of the right to procreate seem to 
have changed, and no longer follow the same line of interpretation 
as the right to found a family. 
 
The scope of Article 12 is limited by its terms.  It limits the right to ‘men and 
women of marriageable age’ and ‘according to the national laws governing the 
exercise of this right’ so can be made the subject of domestic law restrictions.  
On the other hand Article 8 according to Eijkholt ‘has evolved to become a full-
fledged and independent ground for basing claims relating to reproduction’.194  
This is because of the wider interpretation it is capable of than Article 12.  
Private life is described as  a ‘broad term encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an 
individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal 
autonomy, personal development, and to establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings and the outside world’.195  Therefore, Article 8 could 
be said to protect certain interests which are intrinsic to a right to procreative 
liberty such as the right to personal autonomy. 
 
In Shanner’s view, ‘Collectively, and perhaps individually, these declarations 
support efforts to protect fertility, to protect individuals from discriminatory 
government policies, and to affirm the value of families.  The protections in 
these international human rights documents do not necessarily ground rights to 
procreate, to have reproductive assistance, or to have infertility treatment 
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funded.’196  Although that might be the case, the international declarations of 
human rights, in particular the right to marry and found a family and the right to 
family life, have been influential in court decisions in the age of ART which have 
examined the scope of that right in the context of what might constitute a right 
to procreative liberty.197  The question at this point for this thesis is to what 
extent Article 12 and 8 of the ECHR provide clarity as to the parameters of a 
right to procreative liberty. 
 
In Evans v United Kingdom198 the circumstances of the case were that Ms Evans 
and Mr Johnston had become engaged in 2000.  In 2001 Ms Evans was diagnosed 
with ovarian cancer and underwent IVF treatment using Mr Johnston’s sperm to 
create and store embryos before an operation took place to remove her ovaries.  
In 2002 the couple separated and Mr Johnston made a request to the clinic that 
the embryos be destroyed.  Ms Evans commenced a legal challenge in an attempt 
to prevent the clinic destroying the stored embryos.  The case went all the way 
to the ECtHR Grand Chamber.  At first instance the case was heard alongside 
another case, Hadley, which involved some similar issues, so the Evans first 
instance judgment refers to the claimants plural.  The Hadley case will not be 
discussed separately though since the main issues for this thesis are contained 
within the Evans case. 
 
Ms Evans brought the domestic action under a number of different heads.  She 
claimed that the frozen embryos had a right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR.  
She claimed that the HFE Act 1990 which required the consent of her previous 
partner to the use of their embryos for her treatment was a breach of her right 
to private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.  She claimed that to 
destroy the embryos would be a breach of her right to marry and found a family 
under Article 12 of the ECHR.  Finally she claimed that her right to be free from 
discrimination as an infertile woman was infringed under Article 14 of the ECHR 
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because the UK legislative requirements effectively provided for a male veto 
which could only be imposed on an infertile woman using ART, since once an 
embryo was in existence in utero a man could not veto the continuation of 
pregnancy.   
 
The domestic court had little difficulty in finding that Article 12 was not 
breached in the absence of any breach of Article 8.  This was because the 
parties accepted that any interference with private and family which was 
justified under article 8(2) could not at the same time constitute a violation of 
article 12.199  As Ms Evans was arguing that her right to family life under Article 8 
was breached by the denial of access to the embryos because of the provisions 
of the HFE Act 1990, it was accepted that if these provisions were in accordance 
with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the rights 
and freedoms of others, then there could be no separate argument under Article 
12.   
 
The relevant issue for the court in Evans was whether the requirements under 
Schedule 3 of the HFE Act 1990 pertaining to the requirements for consents to 
the keeping in storage200 and use201 of any embryo breached Ms Evans Article 8 
rights.  This section required that an embryo the creation of which was brought 
about in vitro must not be kept in storage unless there is an effective consent by 
each person whose gametes were used to bring about the creation of the embryo 
to the storage of the embryo, and the embryo is stored in accordance with those 
consents.  In the High Court, Justice Wall commented that: 
 
...an unfettered right on the claimants’ part to have the embryos 
transferred into them would, by parity of reasoning, constitute an 
interference with respect of the men's Article 8 rights, in the same 
way that any attempt on their part to insist that the claimants have 
                                                             
199 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR in R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] QB 13, 23 – 27 paras. 22 - 38 ‘The qualifications on the right to respect for 
family life that are recognised by article 8(2) apply equally to the article 12 rights’. 
200 HFE Act 1990 sch. 3 para. 8(2) 
201 HFE Act 1990 sch. 3 para. 6(3) 
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the embryos transferred into them against their will would 
undoubtedly constitute an interference both with the claimants' 
right to autonomy over their own bodies, and with respect for their 
private lives.202  
 
Only Ms Evans as a claimant appealed and the Court of Appeal held that:  
 
We ask ourselves whether the proposed interference with the right 
to respect for private life is proportionate to the need which makes 
it legitimate. The answer, in our judgment, is that it does. The 
need, as perceived by Parliament, is for bilateral consent to 
implantation, not simply to the taking and storage of genetic 
material, and that need cannot be met if one half of the consent is 
no longer effective.  To dilute this requirement in the interests of 
proportionality, in order to meet Ms. Evans's otherwise intractable 
biological handicap, by making the withdrawal of the man's consent 
relevant but inconclusive, would create new and even more 
intractable difficulties of arbitrariness and inconsistency.203   
 
The same approach was taken when the case moved beyond the UK domestic 
courts.  In the Grand Chamber the view was taken that:  
 
...the applicant's right to respect for the decision to become a 
parent in the genetic sense should [not] be accorded greater weight 
than J's right to respect for his decision not to have a genetically 
related child with her.204   
 
                                                             
202 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health and Another 
intervening) Hadley v Midland Fertility Services Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health and 
Another intervening) [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam). 
203 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health intervening), Hadley 
v Midland Fertility Services Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health intervening) [2004] 
EWCA (Civ) 727, [2004] 2 FLR 766 (Evans CA) at para. 110, per Arden LJ. 
204 Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHHR 21 para. 90. 
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The Grand Chamber held that private life incorporated the right to respect for 
the decisions to become and not to become a parent; that the case involved the 
irreconcilable conflict between the Article 8 rights of two people, but that the 
consent provisions contained in the HFE Act 1990 served a number of wider, 
public interests.  The Grand Chamber characterised Ms Evans’ right as a right to 
respect for her decision to become a parent in the genetic sense, as that was 
clearly deemed to be an important aspect of an individual’s private life and 
another aspect of what is encompassed by a right to procreative liberty.  
However, no matter the importance to the individual of becoming a parent, the 
right not to become a parent was considered to be equally important.   
 
The Grand Chamber also recognised that the State enjoyed a certain margin of 
appreciation when seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing 
interests.  The Grand Chamber recognised that:  
  
 
Where a particularly important facet of an individual's existence or 
identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be 
restricted.  Where, however, there is no consensus within the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative 
importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of 
protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or 
ethical issues, the margin will be wider…  The issues raised by the 
present case are undoubtedly of a morally and ethically delicate 
nature...there is no uniform European approach in this field... In 
conclusion, therefore, since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to 
sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-
moving medical and scientific developments, and since the 
questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear 
common ground amongst the Member States, the Court considers 
that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent 
State must be a wide one.205 
 
                                                             
205 Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHHR 21 paras. 77 - 82. 
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In this case given the conflicting and equal rights of the parties the Grand 
Chamber was not prepared to say that the approach taken to the issue by the UK 
amounted to a breach of Ms Evans’ human rights and therefore she lost her case.  
 
There was however a dissenting judgement from 4 of the 17 Grand Chamber 
Judges.  In the view of the dissenting Judges their view was that: 
 
...the interests of the party who withdraws consent and wants to 
have the embryos destroyed should prevail (if domestic law so 
provides), unless the other party: (a) has no other means to have a 
genetically-related child; and (b) has no children at all; and (c) 
does not intend to have recourse to a surrogate mother in the 
process of implantation.206  
 
In their view, in a situation where there was no other possibility for the woman 
to have a child, then the woman's desire to access assistance to have a child 
should outweigh the man’s right to bodily autonomy and right to private life.  
The difference arose from the dissenting minority viewing the case as one of 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a 
genetically related parent, while the majority took the view that the case 
involved the State’s positive obligations to adopt measures designed to secure 
respect for private life which they determined the UK had done.   
 
All this leaves the observer with a rather confused picture of just what 
constitutes a right to procreative liberty under human rights law principles.  
Whilst a right to bodily autonomy and a right to respect for private life might be 
prayed in aid of a right to procreative liberty, is what is of overriding importance 
the right to have a child or the right to choose not to have a child?  The majority 
in the Grand Chamber took the view that provided the State had met its positive 
obligations to secure respect for both these private decisions then one could not 
be preferred over the other. In situations where they conflict, the State could 
                                                             
206 Ibid., para. 426. 
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pass legislation in favour of one party at the expense of the other without 
breaching human rights law. 
 
Human rights arguments are of particular interest when applied to procreative 
choice given the importance of procreation as a significant human value.207   
ECHR Articles have been taken to mean that it is unlawful for States to remove 
from people the capacity to reproduce.208  However, they have not been taken 
to establish a legal right to successful treatment.   
 
In considering the meaning of the rights protected by Article 12, the right to 
marry and found a family the presiding Judge at first instance in the Evans case, 
Justice Wall, commented that: 
 
The two rights identified in article 12 are expressed conjunctively.  
However, even if I were able to read them disjunctively, as Mr 
Tolson and Miss Freeborn invited me to, and assume that the right 
to found a family can exist independently of the right to marry 
(which is plainly not engaged) it does not seem to me that they 
benefit either claimant in the instant case.  The right to found a 
family through IVF can only, put at its highest, amount to the right 
to have access to IVF treatment.  Self-evidently, it cannot be a 
right to be treated successfully.  Furthermore, it is a right which is 
qualified by availability, suitability for treatment and cost.  Once it 
is clear, as in my judgment it is, that the consensual scheme for IVF 
treatment contained in the Act (and to which both claimants have 
had access) is lawful and does not breach article 8 of the 
Convention, it must follow that there is no breach of article 12.209 
 
                                                             
207 McLean, Choosing Children, 17. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health and Another 
intervening) Hadley v Midland Fertility Services Ltd and Others (Secretary of State for Health and 
Another intervening) [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam) at para. 264. 
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Justice Wall clearly had doubts that the right to found a family could be applied 
to anyone other than those within a marital relationship.  This doubt was legally 
well founded as if the intention of the drafters of the ECHR had been that the 
right to marry and found a family were to exist independently of one another it 
can be assumed that they would have made express provision to that effect.210  
This thesis is concerned with a wider array of procreative choices than the right 
of a married couple to have a child.  In that regard the right to marry and found 
a family is not an adequate source for a right to procreative liberty upon which 
this thesis relies.  However, the protection a right to marry and found a family 
was said in Evans to provide, namely, the right of married couples to access ART 
services, is at least a restricted version of a right to procreative liberty which 
this thesis relies.  Recent changes to allow same sex marriage in England and 
Wales and similar legislation introduced in Scotland will lessen some of the 
problems here at least in so far as the scope of Article 12 protection is 
concerned.211   
 
 
Article 14 which secures the enjoyment of the other rights set out in the 
convention without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status, was also 
held not to be engaged in the facts and circumstances surrounding Evans.  One 
of the main difficulties for the Court was deciding upon a comparator against 
which the question of whether Ms Evans had been discriminated against could be 
tested.  The three Court of Appeal Judges were divided on the issue.  The 
majority decided that the correct comparator was between a women seeking 
treatment whose partner had withdrawn his consent and a woman whose partner 
had not.  In her minority judgment, Arden LJ took the alternative view that the 
relevant comparator was between an infertile woman who had created frozen 
embryos using ART and a fertile woman who had created an embryo inside her 
                                                             
210 In the case of Goodwin v UK (Application No. 28957/95, July 11 2002), the Court held that the 
ability to found a family was not required as a condition for a right to marry but did not 
determine the opposite. 
211 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014. 
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body through sexual intercourse.  In any event the Grand Chamber unanimously 
held that the terms of the HFE Act 1990 did not violate Article 14.  The court 
held that if differences in treatment between Ms Evans and the comparator (a 
woman who was able to conceive without assistance) were objectively and 
reasonably justified then there could be no discrimination.  The reasons for 
finding that domestic law had not exceeded the State's margin of appreciation in 
balancing the parties' Article 8 rights also served to establish that there had 
been no violation of Article 14. 
  
The Evans case which looked at procreative rights in the context of a right to 
marry and found a family, the right to private and family life and the right to be 
free from discrimination is interesting because it highlights the different facets 
of what a right to procreative liberty might entail.  The right to procreative 
liberty is essentially an amalgam of rights212 which include a right to make 
procreative choices without State interference, a right to make procreative 
choices without discrimination and a right to equal treatment when it comes to 
respect for procreative choice.  However, while the language of human rights is 
important to any analysis of a right to procreative liberty, viewing such a right 
within a legalistic framework can disguise the moral basis of the right. 
 
While a great many of the arguments for a right to procreative liberty can be 
framed in terms of human rights, in Emily Jackson’s view: 
 
Rights, in the narrow sense envisaged by the Human Rights Act 
1998, are unlikely to transform the regulation of reproduction in 
the UK. Nevertheless, I would argue that a more broadly conceived 
right to respect for reproductive autonomy is demanded by basic 
principles of justice, liberty and moral tolerance.213 
 
What then would that ‘broadly conceived right for reproductive autonomy’ 
actually mean in practice?  While the Evans case did not provide support for an 
                                                             
212 McLean, Choosing Children, 212. 
213 Jackson, Regulating Reproduction, 9. 
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argument that one person’s right to procreative liberty could take precedence 
over another’s right to procreative liberty on human rights grounds it did in the 
view of Ruth Chadwick demonstrate: 
 
How unclear the notion of a right to reproduce, although so 
frequently appealed to, remains - who’s right, and to what?  What 
does reproductive autonomy amount to where one person's exercise 
of it appears to deny it to someone else?  To deal with such 
conflicts requires more than common sense, and perhaps more than 
the language of rights.214 
 
In a paper seeking to address the question of why procreative liberty is valuable 
Nicola Priaulx makes the point that when seeking to explore that question a 
legal framing of the matter might well prove counterproductive.215  The Evans 
case involved the deployment of highly specific rules to determine who won the 
case.  Priaulx is of the view that while this is necessary in a court room setting, 
when thinking about the value of procreative liberty such an approach is too 
narrow.  The language of rights can mask the moral arguments which the rights 
are founded upon and is not the language used in the context of our daily lives 
when discussing procreation.  Priaulx is of the view that when looking at the 
value of a right to procreative liberty the social dimension of procreation n must 
be the starting point.216   
 
Priaulx grapples with the question of whether a right not to procreate can trump 
a right to procreate, a conclusion which the case of Evans might be said to 
support, or at least of equal value thus drawing a stalemate.  In examining this 
question Priaulx makes the point that ‘the notion that reproductive autonomy is 
less about the kinds of reproductive decisions (i.e. right to reproduce) and more 
about its instrumentality to the fostering of human needs is an important 
                                                             
214 R. Chadwick, Reproductive Autonomy – A Special Issue, Bioethics, Vol. 21, Number 6, 2007, ii, 
ii. 
215 N. Priaulx, Rethinking progenitive conflict: why reproductive autonomy matters, Medical Law 
Review, 2008, 16(2), 169 - 200, 173. 
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distinction to draw’.217  As respect for one’s bodily autonomy is a particularly 
important aspect of a sense of self then when there is an apparent conflict 
between procreative decisions then the importance of bodily autonomy must 
determine whose right to procreative liberty is protected.  The right to 
procreative liberty cannot then be founded upon human rights recognised under 
the international declarations but is founded more on the value which is placed 
upon the ‘instrumentality for fostering one's human needs and interests given 
their centrality to our well-being and sense of self.’218 
 
How might this relate to the question of whether or not section 13(5) represents 
an arbitrary interference in a person’s right to procreative liberty?  The question 
which Priaulx seeks to address is – Why is procreative autonomy so valuable?  If 
section 13(5) was to be applied to a couple seeking access to ART it would be a 
denial of procreative liberty which ‘prevents one from an experience that is 
central to individual identity and meaning in life’.219  This idea will be returned 
to in more detail in Chapter Five. 
 
 
2.14 Conclusion 
In conclusion then procreative decisions should be protected from unjustified 
State interference to a significant extent by virtue of a right to procreative 
liberty.  Whilst this right does not entitle an individual to make demands on 
others in order for their particular procreative choice to be realised, it should go 
so far as to afford people the right to non-interference based on respect for 
procreative liberty provided that this does not bring about significant harm to 
others.  The vital importance of procreation to human values should warrant 
procreative liberty being granted ‘presumptive primacy’ where conflicts arise.220   
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State interference in procreative liberty has in the past resulted in quite horrific 
consequences.  While justifications were put forward for this interference and 
widely accepted, as the justifications were not based on actual evidenced harm, 
but relied on pseudo-scientific claims and discriminatory attitudes, there was in 
actual fact no ethical basis for these proposed justifications.  The past illustrates 
the importance of not being complacent when it comes to justifying State 
interference in procreative liberty.  As the eugenics programmes in the USA 
illustrate, even when fundamental human rights are an integral part of a 
nation’s law, serious infringement of a right to procreative liberty is still 
possible. 
 
That is not to say that the right to procreative liberty is an absolute right.  The 
right is founded upon rights to bodily autonomy and self determination.  
Procreation is an action which creates a child who, when born, undoubtedly will 
have rights and interests and which enables a person to establish a parenting 
relationship with the child.  When the State intervenes in the parent/child 
relationship by removing the child when there is suspicion of neglect or abuse, 
such interference is completely justified on child welfare grounds when there is 
evidence of significant harm.  However, it is more difficult to see how 
procreative liberty, choices to seek to have children and to create parenting 
relationships, can justifiably be interfered with on this basis.  Chapter Five will 
return to this question when examining whether child welfare concerns are 
justification for denying patients access to ART treatment. 
 
Prior to the discussion on child welfare however it is necessary to set out a more 
thorough analysis of the regulation of ART in the UK and the reasons behind the 
implementation of the current system in place.  It will be illustrative to look at 
the function and purpose of regulation in an effort to understand the extent to 
which the state seeks to exercise control over it in certain areas in the UK, in 
particular access to treatment. In doing so this thesis will be able to develop its 
arguments that the regulation governing access to treatment has been overly 
influenced by the thinking behind the child welfare principle, which will be 
examined in Chapter Four, and that it should be amended because as it currently 
stands it represents an unjustified interference in a right to procreative liberty. 
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Regulation in the form of section 13(5) is of course a form of interference 
allowing the State to exercise control over who is permitted to access ART 
services.   
 
What the next chapter seeks to build on from the arguments set out in this 
chapter is to examine whether the regulation prevents people from exercising 
their right to procreative liberty in the absence of any evidence that that 
decision will cause significant harm to another. 
 
Martin Johnson has made the point that:   
 
It is incumbent upon those who wish to regulate to demonstrate: (i) 
that in doing so they have clear, worthy and justifiable objectives 
based on sound principles; (ii) that these objectives cannot be met 
within a deregulated framework; and, perhaps most important of 
all, (iii) that the regulatory framework proposed will allow the 
maximum responsible expression of creativity for doctors and 
scientists and of responsible choice and self-determination for 
patients. 
 
The next chapter will set out in detail the development of regulation in this area 
- what section 13(5) actually says and does by way of regulating access to ART 
and examining the thinking behind the introduction and retention of section 
13(5) in the Houses of Parliament to provide the means to evaluate the 
restriction on procreative liberty that this represents.   
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CHAPTER THREE – THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CHILD WELFARE PRINCIPLE 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the justifications for claims that people have a 
right to procreative liberty and how such a right had been neglected and 
breached in the past on spurious grounds.  It also examined the human rights law 
principles that lend support to the importance society places upon a right to 
procreative liberty.  However, it was acknowledged that there might be 
limitations on procreative liberty if there were deemed to be sufficiently 
compelling justifications.  One possible justification would be harm to others, 
and in this context it is harm to children that might be born as a result of ART 
that requires consideration.  This chapter seeks to examine the specific ways in 
which the welfare of the child principle is dealt with by the legislation governing 
ART in the UK in order to provide a clearer picture of the regulatory framework 
which the State has chosen to implement in an effort to ensure that the welfare 
of the child is protected to the degree which the State has deemed to be 
appropriate.  The purpose of this chapter is not to question whether there 
should be any regulation of ART at all as it takes as its starting point that 
regulation is the established and current state of affairs. However it is intended 
to consider the appropriateness of regulation which can restrict access to ART on 
child welfare grounds.  Given such regulation it is important to examine the 
criteria against which it should be measured.  It is one thing to claim that 
regulation is justified in this area; it is quite another to put in place justifiable 
regulation.  
 
This chapter examines whether the State, through legislation, and the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, through its policy and practice has 
satisfied the burden of demonstrating that the current regulation is fulfilling the 
objectives which Johnson sees as important. This will have a particular focus on 
how the current regulation is or is not maximising self-determination for 
patients.   
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As outlined in Chapter One it is section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 which requires 
that licensed clinics take into account the welfare of the child to be born and 
any existing child prior to providing   treatment services for women that are 
governed by this legislation. This thesis will argue that the UK Government 
should propose legislation to amend section 13(5) and the Code of Practice to 
remove the parental ability assessment requirements.  The reasons they should 
do so will be argued in greater detail in Chapter Five but can be briefly 
summarised here as being because this part of section 13(5) is discriminatory, 
impracticable and inconsistent.  The crux of the issue is that if regulation is 
unworkable in practice, not achieving what it sets out to do and is not being 
applied fairly then it is not regulation which is fit for purpose. 
 
Before looking into these arguments in more detail it is necessary to set out 
some background to the regulatory framework which was put in place and why 
the UK introduced a system of statutory regulation.  There are alternatives to 
statutory regulation which existed for a time in the UK but were ultimately 
replaced.  Why this was so highlights some of the reasoning behind the current 
support for statutory regulation.  The chapter will then set out in detail the 
‘nuts and bolts’ of the regulatory regime in a general way, setting out the 
powers of the HFEA.  It will then look at the Parliamentary debates which led to 
the introduction of the legislation in 1990 and its amendment in 2008 to give a 
flavour of what Parliamentary intention was in bringing forward section 13(5).  It 
will then go on to look at the way in which concern about the welfare of the 
child to be born utilising ART has been incorporated into the regulation and the 
approach which the regulatory body takes to this important area.  It will then 
look at some of the problems with regulating in relation to a very specific group 
of people, those seeking access to ART, whilst apparently ignoring potential 
child welfare concerns in other areas.  It will then conclude with an analysis of 
whether or not the regulatory regime, particularly section 13(5) is actually 
working in practice.   
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3.2 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
The formal regulation of ART services has been in place in the United Kingdom 
now for well over 20 years.1  The body entrusted with overseeing the practice of 
ART in line with this regulation is the HFEA.  The HFEA was established in August 
1991 and consists of twenty members made up of medical and nursing 
practitioners, academics and other professional people who are all appointed by 
the UK Secretary of State for Health.2   The Chair, Vice-Chair and at least half of 
the membership must be lay persons in an effort to ensure objectivity, while at 
least one-third must be medical practitioners or scientists to ensure that there is 
a sound knowledge-base.3  The HFEA is a body corporate4 and an executive Non-
departmental Public Body sponsored by the Department of Health.5  It has its 
origins in the recommendation of the Warnock Committee that infertility 
services and embryo research should be regulated.6  The principal role of the 
HFEA is to control and monitor the activities of licensed clinics and research 
facilities.  As the HFEA has said, it is the UK’s independent regulator overseeing 
the use of gametes and embryos in fertility treatment and research.7   
 
In September 2010 the Government announced plans to scrap the HFEA along 
with 176 other ‘quangos’ in a move designed to cut costs.8  The Public Bodies 
                                                             
1 The HFE Act 1990 received Royal Assent on 1 November 1990. 
2 In accordance with the HFE Act 1990 schedule 1 paragraph 4(1). 
3 In accordance with the HFE Act 1990 sch. 1 paras. 4(3) and (4). 
4 Established by HFE Act 1990 section 5. 
5 See www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/HFEA_standing_orders.pdf (accessed 25 May 2011). 
6 The Warnock Report, para. 13.3. 
7 See www.hfea.gov.uk (accessed 25 May 2011). 
8 See www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11407174 (accessed on 27 May 2011) - Television 
Interview with Linda Jardine of HFEA quango – ‘We will hold the line’, 24 September 2010. 
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Act 20119 provided Ministers with powers to abolish specified bodies or offices, 
of which the HFEA was one.10  However, in January 2013 the Government 
backtracked on this proposal following a public consultation exercise.  In their 
response to the public consultation11 the Government decided that: 
 
We will not pursue a transfer of functions at the present time.  
However, retaining the HFEA and the HTA with further efficiencies 
must take account of the support for a review of the way in which 
the two bodies undertake their functions, with a view to reducing 
the regulatory burden.  It must also include a programme of work 
on achieving efficiencies to deliver streamlining of their non-
specialist functions.12  
 
The Government went on to say: 
 
In line with our conclusion above, the Department will arrange an 
immediate independent review of the way in which the HFEA and 
the HTA undertake their regulatory functions.  
 
The independent review13 which followed included recommendations to retain 
the HFEA as a separate Non-Departmental Public Body in order to ensure 
                                                             
9 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/24/contents/enacted (accessed on 4 February 
2014).  The legislation received Royal Assent on 14 December 2011 and commenced on 14 
February 2012. 
10 Public Bodies Act 2011 sec. 1 and sch. 1. 
11 Government response to the consultation on proposals to transfer functions from the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Human Tissue Authority, Department of Health, 
Published 25 January 2013. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/health/201
3/01/response-hfea-hta/ (accessed on 4 February 2014) (hereinafter ‘Government Response’). 
12 Government Response, para. 69. 
13 Review of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority and the Human Tissue Authority, 
April 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-human-fertilisation-
embryology-authority-and-human-tissue-authority (accessed on 10 February 2014). 
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maintenance of public confidence in the activities it regulates,14 to have the 
HFEA review and strengthen their arrangements for consulting with stakeholders 
on their approach to regulatory activities to improve transparency,15 and for the 
HFEA to conduct their own review of the balance of its regulatory focus to 
ensure that it reflected the relative risks of the different activities that it 
oversaw.16  All the recommendations of the independent review were accepted 
by the Government.17  The author of the independent review concluded that the 
regulatory regime operated by the HFEA was achieving its primary purpose of 
‘providing effective public protection and commanding public confidence in 
sensitive, complex, and dynamic areas’ and that there were thus ‘no public 
protection or public confidence drivers for changes in the regulatory 
landscape’.18 
 
So despite the Government proposals to significantly alter the regulatory 
framework, the role which the HFEA performs in relation to the regulation of 
ART continues largely unaltered for the time being.19  The stakeholders sent a 
clear message to the Government that any changes to the framework would risk 
damaging public confidence in the regulatory regime.  One of the proposed 
objectives of the Government’s original proposals was ‘strengthening the 
effectiveness of regulation in this area – recognising that effective regulation 
enforcement is paramount to ensure public confidence and protect health and 
safety.’20  This statement provides some insight into the view that the 
                                                             
14 Ibid., Recommendation 1. 
15 Ibid., Recommendation 4. 
16 Ibid., Recommendation 10. 
17 Department of Health, Response to the Review of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology 
Authority and the Human Tissue Authority, July 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-human-fertilisation-embryology-
authority-and-human-tissue-authority (accessed on 10th February 2014). 
18 See fn 16, 28. 
19 UK Government has ‘no intention to revisit’ the HFE Act, 
www.bionews.org.uk/page_90916.asp (accessed on 16 September 2011). 
20 Government Response, para. 22.  
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Government took as to the purpose and goal of regulation in this area.  Public 
confidence was also a fundamental consideration for the various stakeholders.21 
 
Therefore, it was perhaps heartening for the HFEA to learn that 85% of the 
responses received through the public consultation were against it being 
subsumed into the Care Quality Commission.  One commonly expressed reason 
for not transferring its functions was that it had ‘developed considerable 
expertise in highly specialised fields and [was] trusted and respected by the 
regulated sectors.’22  Interestingly however the British Fertility Society which 
represents a large number of fertility clinicians, nurses, scientists and others 
who work in the field, were supportive of the proposed transfer because ‘There 
are no compelling reasons to continue to regulate IVF as a distinct category of 
treatment, and some serious downsides to doing so’.23  So whilst the proposed 
changes to the HFEA will not be happening there are still some outstanding 
questions and disagreement as to the role regulation should play in this area of 
medical practice.  The HFEA having been established almost 25 years ago 
continues as the body authorised by Government to oversee the regulation of 
ART.  It describes its current role as ‘setting standards for clinics, licensing 
them, and providing a range of information for the public, particularly people 
seeking treatment, donor-conceived people and donors.’24  The HFEA stated in 
2014 that they will over the next three years undertake to improve the quality 
and standard of care through their regulatory activities; improve the lifelong 
experience of donors, donor-conceived people, patients using donor conception 
and their wider families; use the data in the registrar of treatments to improve 
outcomes and research; ensure that patients have access to high quality 
meaningful information; ensure the HFEA remains demonstrably good value for 
the public, the sector and Government.25   
                                                             
21 Government Response, para. 37. 
22 Government Response, para. 36. 
23 Government Response, para. 39. 
24 HFEA, HFEA Strategy 2014 – 2017. 
25 Ibid. 
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The regulation of ART in the form of the HFE Acts 1990 and 2008 has a fairly 
lengthy history which went through various stages of development.  In the 
beginning, the science and its application were unregulated.  There then 
followed a period of self-regulation, before statutory regulation was formally 
introduced in 1990.  The form that the statutory regulation took was influenced 
by the way in which non-regulation and self-regulation had previously operated.  
Therefore, it is worth spending some time analysing the past to explain how the 
situation in regard to statutory regulation restricting access to ART on the 
grounds of child welfare got us to where we are today.  
 
 
3.3 The Unregulated System 
The birth of the first ‘test-tube’ baby in 1978 acted as the catalyst for 
widespread public debate which eventually led to the establishment of the 
HFEA.26  However, there was an extensive period of time, from 1968 to 1985, 
when specific regulation of ART research or treatment, above and beyond the 
rules of medical ethics pertinent to all medical practice and research, was non-
existent.27  In Johnson’s view the unregulated period between 1968 and 1985 
had a number of advantages, not least the freedom it allowed scientists to 
develop new ideas in the field.  As Johnson says: 
 
Perhaps the most powerful argument [in favour of no regulation] is 
the maximized creativity and freedom of ideas, action, exploration 
and discovery that such a situation brings.  Science and medicine at 
their most innovative and imaginative are the province of the 
                                                             
26 R.L. Stenger, The Law and Assisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom and United States, 
Journal of Law and Health, 1994-1995, vol. 9, 135 - 161, 139. 
27 M.H. Johnson, Should the use of assisted reproduction techniques be deregulated? The UK 
experience: options for change, Human Reproduction, 1998, vol.13, no.7, 1769–1776, 1770. 
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adventurous, the non-conventional, the opportunist, the risk-taker 
and the boundary crosser.28 
 
Interestingly Johnson was writing at the time of another great medical advance 
in the field of embryology, the creation of the cloned ‘Dolly the Sheep’.29  It is 
also of note that following the creation of Dolly the Sheep there was swift action 
as a working group consisting of members of the HFEA and of the Human 
Genetics Advisory Commission was established to look at the issue of human 
cloning.  Thereafter the Human Reproductive Cloning Act (2001) was passed 
which made reproductive human cloning illegal in the UK.30  It certainly appears 
that whenever science advances in a way which is unsettling to the general 
public there are calls for the review of the regulatory framework governing the 
field.  As Johnson noted ‘The successful reproductive cloning of Dolly using a 
nucleus from an adult sheep cell has stimulated a resurgence of discussion about 
whether and how to control the development and therapeutic application of all 
the new assisted reproduction technologies’. 31 
 
Johnson goes on to make the important point that it was in an unregulated 
environment that the whole research project aimed at alleviating infertility 
through IVF began.32  He asks the question whether or not the work of Edwards 
and Steptoe would have proceeded at all if regulation had been in place at that 
time.33  Johnson suggests that deregulation is the political philosophy 
underpinning the free market economy and is often heralded in the field of 
                                                             
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 HFEA Website, Cloning issues in reproductive science, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/518.html 
(accessed on 25 June 2014). 
31 M.H. Johnson, Should the use of assisted reproduction techniques be deregulated? The UK 
experience: options for change, Human Reproduction, 1998, vol.13, no.7, 1769–1776, 1771. 
32 Ibid., 1770. 
33 Ibid. 
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economics34 and asks ‘why should not scientists and doctors also be set free to 
explore the boundaries of their imagination and expand the boundaries of 
reproductive manipulation?’35  However, it is worth noting as an aside that one 
major concern commonly voiced with respect to ART is that it involves the 
commoditisation of embryos and pregnancy and this may be one reason why 
deregulation on a free market model is opposed.36 
 
While the period of non-regulation left the way clear for innovative scientists to 
forge ahead, the science was not without its critics who expressed their 
concerns and put certain obstacles in the way of unfettered research and 
application of novel techniques in medical treatment.  Edwards and Steptoe’s 
application for funding to the Medical Research Council (MRC) for long-term 
support for a programme of scientific and clinical ‘Studies on Human 
Reproduction’ was declined on the basis of concerns over the safety and well-
being of patients and potential offspring.37  The MRC’s stated reasons for refusal 
were on ethical grounds.  They wanted to see experiments carried out on 
primates first and had serious reservations about the experimental nature of the 
work.38  Furthermore the Chief Medical Officer at the Department of Health and 
Social Services did not believe that public money should be spent on 
experiments which might produce abnormal offspring.39  The work of Edwards 
                                                             
34 Although it should be noted that Johnson was writing prior to the banking crisis of 2008 which 
led many to question the wisdom of unbridled deregulation in this area. 
35 M.H. Johnson, Should the use of assisted reproduction techniques be deregulated? The UK 
experience: options for change, Human Reproduction, 1998, vol.13, no.7, 1769 – 1776, 1770. 
36 See for example, A. Banerjee, An insight into the ethical issues related to in vitro fertilization, 
The Internet Journal of Health, 2006, Volume 6, Number 1. 
37 M.H. Johnston, S.B. Franklin, M. Cottingham, N. Hopwood, Why the Medical Research Council 
refused Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe support for research on human conception in 1971, 
Human Reproduction, 2010, Volume 25, Issue 9, 2157 - 2174. 
38 Ibid., 2158. 
39 M.H. Johnson, Should the use of assisted reproduction techniques be deregulated? The UK 
experience: options for change, Human Reproduction, 1998, vol.13, no.7, 1769 – 1776, 1770. 
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and Steptoe continued with the use of private money until the birth of Louise 
Brown in 1978 turned the MRC into enthusiastic backers of ART.40 
 
As this thesis is focused on the impact of child welfare concerns upon the 
current regulation of ART services, it is interesting to note that some of the first 
opposition to this work centred on concerns for the physical welfare of the 
potential child.  The view that children who might be born through the use of 
ART required some sort of protection influenced the debate on regulation of this 
field from the outset. 
 
Edwards himself was aware of the social and ethical issues surrounding his work 
and in 1971 asked the question; did anything need to be done to regulate the 
application of these new scientific advances.41  Edwards was of the opinion that 
the difficulty with regulation was that it contained an implicit direction for the 
scientist to ask permission before carrying out his/her work.42  Edwards noted 
the great strides science had taken when the need to ask the permission of the 
Church disappeared.43  One of Edwards’ fears was that the State would 
appropriate the science of human embryology and turn all research over to a 
government agency.  In his view:  
 
If some form of regulation is required, perhaps what is needed is 
not heavy handed public statute, or rule making committees, or the 
conscience of individual doctors, but a simple organisation easily 
                                                             
40 M.H. Johnston, S.B. Franklin, M. Cottingham, N. Hopwood, Why the Medical Research Council 
refused Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe support for research on human conception in 1971, 
Human Reproduction, 2010, Volume 25, Issue 9, 2157-2174, 2157. 
41 R.G. Edwards and D.J. Sharpe, Social values and research in human embryology, Nature, 231, 
87-91, 89.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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approachable and consulted to advise and assist biologists and 
others to reach their own decisions.  Such an organisation must 
represent widespread but uncommitted interests and be free of 
partisan politics.  It would frame public debate, act as a watchdog, 
and yet interfere minimally with the independence of science.44   
 
It is arguable whether or not this is what Edwards saw being introduced in the 
end.  Whether the HFEA is a simple, easily approachable organisation offering 
advice and assistance, or a body created through heavy-handed statute is a 
matter of debate.  However, by the time legislation was being considered, the 
focus had shifted somewhat from concerns about the physical welfare of the 
potential child to upholding the special status of the embryo.  Given the 
concerns and arguments surrounding the status to be afforded the human 
embryo,45 ART was not being seen as just any other medical procedure and 
extensive regulation of human embryology was considered necessary.   
 
While an unregulated state of affairs was useful in the early stages of the 
development of ART, it was acknowledged at the time that scientific research 
should not go beyond what was tolerable to the wider society.46  There had to be 
room for consultation between the scientific community and the general public 
to ensure that public confidence was maintained.  For this reason there was a 
good deal of support amongst scientists for a system of self-regulation.  As 
Edwards said himself:  
 
                                                             
44 Ibid., 90 
45 The Warnock Committee actually reached the conclusion that the embryo was ‘special’ and 
should be treated with ‘respect’. The Warnock Report, para. 11.7. 
46 J. Gunning and V. English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
Vermont, 1993, 41a (henceforth, Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization). 
107 
 
Forms of regulations or consultation immediately between laisser-
faire and state pre-emption might be useful.  In many professions 
various forms of self-regulation exist already, and could be adapted 
to meet present needs..........Delegating regulations to individual 
physicians or medical organisations is an attractive possibility.47 
  
In the UK a system of self regulation was introduced between 1985 and 1991 in 
the form of the Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA) which became for a short 
period of time the Interim Licensing Authority (ILA), a forerunner to the HFEA.  
The next section will look at that system of self regulation and examine why it 
was replaced by a more formal system of statutory regulation.  It is of note that 
this debate is still ongoing particularly in the USA where according to one 
commenter lack of formal regulation has led to a ‘reproductive free-for-all’.48 
 
 
3.4 The System of Self Regulation 
In November 1984 the MRC Advisory Group met to co-ordinate their response to 
the recently published Warnock Committee Report.49  The Group welcomed the 
recommendation that a statutory authority should be set up and proposed that 
some interim arrangements be put in place.  At the same time the Warnock 
Committee was generating heated debate in Parliament, principally on the issue 
of human embryo research.50  The House of Lords called for a moratorium on 
human embryo research until such time as legislation was enacted.51  The VLA 
                                                             
47 R.G. Edwards and D.J. Sharpe, Social values and research in human embryology, Nature, 231, 
87-91, 90. 
48 K. Riggan, Regulation (or Lack Thereof) of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the U.S. and 
Abroad, Dignitas, 17(1 & 2), Spring/Summer 2010, 8-11. 
49 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 41. 
50 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 41-42. 
51 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 41-42. 
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was hastily established to counter the serious threat to continuing research 
contained in Enoch Powell’s Unborn Children (Protection) Bill, which was 
receiving widespread support in Parliament.52  The remit of the VLA was to 
approve a Code of Practice on research related to human fertilisation and 
embryology; to invite all centres, clinicians and scientists engaged in research on 
IVF to submit their work for approval and licensing; to visit each centre prior to 
granting a licence; and to make known publically details of approved and 
unapproved work.53  The uptake of licences issued by the VLA was a resounding 
success with practitioners keen to show that their work had been afforded some 
sort of official approval.54  Whilst the aim of setting up the VLA was to ward off 
the prohibitions to research proposed by Powell’s Bill the organisation later 
became the Interim Licensing Authority (ILA), one of the motives being that 
practitioners wished to emphasis the desire for statutory guidance and 
protection from claims of unethical behaviour in the face of uncertainty as to 
what they were and were not allowed to do.55  
 
There were certain advantages to a system of self-regulation such as the fact 
that the regulators were from the profession and therefore knowledgeable about 
the type of work being carried out.  Whilst the VLA was not endowed with legal 
powers to enforce its code of practice, the potential for the withdrawal of its 
endorsement of a clinic was a powerful means through which it could ensure 
compliance.  The VLA code of practice also played a significant role in the initial 
considerations surrounding the question of how ART might impact upon the 
welfare of the children born as a result.  The code of practice ‘Guidelines for 
both Clinical and Research Applications of Human in vitro Fertilisation’ 
contained a clause which read: 
                                                             
52 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 42; M. Mulkay, The embryo research debate 
– Science and the politics of reproduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 24-29. 
53 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 45. 
54 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 48. 
55 M.H. Johnson, Should the use of assisted reproduction techniques be deregulated? The UK 
experience: options for change, Human Reproduction, 1998, vol.13, no.7, 1769 – 1776, 1771. 
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The following general considerations must be taken into account 
when establishing clinical facilities where in vitro fertilisation or 
GIFT is carried out: detailed records must be kept along the lines 
recommended in the Warnock Committee Report, and should 
include details of the children born as a result of in vitro 
fertilisation; the records should be readily available for 
examination by duty authorised staff for collation on a national 
basis for a follow-up study.56 
 
Clinics were asked to provide these records to Dr Valerie Beral who was carrying 
out a follow-up study of children born as a result of IVF.  The study found that 
multiple pregnancies which frequently resulted from assisted conception were 
the main determinant of complications during pregnancy and of the health of 
the children at the time of birth.  The study also found that overall 
malformation rates were similar to those in the country as a whole.  However, 
there were insufficient numbers of children studied at the time to draw firm 
conclusions about the risk of specific types of malformations.  Continued 
monitoring of children resulting from assisted conception and the continued co-
operation of individuals and centres practising assisted conception were 
recommended.57  It is clear, then, that the physical welfare of the children 
resulting from assisted conception was a particular area of concern between 
1985 and 1991, although, beyond the increased risks associated with multiple 
births, the research did not provide particularly strong confirmation of grounds 
for this concern. 
 
                                                             
56 Guidelines for both Clinical and Research Applications of Human in vitro Fertilization, Clause 
13(b) at Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 187. 
57 V. Beral, P. Doyle, S.L. Tan, B.A. Mason, S. Campbell, Outcomes of pregnancies resulting from 
assisted conception, British Medical Bulletin, (1990) Vol. 46, No. 3, 753-768. 
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The idea of making value judgements on the ‘type’ of people who should be 
offered treatment and be ‘allowed’ to become parents was raised in 1984 in the 
Warnock Committee Report which - as has previously been noted - stated that 
‘we believe that as a general rule it is better for children to be born into a two-
parent family, with both father and mother’.58  However the Warnock 
Committee considered the welfare of the future child and concluded that ‘hard 
and fast rules are not applicable’59, preferring to leave the final access to 
treatment decision in the hands of the consultant.  Although the Committee 
recommended that anyone seeking infertility treatment should be provided with 
the opportunity of advice and investigation, it could also:  
  
...foresee occasions where the consultant may, after discussion 
with professional health and social work colleagues, consider that 
there are valid reasons why infertility treatment would not be in 
the best interests of the patient, the child that may be born 
following that treatment, or the patient’s immediate family.60   
 
In McLean’s opinion the Warnock Committee Report was relatively inconclusive 
on the question of whether access to treatment should depend upon parenting 
ability.61  That said the Warnock Committee clearly envisaged situations where a 
clinic might consider a patient unsuitable for treatment for reasons unrelated to 
medical issues.62  While the Warnock Committee had raised the question of the 
suitability of a patient in terms of allowing access to ART, the self-regulatory 
regime did not address this issue directly.  It did not, for example, form part of 
                                                             
58 The Warnock Report, para 2.11. 
59 The Warnock Report, para 2.13. 
60 The Warnock Report, para 2.12. 
61 S. McLean, Assisted Reproduction and the Welfare of the Child, (Cardiff Centre for Ethics, Law 
and Society, 2005), 1. 
62 Ibid., 2. 
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the VLA’s Guidelines for both Clinical and Research Applications of Human in 
vitro Fertilisation.63   It was not until legislation was introduced that the 
questions raised by the Warnock Committee in 1984 were addressed in terms of 
a regulatory framework.   Regulation was principally concerned with controlling 
what clinics could and could not do.  It was decided that the HFEA would exert 
this control through the issuing of licences under certain conditions.  One of 
these licence conditions was that treatment providers would take into account 
the welfare of the child to be born.  
 
 
3.5 Statutory Regulation 
The regulation of ART performs two main functions.  Firstly, it places constraints 
on the practice of fertility medicine above and beyond the standard ethical and 
legal constraints incumbent upon all medical practitioners, and, secondly, it 
places limits on what treatment patients seeking access to ART may receive.64     
As previously noted the licensing and control of clinics by the HFEA arose from a 
recommendation from the Warnock Committee Report65 which saw the primary 
objective of regulation as being the protection of the public.66  Other reasons for 
statutory regulation which have been identified included the need to allay public 
concerns about the creation, manipulation and appropriate uses of human 
embryos; to protect scientific freedom by reassuring the public that the work 
was subject to monitoring and proper control; and to protect those working in 
the field from criticisms and accusations of unethical behaviour.67  The licensing 
role of the HFEA was established to ensure that these goals were achieved.  The 
                                                             
63 Gunning and English, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 49. 
64 M. Brazier, Regulating the Reproduction Business?, Medical Law Review, 7, Summer 1999, 166-
193, 166. 
65 The Warnock Report, Chapter 13 – Regulating Infertility Services and Research. 
66 The Warnock Report, para. 13.3. 
67 V. English, Autonomy versus protection — who benefits from the regulation of IVF?, Human 
Reproduction, Vol.21, No.12, pp. 3044–3049, 2006, 3045. 
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Warnock Committee made clear it was not the intention of licensing regulation 
to interfere with the duty of the doctor to exercise clinical judgement in 
treating patients.68  However, clinics were expected to operate within a moral 
and legal framework determined by society through Parliament.69 
 
The HFE Act 1990 made it a criminal offence to bring about the creation of an 
embryo except in pursuance of a licence,70 or to keep or use an embryo except 
in pursuance of a licence.71  The HFE Act 1990 also made it a criminal offence to 
procure or distribute an embryo intended for human application except in 
pursuance of a licence or third party agreement,72 place in a woman a live 
embryo other than a human embryo,73 or place in a woman any live gametes 
other than human gametes.74  The HFE Act 1990 created similar criminal 
sanctions in relation to the storage, use, procurement or distribution of 
gametes.75   
 
The terminology in regard to the placing of a live embryo other than a human 
embryo was altered by the HFE Act 2008.  Section 3(2) now reads that no person 
shall place in a woman an embryo other than a permitted embryo (as defined by 
section 3ZA) any gametes other than permitted eggs or permitted sperm (as so 
defined).76  A permitted egg is one (a) which has been produced by or extracted 
from the ovaries of a woman, and (b) whose nuclear or mitochondrial DNA has 
                                                             
68 The Warnock Report, para. 13.1. 
69 The Warnock Report, para. 13.2. 
70 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(1) and sec. 41(2). 
71 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(1A) and sec. 41(2). 
72 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(1B) and sec. 41(2). 
73 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(2)(a) and sec. 41(1)(a). 
74 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(2)(b) and sec. 41(1)(a). 
75 HFE Act 1990 sec. 4 and sec. 41. 
76 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(2)(a) and (b) as amended by of the HFE Act 2008 sec. 3(2). 
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not been altered.77  Permitted sperm are sperm (a) which have been produced 
by or extracted from the testes of a man, and (b) whose nuclear or 
mitochondrial DNA has not been altered.78  An embryo is a permitted embryo if 
(a) it has been created by the fertilisation of a permitted egg by permitted 
sperm, (b) no nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of any cell of the embryo has been 
altered, and (c) no cell has been added to it other than by division of the 
embryo's own cells.79  Regulations may provide that (a) an egg can be a 
permitted egg, or (b) an embryo can be a permitted embryo, even though the 
egg or embryo has had applied to it in prescribed circumstances a prescribed 
process designed to prevent the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease.80  
The requirement that treatment be given to patients using only permitted 
embryos was introduced to prohibit the use of genetically modified embryos for 
reproductive purposes. 
 
A licence cannot authorise keeping or using an embryo after the appearance of 
the primitive streak,81 placing an embryo in any animal,82 keeping or using an 
embryo in any circumstances in which regulations prohibit its keeping or use, or 
replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell of 
any person,83 embryo or subsequent development of an embryo84 and it is a 
criminal offence to do any of these things, which cannot be authorised by a 
licence.85   
                                                             
77 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3ZA(2) inserted by the HFE Act 2008 sec. 3(5). 
78 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3ZA(3) inserted by HFE Act 2008 sec. 3(5). 
79 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3ZA(4) inserted by HFE Act 2008 sec. 3(5). 
80 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3ZA(5)  inserted by of the HFE Act 2008 sec. 3(5). 
81 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(3)(a). 
82 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(3)(b). 
83 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(3)(c). 
84 HFE Act 1990 sec. 3(3)(d). 
85 HFE Act 1990 sec. 41(1)(b). 
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The licensing role of the HFEA illustrates one of its leading goals which is ‘safety 
first’.86  When regulation was first proposed by the Warnock Committee in 1984 
a great deal of doubt and fear surrounded the whole practice of infertility 
treatment, as Mulkay has observed ‘The reception given to the Warnock Report 
in 1984 showed that many people, in parliament and in society at large, were 
deeply disturbed to find that there was no law dealing with research on human 
embryos and no formal procedures whereby scientists? could be made 
accountable for their use of human embryos’.87  As a consequence, the HFE Act 
1990 created a regulatory body tasked with keeping a close eye on what was 
happening within clinics and research facilities.  As discussed, the HFEA still has 
a significant role in setting standards and protecting the public and the licensing 
powers are the teeth it has to achieve this.  Nevertheless, as a result of the 
stautory provisions, the HFEA has no power to grant licences in certain areas 
which are considered to be ethically unsound, either because they undermine 
the moral status of the human embryo or are in some other way considered to be 
problematic.  
 
The HFEA is required to maintain a Code of Practice giving guidance about the 
proper conduct of activities carried on in pursuance of a licence under the Act.88  
This includes guidance for those providing treatment services about the account 
to be taken of the welfare of the children who may be born as a result of 
treatment services.89  Unlike a breach of a licence condition, a failure to observe 
any part of the Code of Practice does not in itself render a person liable to any 
                                                             
86 M. Brazier, Regulating the Reproductive Business, Medical Law Review, 7, Summer 1999, 166-
193, 173. 
87 M. Mulkay, The Embryo Research Debate: Science and Politics of Reproduction, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 3. 
88 HFE Act 1990 sec. 25(1). 
89 HFE Act 1990 sec. 25(2). 
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legal proceedings,90 but the licence committee may take the Code of Practice 
into account when deciding whether or not there has been a failure to comply 
with a licence condition91 and take into account any failure to observe any 
provisions of the Code of Practice when considering whether to vary or revoke a 
licence.92  The Code of Practice represents a different sort of rule-making which 
is designed to complement the statutory powers of the HFEA.  
 
The UK statutory regime as set out in the HFE Act 1990 has been described as ‘a 
milestone in biomedical regulation...the first attempt in English law to provide a 
comprehensive framework for making medical science democratically 
accountable’.93  Montgomery is of the view that the HFE Act 1990 operates as a 
model for establishing a workable compromise between incompatible ethical 
positions as opposed to setting out definitive solutions to resolve conflicts where 
they might arise.94  The statutory powers and duties set out above illustrate that 
the HFEA has considerable powers to determine what embryo research and 
infertility treatment will be carried out, with the creation of a system of checks 
and balances through Parliamentary oversight.  Montgomery considers that the 
HFEA licensing model of regulation is attractive because it allows for the 
continuing review of professional practice and is flexible enough to allow for 
new issues to be dealt with without recourse to Parliament.  However, he is 
more cautious in his views about how much it makes the clinicians accountable 
to the public.  Whilst he welcomed the inclusion of lay members of the HFEA he 
contends that ‘Lay participation is sought through the benevolence of the great 
and the good, not by empowering consumers.  As a result, the practical effect of 
the powers given to the licensing authority may turn out to be more the 
                                                             
90 HFE Act 1990 sec. 25(6). 
91 HFE Act 1990 sec. 25(6)(a). 
92 HFE Act 1990 sec. 25(6)(b). 
93 J. Montgomery, Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
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centralisation of medical power than the opening of professional values to public 
debate.’95  So whilst the licensing model of regulation by a non-government 
authority has some particular advantages over direct Government involvement, 
Montgomery for one is not fully convinced that the model goes far enough in 
making the practitioners accountable to the public. 
 
The role of the HFEA is to balance the risk of harm against the benefits of 
proceeding.  However, Dawson argues that the regulatory role which the HFEA 
plays is confused.96  It is tasked with what he calls its ‘narrow role’ of licensing 
and inspecting clinics, but it also has a ‘broader role’ in policy formation.  In 
Dawson’s view this has meant that the HFEA has become embroiled in difficult 
ethical decisions which have a huge impact upon the lives of the people 
involved.97  This has led to it being criticised both by those who wish to see 
greater respect for reproductive liberty and those who wish to see it act in a 
more conservative fashion.98  The regulatory model which Dawson calls for is a 
separation of the two roles.  The body tasked with the broader role of policy 
formation would be guided by: 
 
...the fundamental principle that private individuals should be able 
to make free decisions about their reproductive choices (in line 
with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act). 
This would only be subject to constraints based upon evidenced risk 
of harm to the resultant child.  No decision would be permissible 
based upon a mere assumed risk of harm but must be backed up 
with solid evidence. Such a policy would be able to take into 
account the benefits of producing children as well as removing the 
                                                             
95 Ibid., 534. 
96 Ibid., 1. 
97 The HFEA’s involvement in the Diane Blood case is a particular case in point. 
98 A. Dawson, The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: Evidence Based Policy 
Formation in a Contested Context, Health Care Analysis, Vol. 12, No.1, March 2004, 1-6, 2. 
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harm of not permitting people to have children that they would 
love.99 
 
While, as discussed in Chapter Two, there may be doubts about the extent to 
which Article 8 (and indeed Article 12) can be useful in practice to uphold 
specific procreative choices, it is undoubtedly true that human rights principles 
are engaged in this area and are seen as an aspect of respect for autonomy.  The 
focus of this thesis is whether public concern for the welfare of the child to be 
born justifies interference with procreative liberty.  One of the principal issues 
is whether it is for those who wish to restrict procreative liberty to provide 
evidence of harm, or the responsibility of those seeking to exercise make 
procreative choices to demonstrate that their choice is safe.  The next section 
will look at the way in which concern about the welfare of the child to be born 
utilising ART services has been incorporated into the regulation and the 
approach which the regulatory body takes to this important area. 
 
 
3.6 Section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 
Section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 as enacted stated that: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of the child who may be 
born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child 
for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the 
birth.100 
 
                                                             
99 Ibid., 6. 
100 A discussion of the need to take into account the welfare of any other child who may be 
affected by the birth is outwith the scope of this thesis and will not be examined in detail.  
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In order to obtain a licence a clinic had to satisfy the HFEA that it would adhere 
to this requirement.  Treatment services meant medical, surgical or obstetric 
services provided to the public or a section of the public for the purpose of 
assisting women to carry children.101  Section 25 of the HFE Act 1990 required 
the HFEA to maintain a code of practice giving guidance about the proper 
conduct of activities carried on in pursuance of a licence under the Act.102  All 
the HFEA codes of practice since 1990, eight to date, have included a section 
intended as guidance to clinics on how to apply section 13(5).  The first Code of 
Practice gave guidance on how clinics were to carry out a child welfare 
assessment in circumstances where the child would be born with no legal father. 
 
Where the child will have no legal father centres are required to 
have regard to the child’s need for a father and should pay 
particular attention to the prospective mother’s ability to meet the 
child’s needs throughout his or her childhood, and where 
appropriate whether there is anyone else within the prospective 
mother’s family and social circle who is willing and able to share 
the responsibility for meeting those needs and for bringing? up, 
maintaining and caring for the child. 103 
 
The HFEA commenced a public consultation in 2005 in order to gauge public 
opinion on guidance to licensed clinics on taking into account the welfare of a 
child born of assisted conception treatment.  The consultation paper was 
entitled ‘Tomorrow’s Children’.104  In setting out the purpose of the consultation 
exercise the HFEA stated that:  
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Since 1991, when the first Code of Practice was published, staff in 
licensed fertility clinics have acquired more than ten years’ 
experience of carrying out welfare of the child assessments.  The 
purpose of this consultation is to capture that experience and to 
gather views both on the limitations of the current guidance and on 
how it could be improved in the future. 
 
It is not within the powers of the HFEA to amend the welfare 
section in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.  Therefore, 
whilst we welcome views on the welfare principle itself, the 
primary purpose of this consultation is not to solicit suggestions on 
how the Act might be amended.  The Department of Health is 
carrying out its own review of the Act.105 
 
The consultation paper set out what the HFEA believed to be the harms that 
children born using ART might face.  The HFEA separated these possible harms 
into four categories; medical, physical, psychological and social.  Medical harms 
were defined as the risk of being born with a genetic or infectious disease due to 
a potential parent transmitting that disease to the child.  Physical harms were 
defined as the risk of a child being subjected to abuse or neglect after birth, or 
risks associated with drug or alcohol abuse during pregnancy or after birth.  
Psychological risks were classified in two ways; firstly, the risk of psychological 
harm associated with growing up in a particular family structure, such as being 
raised by a single parent, gay couple, older couple or non-genetically related 
parent(s) and secondly, the psychological risk to a child as a result of abuse and 
neglect. The latter is clearly closely associated with physical harm though this 
need not have been the cause.  Social harms were defined as care being 
compromised due to a particular factor associated with the patient(s), such as 
age, absence of a father figure or an unstable relationship.  
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This thesis is principally concerned with the assessment of what might be called 
the parenting environment which really pertains to the risk of physical or 
psychological harm that might arise from social factors.  These were identified 
by the HFEA in the report as:    
 
Any aspect of the patient’s past or current circumstances which 
means that either the child to be born or any existing child of the 
family are likely to face serious physical or psychological harm or 
neglect. Such aspects might include: 
 
(a) previous convictions relating to harming children; 
(b) child protection measures taken regarding existing children; or 
(c) serious violence or discord within the family environment. 
 
Any aspect of the patient’s past or current circumstances which is       
likely to lead to an inability to care for the child to be born or 
which is already seriously impairing the care of any existing child of 
the family. Such aspects might include: 
(a) mental or physical conditions; or 
(b) drug or alcohol abuse.106 
 
The outcome of the Tomorrow's Children consultation was to shift the burden of 
proof from requiring the prospective parents to show that there was no reason 
why they should not be provided with treatment to a ‘presumption to provide 
treatment, unless there is evidence that any child born to an individual or 
couple, or any existing child of their family, would face a risk of serious 
harm.’107  This was a significant change in emphasis and was accompanied by a 
revision of the risk factors which had to be taken into account as the HFEA 
‘concluded that broader social factors such as the stability of the relationship, 
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the commitment to having children and the age of the prospective parents, are 
unlikely to pose a risk of serious harm to the child’.108  The overall outcome from 
the report was that:  
 
There should be a presumption to provide treatment to all those 
who request it, unless there is evidence that the child to be born 
would face a risk of serious medical, physical or psychological 
harm. Clinics should collect medical and social information from 
the patient(s) about the risk factors described above. In cases 
where clinics think that the child may be at risk of serious harm, 
they should obtain the patient’s consent to make enquiries of other 
individuals, agencies or authorities in order to gather further 
factual information.109  
 
These changes to HFEA Code of Practice preceded the amendments to the 
legislation which came about following a Government consultation exercise 
undertaken by the Department of Health in the summer of 2005.  The proposals 
following this consultation exercise were contained in a paper entitled ‘Review 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for revised legislation 
(including establishment of the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos)’.110  
In parallel to this consultation exercise the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee conducted its own enquiry into Human Reproductive 
Technologies and the Law and produced its report in March 2005.111   
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In response to the consultation and enquiry Parliament eventually passed the 
HFE Act 2008 which amended (but did not delete) section 13(5) so that it now 
reads: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services, other than 
basic partner treatment services, unless account has been taken of 
the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment (including the need of that child for supportive 
parenting), and of any other child who may be affected by the 
birth. 
 
Section 25 of the HFE Act 1990 was also amended and now stipulates that the 
guidance given by the HFEA Code of Practice shall include guidance for those 
providing treatment services about the account to be taken of the welfare of 
children who may be born as a result of treatment services (including a child's 
need for a supportive parenting), and of other children who may be affected by 
such births.112 
 
The current Code of Practice provides a definition of the term ‘supportive 
parenting’, the words which replaced ‘a father’ in section 13(5) following its 
amendment by the HFE Act 2008.  It states: 
 
Supportive parenting is a commitment to the health, well being and 
development of the child.  It is presumed that all prospective 
parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any 
reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be born, or 
any other child, may be at risk of significant harm or neglect. 
Where centres have concern as to whether this commitment exists, 
they may wish to take account of wider family and social networks 
within which the child will be raised.113 
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It goes on to state that a centre providing assisted reproductive services should 
assess each patient and their partner (if they have one) before providing any 
treatment, and should use that assessment to decide whether there is a risk of 
significant harm or neglect to any child.114  While the changes to the guidance 
following the ‘Tomorrow's Children’ consultation exercise introduced a 
presumption in favour of treatment, for a couple or individual seeking access to 
infertility treatment the section 13(5) assessment still represents a fairly wide-
ranging analysis of past, present and future abilities to care for a child.  The 
language used in the current HFEA Code of Practice is almost identical to that 
used in parts of the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.   
 
In terms of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, a sheriff can make a child 
protection order removing the child to a place of safety if the sheriff is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is being so treated 
(or neglected) that he is suffering significant harm.115  In terms of the Children 
Act 1989 a court may only make a care or supervision order if satisfied that the 
child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and that the 
harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child.116  The 
Children Act 1989 defines ‘harm’ as ill-treatment or the impairment of health or 
development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing 
the ill-treatment of another.117  The parallels between the interpretation of 
section 13(5) in the HFEA Code of Practice and the child welfare principle as 
applied to children are clear.   
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The supportive parenting requirement has been described by Jackson as ‘rather 
puzzling’118 as it requires the clinician to decide whether or not to allow access 
to treatment with the aim of bringing a child into existence based on the 
welfare of that child.  This thesis will come on to address in greater detail the 
difficulties in attempting to weigh up the benefits of existence against non-
existence in a later chapter, but at present it is worth noting that in Jackson’s 
view: 
 
Section 13(5) cannot in fact be directed towards assessing whether 
being conceived would promote the child’s welfare, because if the 
alternative is not being conceived, it obviously would.  Instead 
section 13(5) requires clinics to take into account the prospective 
patent’s aptitude for parenthood.119 
 
What a licensed clinic is actually being asked to do when deciding on whether or 
not to provide a woman with treatment services when social factors are 
concerned is to make various judgements on how satisfactory a parent a patient 
seeking access treatment might become.  It has been said that:  
 
...the issue raised by s. 13(5) concerns the grounds on which 
persons may be rejected when seeking treatment services, and 
more particularly whether the regulation of assisted conception can 
become an excuse to promote values and limit persons to 
relationships seen worthy of support by the state.120    
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In the case of R. v Ethical Committee of St Mary's Hospital Ex p. Harriott121 an 
infertile woman’s application to adopt a child had been refused because of her 
criminal record for offences related to prostitution and the running of a brothel 
and because of her allegedly poor understanding of the roles of a foster-parent 
and the local authority’s social service department.  She then sought access to 
IVF treatment and saw a consultant who decided that IVF treatment should not 
be given due to these and other reasons.  The question that the facts of this 
case give rise to is whether the consultant was in any position to say that a 
person convicted of these offences would necessarily make a bad parent.  The 
Court recognised that decisions on whether to treat patients ‘will place a heavy 
burden of responsibility on the individual consultant who must make social 
judgements that go beyond the purely medical’.122  If it is necessary for 
consultants to make social judgements then the question can be asked just what 
the basis of their expertise in actually making such decisions is? 
 
This part has looked at the development of the current wording of section 13(5).  
The next will take a step back slightly and look at the Parliamentary debates 
which surrounded the HFE Act 1990 and in particular section 13(5).  It is 
important when looking at the regulation of ART in the UK to examine the 
intention of Parliament in enacting this law as that may provide guidance on how 
it was and is supposed to be applied in practice.  As will become clear there 
were many assumptions made (some might say prejudices expressed) as to what 
the important factors were in ensuring that a child born using ART was not put 
at an acceptable risk of harm.  While the terms of section 13(5) would lead one 
to believe that Parliament was motivated by child welfare concerns, the debates 
present a different picture. 
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3.7  The Political Debates 
The Warnock Committee gave consideration to the welfare of the child in regard 
to surrogacy123 and the deliberate creation of single-parent families.124  
However, what the Committee did not do was specifically recommend that a 
child welfare provision be incorporated into any legislation regulating ART.  
When the Government produced its consultation in 1986125 and its White Paper in 
1987126 there was only one specific reference to the welfare of the child, which 
pertained solely to surrogacy arrangements.  The incorporation of a general 
child welfare provision only came about after debates in the Houses of 
Parliament. 
 
In 1990, during a House of Lords debate on the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill, Lord MacKay, the then Lord Chancellor, observed: 
 
I think everyone would agree that it is important that children are 
born into a stable and loving environment and that the family is a 
concept whose health is fundamental to the health of society in 
general.  A fundamental principle to our law about children, 
including the legislation which this House considered in such detail 
last Session and which became the Children Act 1989, is that the 
welfare of children is of paramount consideration.  I think it is, for 
these general reasons, entirely right that the Bill should be 
amended to add that concept.  It could be argued that the concept 
of the welfare of the child is very broad and indeed all-embracing.  
That I think is inevitable given the very wide range of factors which 
need to be taken into account when considering the future lives of 
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children who may be born as a result of technologies to be licensed 
under the Bill.127 
 
The suggested amendment to the Bill moved by the Lord Chancellor was to the 
effect that: ‘A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result 
of the treatment, and of any other child who may be affected by the birth’.128  
This amendment was moved along with an amendment which would require the 
licensing authority to include guidelines as to the assessment of the welfare of 
children within the Code of Practice.   
 
It is of note that these proposed amendments had only been introduced 
following a debate on another amendment moved in Committee by Lady Saltoun 
which would have confined the treatments licensed by the HFE Bill to married 
couples only.129  Lady Saltoun was quite clear that the purpose of her proposed 
amendment was to prohibit the provision of Artificial Insemination by Donor 
(AID) and In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) to unmarried women, lesbian couples or 
unmarried couples.  While Lady Saltoun acknowledged that: ‘many single women 
have succeeded in giving their child a good home and upbringing, and that their 
children are wanted and very much loved’, she felt that: ‘no one would deny 
that their children must, in the nature of things, suffer some disadvantage from 
the lack of a father, if only that they have only one parent who loves them and 
belongs to them instead of two’.130  Lady Saltoun had particular concerns about 
a lack of a male role model in the home and suggested that unmarried couples 
could not be in stable relationships otherwise they would have married.  The 
whole argument of course was predicated on a belief that it was not in the best 
interests of the child to be born into a single-parent, same-sex couple or 
unmarried couple family.  
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In response Lord Ennals, while believing himself to be a family man, sharing 
family values, did not think it was his responsibility to tell other people what 
they should do.  He considered that having children was a private area of human 
affairs and it was not for the State to decide who should or should not be 
allowed to bear children.131  He felt that such a law would be ‘bossy, 
judgemental, and interfering’.132  Baroness Ewart-Biggs, while stating that she 
would always favour a nuclear family as the right setting in which to bring up 
children, made the argument that as the statistics showed that children were 
commonly raised by unmarried couples or single-parents, it was in the best 
interest of the child to support the family in whatever structure it came in.133 
 
In the end, Lady Saltoun’s amendment was defeated on a free vote, but only by 
one solitary vote.  The House of Lords felt that the course of the debate had 
raised the question of what account should be taken of the welfare of the child 
when considering allowing access to treatment.  This is worth remarking upon 
because the origins of section 13(5) do not lie in concerns arising from a broad 
concept of child welfare per se but from concerns about children being born out 
of wedlock and/or without a father present during childhood.  This attitude is 
reflected in the rest of the Lord Chancellor’s speech where he goes on to say: 
 
Among the factors which clinicians should take into account [with 
regard to the welfare of the child] will be the material 
circumstances in which the child is likely to be brought up and also 
the stability and love which he or she is likely to enjoy.  Such 
stability is clearly linked to the marital position of the woman and 
in particular whether a husband or long-term partner can play a full 
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part in providing the child with a permanent family setting in the 
fullest sense of that term, including financial provision.134 
 
This led on to consideration not only of whether the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill ought to include a stipulation that the welfare of the child 
should be taken into account, but also whether treatment services should only 
be given to a woman together with a man.  Baroness Warnock was not in favour 
of such an amendment saying: 
 
My Lords, the amendment in whatever words it was put forward 
would be difficult to enforce.  I oppose it because Amendment No. 
15 moved by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor [the 
welfare of the child amendment] has already taken care of the true 
issue, which is the good of the child, which must be considered and 
taken into account.  There is to be discussion and counselling is to 
be given to anyone who attends for treatment.135 
 
That proposed amendment was withdrawn but the issue was raised in a slightly 
different format during the House of Commons debate when the insertion of a 
clause stating that licensed clinics should take into account the child’s ‘need for 
a father’ was debated.  Ann Winterton MP’s principal concern when proposing 
this amendment was ‘absent fathers’.  She proposed that single women who 
present themselves for artificial insemination by donor should not be allowed to 
be inseminated unless they were prepared to bring forward a man who would 
stand as the ‘social father’.136  This social father would enter into an agreement 
by saying that throughout the life of the child he would be responsible for it in 
financial and other ways in the same way as a natural father.  This, in 
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Winterton’s view, was extremely important to assure the child's sense of security 
and identity.137 
 
In supporting the amendment David Wilshire MP said: 
 
For me, the word "family" means three things.  It means the family 
as a social unit, a financial unit, and a biological unit... As to the 
family being a social unit... when speaking of the family in this 
context, we are seeking to speak up for the traditional values and 
standards of society that have stood us in good stead for a long 
time.  It is clear to me that the traditional social family unit in this 
country is, for better or worse, a unit of a mother and a father in a 
stable, long-term relationship... As to the family being a financial 
unit... It is clear also that looking after a young child requires the 
combined efforts of two people.  If one refers to the evidence 
provided by those who are often referred to as the new poor, 
figuring largely among them are the single mums with their young 
children who look desperately to the state to provide the financial 
security that they need to be able to cope.  As to the family being a 
biological unit... fathers still have a role to play in the process 
somewhere.  It is important that we should make it clear that the 
father's role does not begin and end at conception.138 
 
The amendment was passed and licensed clinics were required as part of their 
licensing conditions to take into account the welfare of the child including the 
child’s ‘need for a father’ when considering whether or not to allow access to 
treatment.  What the original debates in the Houses of Parliament were really 
about were as one MP put it, ‘the welfare of the family’139 not the welfare of 
the child, although at the same time the accepted wisdom among many 
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politicians then was that a child’s welfare would suffer if the child was raised 
outwith a traditional family unit.  This position lasted for a period of 15 years 
before pressure from the lesbian community in particular and changes in societal 
attitudes meant that a change was considered necessary.140  As McCandless and 
Shedlon noted ‘the 2008 Act would provide an opportunity to update the 
legislation in the light of changing social and familial norms, most notably with 
respect to the recognition of single and same-sex parents.’141 
 
As has been said, the HFE Act 2008 removed the ‘need for a father’ 
consideration and replaced it with the ‘need for supportive parenting’.  The 
Government originally intended simply to remove the ‘need for a father’ 
provision from the legislation, in recognition of the range of different family 
models that exist.142  There was never an intention to remove the requirement 
for the welfare of the child to be taken into account and there was little, if any, 
discussion around this point.  Following strong objections to the removal of the 
‘need for a father’ provision the Government tabled the ‘supportive parenting’ 
amendment.  The Bill included amendments which provided clear recognition of 
same-sex couples as legal parents of children conceived through the use of 
donated sperm, eggs or embryos. 
 
In contrast Baroness Deech, a former Chair of the HFEA, opposed the 
amendment saying:143 
 
The requirement is, after all, only to consider the need; it is not an 
absolute ban on treatment by any means, and it is well known that 
many single women and gay couples receive IVF treatment at clinics 
and have children...  The current law does no more than require 
that a doctor checks whether there is a male in the social circle—
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for example, a grandfather—and causes parents to reflect on how 
to cope with the situation...I would argue that the present law is 
not discriminatory. It applies to men and women: heterosexual 
couples, homosexual couples, married, cohabiting and others. Even 
if it were discriminatory, it is justified on the ground that the 
welfare of the child is paramount. [emphasis added]. 
 
Also in support of retaining the clause Baroness Williams of Corby said: 
 
My main concern is that research shows conclusively in fields such 
as education and educational achievement that a child who has a 
male model as well as a female model is likely to do considerably 
better than one who does not have that male model...I refer in this 
context to the very interesting research done by Professor Carol 
Gilligan in the United States and her book In a Different Voice.  She 
goes at length into the ways in which little girls and little boys 
develop. In no sense is one more able than the other. Simply, one is 
rather different from the other, and a child will benefit from 
understanding from its babyhood what a man and a woman 
constitute and how they should complement each other.144 
 
In support of the amendment, Baroness Hollis pointed out that: ‘Either the need 
for a father contained in a phrase or clause in the Bill carries meaning or it does 
not.  Currently it is in the Act and I understand that it has become meaningless, 
vacuous, empty rhetoric.’145  Baroness O'Neill of BengarveIt described it as: ‘a 
highly ambiguous phrase which has not proved practical in the way in which IVF 
clinics operate.’146  The point being made that because the ‘need for a father’ 
stipulation merely required clinics to check whether there was a male in the 
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social circle the argument for its inclusion was being undermined rather than 
strengthened.  The criticism ran that there was a lack of effectiveness in the 
practical application of the clause.  So despite fears that doing away with the 
requirement to consider a child’s need for a father would ‘undermine the role of 
fathers’ the decision reached by Parliament was that children’s welfare could be 
safeguarded with the requirement to consider a child’s need for supportive 
parenting. 
 
The debates in the Houses of Parliament on both the 1990 and 2008 Acts focused 
upon questions of traditional family values versus alternative family units, with 
the welfare of the child very much presumed to be a necessary consideration in 
any and every case.  Blyth and Cameron observed that the debates in both 
Houses of Parliament assumed the value of consideration of the welfare of the 
child and set it against other considerations, such as the desirability of children 
being born to single mothers or unmarried couples.147 In Jackson’s view the 
proposition that the welfare of the child should be taken into account largely 
went unquestioned during the debates and that ‘it was simply assumed to be 
self-evidently true that their future child’s welfare ought to be taken into 
account before the couple is offered assistance with conception’.148 What 
Parliament failed to address in their debates (their focus being drawn 
elsewhere) was the vitally important question of whether or not a child welfare 
assessment at the pre-conception stage was in any way justifiable and 
conceptually sound, quite apart from individual factors thought to affect child 
welfare.  Chapter Five will come on to address this question in more detail later. 
 
When the new Code of Practice guidelines were introduced in 2005, Suzi 
Leather, then Chair of the HFEA, said: 
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By focussing more clearly on the risk factors that could lead to 
serious harm, we will have a system that is fairer for patients and 
more proportionate for doctors whilst still protecting children's 
interests.  Our revised guidance will support clinicians in using their 
professional judgement to assess patients.  Where they have 
concerns, clinicians will still contact GPs, social services or other 
relevant bodies.  These new guidelines will enable medical teams 
to get on with the job and will give patients reassurance that the 
process will not be unjustifiably burdensome or intrusive.149  
 
It is clear, then, that a judgement is being made of a person’s competence to 
parent, before, it should be noted, that person may ever have been given the 
opportunity to conceive, never mind parent (at least in cases where there is no 
existing child in the family).  Alghrani and Harris are of the view that: 
 
The very fact the law insists that only those individuals who require 
assistance in founding a family are screened for their potential as 
prospective parents is not only inconsistent and unjustifiable, but is a 
clear violation of reproductive liberty...The HFE Act, which 
determines who may be granted access to assisted conception services 
based on a speculative judgement as to their potential to parent, is a 
clear and unjustifiable violation of reproductive liberty.150 
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patients, GPs and clinics, 2 November 2005 (accessed at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/667.html on 
27 September 2011). 
150 A. Alghrani and J. Harris, Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be 
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Alghrani and Harris expressed doubt as to whether or not the amended 
guidelines were fairer for patients as Suzi Leather had suggested.  Section 13(5) 
still required clinics to operate some form of screening of prospective parents, 
and could still exclude some people from access to ART.151  Alghrani and Harris 
also make the point that it is doctors who continue to be required to make a 
social judgement about whether a child would be at risk of serious physical or 
psychological harm or neglect or whether there was the risk that the patient 
may not be able to provide ongoing care for the child.  Alghrani and Harris are 
critical of the fact that section 13(5) requires doctors to make decisions that go 
beyond their expertise.152   
 
In discussing the question of whether doctors may permissibly deny assistance to 
prospective parents whom they deem unsuitable on non-clinical grounds, Mary 
Warnock said of the child welfare principle: 
 
What exactly this principle means, what force it has, and how the 
child's future good is to be estimated have not been seriously 
examined, nor did we on the Committee examine such issues. The 
principle sounded good, and we adopted it.153 
 
Whether a piece of legislation can be justified when issues surrounding what it 
actually means, what force it has and how it is to be applied have not been 
seriously examined, but adopting a position  merely because it ‘sounded good’, 
is surely questionable.  The uncertainty surrounding section 13(5) of the HFE Act 
1990 calls into question whether its continuing existence is justified or whether 
it should be scrapped altogether.  As is apparent from the above discussion the 
                                                             
151 Ibid., 197. 
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153 M. Warnock, Making Babies: Is There A Right To Have Children?', Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002, 45. 
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option of repealing section 13(5) was available to Parliament when they 
introduced the HFA Act 2008.  This was an opportunity which they did not take 
and which this I would suggest was a mistake which remains to be rectified. 
While this thesis is limited to arguing for amendment of section 13(5) in respect 
the need for a parenting assessment, it is clear that many of the arguments in 
favour of this amendment also support repeal in its entirety.  
 
 
3.8 Other Fertility Treatments and Natural Reproduction 
In terms of the HFE Act 1990 ‘treatment services’ means medical, surgical or 
obstetric services provided to the public or a section of the public for the 
purpose of assisting women to carry children.154 ‘Basic partner treatment 
services’ are treatment services provided for a woman and man together without 
using the gametes of another person or embryos created outside a woman’s 
body.155  It is only treatment services and basic partner treatment services which 
a patient can be denied access to unless account has been taken of the welfare 
of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment and judged 
favourably.  Treatment services and basic treatment partner services as defined 
within the legislation do not cover other forms of medical assistance to 
conceive, such as the prescription of fertility drugs or an operation to unblock 
Fallopian tubes.  While the resources in question are likely to be cheaper and 
more common when compared with IVF, they do still amount to seeking third 
party assistance to enable conception.  The prospective parents are taking their 
decision to try to conceive a child out of the bedroom and into the consultation 
room.  The fact that there is no social screening of patients seeking assistance in 
this manner places a question mark over why it is justifiable in the case of IVF. 
 
                                                             
154 HFE Act 1990 sec. 2(1). 
155 HFE Act 1990 sec. 2(1) as inserted by Regulation 6 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Quality and Safety) Regulations 2007. 
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A Select Committee Report noted in 2005 that the welfare provision was being 
unevenly applied: 
 
If one accepts that the welfare of the child provision is important 
and that the involvement of healthcare professionals justifies an 
erosion of liberty, logic would dictate that any professional 
intervention to overcome infertility or sub-fertility should be 
subject to the same standards.  IVF is just one of a number of 
techniques that include ovulation induction, tubal and uterine 
surgery, surgical management of endometriosis, IUI and GIFT.  Only 
with the last two is a welfare of the child assessment required, and 
only if donor sperm is being used.  The exclusive requirement to 
consider the welfare of the child for fertility treatments where 
fertilisation takes place outside the woman or involves donated 
sperm is illogical.  If the legislation aims to regulate the treatment 
of infertility or sub-fertility then it should cover all forms of 
interventions.  If it wishes to do both then this needs to be clearly 
stated and justified.156 
 
In the recent past if a woman used self-insemination there were no safeguards 
protecting the welfare of the future child nor any monitoring of the donor sperm 
for disease such as HIV or sexually transmitted diseases.  Likewise Gamete Intra-
Fallopian Transfer (GIFT) using a partner’s sperm and Intrauterine Insemination 
(IUI) using a partner’s sperm were not regulated. However, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Quality and Safety) Regulations 2007 brought the 
EU Tissues and Cells Directive into UK law and set a higher standard of quality 
and safety for previously unregulated treatments.  Non-medical fertility services 
such as internet sperm providers were also brought under the HFE Act 1990 by 
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the 2007 Regulations.157  A greater range of treatments and services are now 
covered by the HFE Acts and therefore require a treatment provider to carry out 
a child welfare assessment.  However, ovulation induction, tubal and uterine 
surgery and surgical management of endometriosis still do not require a child 
welfare assessment to be made even though they involve a person seeking 
medical assistance to conceive a child.  The regulation of treatment services in 
certain areas of treatment designed to assist a woman to conceive and its 
absence in others calls into question the justification of regulation in these 
specific areas. 
 
The argument that the welfare of the future child is a matter which must be 
considered in reproductive decision-making does not, of course, generally apply 
to people having children ‘naturally’.  The choice to engage in sexual 
intercourse with the aim of having a child is (with the exception of criminal 
offences such as incest and rape previously mentioned) unregulated in the UK, 
while at the same time access to ART services is comprehensively regulated.158  
Any proposals to regulate ‘natural’ reproduction are largely rejected, due in no 
small part to the spectre of the eugenics programmes of the past which were 
discussed in the previous chapter.  It is argued that their implementation would 
violate some of our most cherished interests and rights: in particular the interest 
in becoming a parent and the right to reproduction and parenting.159  However, 
such fears do not prevent the regulation of assisted reproduction.  There is 
inequality in the way in which the State respects the procreative choices of 
those who can reproduce through engaging in sexual intercourse and those who 
require certain forms of medical assistance to create a child. 
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159 Ibid. 
139 
 
Cutas and Bortolotti are of the view that there are serious inconsistencies in the 
treatment of people who become parents naturally and people who require 
assistance to become parents.  They propose that regulation of reproduction and 
parenting be revised in such a way as to eliminate the inconsistencies.160  They 
agree with the point made earlier that if the welfare of the child is a sufficiently 
important reason to justify intervention in assisted reproduction, it is hard to 
justify the exemption from scrutiny that people engaging in natural reproduction 
currently enjoy.  This inconsistency has also been criticised on the basis that 
assistance in reproduction comes in different degrees161 and the distinction 
between ‘natural’ reproduction and assisted reproduction is not always as clear 
cut as might be imagined.162  As mentioned above, the provision of fertility drugs 
falls outwith the remit of the HFE Act 1990, but it is still assistance with 
reproduction in a very real sense.  This particular justification for regulation of 
ART services is therefore weakened by its inconsistent application.   
 
The HFEA has stated that it is determined to ‘safeguard all relevant interests – 
patients, children, doctors and scientists, the wider public and future 
generations’.163  This is clearly an ambitious undertaking, given that many of 
these interests have the potential to conflict with one another.  It is important, 
therefore, to consider whether or not the powers granted to the HFEA by the 
HFE Act 1990 effectively deliver the safeguards that all of the relevant people 
with these varying interests might reasonably expect to receive.  
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3.9 Good or Bad Regulation? 
This Chapter has set out in detail the development of regulation of ART, the 
current regulatory regime and the views of the politicians who voted to 
introduce and then amend section 13(5).  The purpose of doing so has been to 
question of whether or not the regulation, to paraphrase Johnson, allows for 
responsible choice and self-determination for patients.  This thesis argues that 
section 13(5) in its current form falls to demonstrate such a requirement. 
 
A couple who have been informed by their doctor that the only chance they have 
of conceiving a child genetically related to them both is to access ART, have a 
hugely personal decision to make as to whether they wish to go down this road.  
The decision to seek to have children in itself is a very personal decision which 
goes to fundamental aspects of an individual’s sense of identity and place in 
society.  The decision to seek to have children utilising ART services carries yet 
more weighty decisions surrounding the nature of the treatment itself, the 
impact the treatment would have on physical health, potential cost, the time 
commitments and the chances of failure with all the emotional considerations 
that entails.  There can be few decisions which are more personal and deserving 
of respect. 
 
What the UK legislation in effect does is require couples to decide whether they 
wish to subject themselves to an enquiry into whether or not they will be 
supportive parents to the child they are seeking to create.  This thesis argues 
that this requirement acts as a barrier to self-determination and is therefore an 
interference with procreative liberty.  This is because the couple in my example 
are required to disclose information pertaining to the issues of supportive 
parenting to an employee of the licenced clinic who then has to exercise a 
judgement on whether or not the answer to these questions rebuts the 
supportive parenting presumption. This is not conducive to self-determination.  
This thesis argues that it should be left to prospective parents to make the 
decision for themselves as to whether they are able to give the care, support 
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and love which their child will require.  The application of section 13(5) in its 
current form takes one of the most fundamental and personal decisions about 
procreation and hands it to an employee of a licensed clinic who will have no 
involvement in the rearing of that child whatsoever. As such this forms a ground 
for considering that this interference with procreative liberty requires serious 
reconsideration.   
 
What though of responsible choice?  Is the presence of section 13(5) not a good 
thing to have in place as it directs prospective parents towards responsible 
choice, or at least to give some consideration to whether they are acting 
responsibly or not?  This thesis takes the view that rather than allow for 
responsible choice what section 13(5) does is to remove the responsibility from 
the patients and places it in the hands of a third party.  The factors which can 
rebut the presumption of supportive parenting - previous convictions for harming 
children, child protection measures, serious violence and discord within the 
family, mental or physical conditions, drug or alcohol problems and other 
aspects of their lives which may pose a risk - are all factors which any 
responsible prospective parent should be considering in regards to their parental 
abilities.  People will ask themselves the question ‘will I make a good parent’.  
They do not require to be directed towards responsible choice by legislation.  
 
 
3.10 Conclusion   
Margaret Brazier praises the system of regulation in the UK for ensuring public 
accountability, promoting high standards of medical treatment and providing a 
certain amount of protection for patients against medical negligence.164  
However, she also draws attention to the fact that, while the regulatory system 
is built on reaching a consensus on difficult issues meaning that regulators and 
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scientists have to work together, this is at the cost of issues central to individual 
rights being ‘skated over’.165   It is perhaps understandable that Parliament did 
not attempt to find comprehensive solutions to the controversial ethical issues 
raised by ART.  A line could not have been taken which would have satisfied all 
parties.  While Brazier argues that ‘British law displays contradictions, no single, 
coherent philosophy underpins the law’s response to reproductive medicine’ she 
nonetheless suggests that, as a workable system has been put in place, perhaps 
the pragmatic approach has its advantages.166  The approach of the UK 
government of avoiding making definitive pronouncements upon highly 
controversial ethical issues, but instead setting up a regulatory body with the 
stated aim of reaching consensus where possible, illustrates the difficulty 
legislators have in creating a system of regulation in this controversial area.  
That is not a reason though to continue to review and assess the fairness and 
practical utility of the rules and regulations in place.   
 
The previous chapter has set out what this thesis contends are the important 
aspects of an individual’s right to procreative liberty.  This chapter has analysed 
the regulatory framework and the specific provisions which the UK Parliament 
has felt justified putting in place to limit that right, focusing on child welfare 
grounds arising from questions about parental ability.  The justification put 
forward by the UK Government in support of section 13(5) is that it acts to 
protect children from harm and is therefore justified as an extension of the 
State mandate to ensure that the welfare of children is protected by the State.   
 
This thesis argues that section 13(5) should be amended to remove a parental 
ability assessment.  The development of regulation from non-regulation to self 
regulation to a licensing authority highlights the way in which various societal 
attitudes and concerns about the consequences of ART have influenced the 
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debate on what level of State interference is acceptable.  As this chapter has 
shown the regulation has already gone through revision following valid criticism 
from the lesbian community and single women that the original wording of 
section 13(5) was discriminatory against them.  This thesis argues that the 
legislation remains discriminatory against infertile people or people who cannot 
have children genetically related to themselves because of sexual preference as 
it requires them to undergo a parenting ability assessment not required of those 
who can procreate through heterosexual intercourse. 
 
The purported justification for section 13(5) cannot be fully held up to criticism 
unless the extent of the State mandate to ensure that the welfare of children is 
protected is analysed.  The next chapter will develop the overall argument of 
the thesis further by examining how the child welfare principle developed as an 
established legal principle, how it is applied and what problems exist for its 
application which might mirror the application of section 13(5).  It is the right to 
parent which the child welfare principle can justifiably interfere with on child 
welfare grounds not, it will be argued, the right to procreative liberty.  That 
raises the question of whether the State mandate to protect children from harm 
can be extended backwards to the pre-conception stage. The next chapter will 
therefore look at where that general mandate arises from and ask whether 
concerns surrounding child welfare in general are acting to blur the distinction 
between a right to procreative liberty and parental rights and responsibilities.  
The chapter will analyse the development of the child welfare principle in family 
law and how this is applied in the context of parental rights and responsibilities.  
While it is largely accepted that the child welfare principle applies to the 
exercise of parental rights and provides valid justification for the curtailment of 
these rights in cases of abuse or neglect, it is more difficult to support the 
notion that child welfare should be a factor in limiting access to ART services. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE CHILD WELFARE PRINCIPLE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have sought to examine the basis upon which people 
seeking access to ART treatment are entitled to have that procreative choice 
respected and the regulatory framework put in place by the UK as a means of 
controlling access to treatment.  The Lord Chancellor chose to word the 
legislation so that control is exercised by clinics ‘taking account of’ the welfare 
of the child prior to allowing access to treatment.  What follows in this chapter 
is an examination of the child welfare principle as applied in the familiar 
context of family law.  An analysis of the child welfare principle in this context 
is necessary before moving on to look at how the child welfare principle has 
influenced the question of who should be allowed access to ART.  It is necessary 
because it is the child welfare principle which the Government claims provided 
the mandate to pass section 13(5).  
 
While the child welfare principle is set out in relatively recent legal 
instruments1, the concept that a child’s welfare is an important consideration in 
legal proceedings concerning children is not so recent and it is a worthwhile 
exercise to examine the child welfare principle in its historical context because 
this will highlight how the concept has become to be so all encompassing. 
Eekelar has suggested that since Victorian times there has been a movement 
away from what he calls ‘instrumentalism’, where children were perceived as 
instruments for the promotion of the interests of others, to one of ‘welfarism’, 
where parents were expected to use their position to further their children’s 
interests.2  It is certainly of note that the legal status of the child has developed 
over the centuries from the father having absolute authority over the child’s life 
to the parent(s) owing a myriad of legal parental responsibilities towards the 
child.  It is clear that the welfare of the child has progressively become an issue 
of greater and greater significance for society, perhaps to the point now where 
                                                             
1 Children Act 1989 in England and Wales and Children (Scotland) Act 1995 in Scotland. 
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society has lost the ability to distinguish between an actual welfare of the child 
assessment and a speculative welfare of the future child assessment. 
 
 
4.2 The Historical Development of the Child Welfare Principle 
The roots of the child welfare principle can be found in the feudal system of 
guardianship.3  In Medieval England, where a child had an interest in inherited 
property which also involved an inherited duty of fealty, the courts would 
protect these interests by the use of guardianship appointments.4  Guardianship 
was viewed as a duty placed upon the relevant adult to protect the property of 
the child and, with it, the child himself.  It was rooted in the concept of ‘trust’ 
or ‘office’.5  There also existed within the feudal system a principle that all 
subjects owe allegiance to the Crown and the Crown in return protected its 
subjects as parens patraie.6  In the 16th Century case of Eyre v Shaftsbury7 it was 
accepted that ‘the Crown as parens patriae, was the supreme guardian and 
superintendent over all infants’.8  The protection of the Crown was afforded to 
children by making them wards of the Crown.  In mid-16th century England and 
Wales responsibility for wardship was transferred to the Chancery Courts.9  
Wardship enabled the court, on behalf of the Crown, to effectively act as if it 
were a parent, and the court assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the 
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child.10  The court’s inherent jurisdiction, which this chapter will look at in more 
detail in the next section, is derived from the parens patriae doctrine.11   
 
By the middle of the 19th Century the courts had generally moved away from the 
concepts of guardianship and wardship and had reverted to one of parental 
authority more akin to the Roman law doctrine of patria potestas.12  A father 
was considered to have an over-riding authority over the custody and control of 
his child which would only be interfered with by the courts in extreme cases of 
abuse and neglect.  The powerful legal position of the father to control the 
upbringing of the child is well-illustrated by the comments of Cotton LJ in the 
1883 case of Re Agar-Ellis:13 
 
When by birth a child is subject to a father it is for the general 
interest of children and really for the interest of the particular 
infant that the Court should not, except in extreme cases interfere 
with the discretion of the father but leave to him the responsibility 
by exercising that power which nature has given by the birth of the 
child.14 
 
The corresponding legal position of the mother was weak and she had no ‘rights’ 
over the child as such.  However, during the 19th Century a progression of 
Government Acts, beginning with the Infants Custody Act 1839, did give the 
courts the discretion to grant the mother custody and access to any of her 
children.15  However, while moves to equalise maternal and paternal rights 
                                                             
10 Ibid. 
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13 (1883) 24 ChD 317. 
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15 N. V. Lowe, The Legal Position of Parents and Children in English Law, Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies, [1994] 332 – 346, 335. 
147 
 
continued into the 20th Century,16 this development was generally overshadowed 
by a growing focus on the welfare of the child.17 
 
The modern concept of the State having a duty to protect the welfare of 
children has its roots in the work of the Victorian social reform movement of the 
late 19th century.  In 1881, the Reverend George Staite called for the formation 
of a society for the protection of children.  He wrote to the philanthropist Lord 
Shaftesbury who warned Staite against the difficulties of trying to protect 
children through legal means.18  Lord Shaftesbury noted that ‘[t]he evils you 
state are enormous and indisputable, but they are of so private, internal and 
domestic a nature as to be beyond the reach of legislation’.19  Nonetheless, the 
year 1889 saw the occurrence of two important and connected events, with the 
formation of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
(NSPCC) and the passing of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1889 (the 
1889 Act).20  The 1889 Act made cruelty to children a crime. Intentional ill-
treatment or neglect was punishable by up to six months imprisonment and 
policemen were empowered to remove suspected child victims from their 
homes.21  This was very much the beginning of English society’s efforts to use 
the law for the specific purpose of furthering the welfare of the child.  
 
In Scotland the impact of the Reformation from the mid-16th century onwards 
saw a greater availability of affordable education, first provided for by the 
                                                             
16 The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 provided that in any proceedings before any court 
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17 N. V. Lowe, The Legal Position of Parents and Children in English Law, Singapore Journal of 
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Church of Scotland and later subsidised by the tax payer, than in England and 
Wales.22  Poor laws in the 16th Century in Scotland placed a duty on parishes to 
provide for the poor, including children.23  However, there was no formalised 
system of poor law relief in Scotland until 1845 which saw the setting up of a 
National Supervisory Board.24  The vast upheavals in society brought about by the 
industrial revolution had a significant impact upon the health, education and 
work of children.25  In the 19th Century the infant mortality rate was lower in 
Scotland than it was in England but this situation had been reversed by the 
1930’s.26  Average levels of child poverty have remained higher in Scotland than 
in England and Wales throughout the 20th Century and into the 21st Century27 and 
it is fair to say that the issue of child welfare has been viewed through the lens 
of child poverty in Scotland to an even greater extent than England and Wales.   
 
The year 1884 had seen the setting up in Scotland of a similar organisation to 
that of the NSPCC known as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
which in 1922 became the Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children.28  The NSPCC’s definition of cruelty in the early 20th Century included 
inflicting wrongful, needless or excessive physical pain; endangering life, limb or 
health; causing morals to be imperilled or depraved; all forms of neglect relating 
to food, clothing, shelter, protection and care; forcing the child to work overly 
long hours or in degrading, unlawful or illegal employment; and vagrancy or 
begging.29  In 1900, of the 573,325 children that the NSPCC investigated, the 
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27 Ibid. 
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vast majority, 446,722, fell into the category of neglect.30  This had a great deal 
to do with the fact that it was the children of the poor who society viewed 
almost exclusively as the problem.  The cause of neglect was largely viewed as 
being the ignorance and incompetence of the mother who had led the family 
into poverty.31  However, while the 1889 Act was as much about addressing the 
perceived shortcomings of the poor as it was about protecting child welfare, 
Hendricks is of the view that the legislation marked a turning point in legal and 
social attitudes towards children.32  It developed the whole idea of parental 
responsibilities and introduced the interventionist approach by the state into 
family life previously thought impossible by Lord Shaftesbury.  
 
The next big step forward regarding concern for the welfare of the child in 
England and Wales came with the introduction of the Guardianship of Infants Act 
1925.  This Act provided that, in deciding issues concerning the custody or 
upbringing of a child, all courts were to regard the child's welfare as ‘the first 
and paramount consideration’.33  This legislation effectively established the 
paramountcy of the child's welfare in court decisions which concerned them and 
this has been continued and refined in subsequent legislation up to the present 
day.34 
 
The end of the Second World War saw the creation of the welfare state and with 
it a major shift in child welfare theory.  The Children Act 1948 saw the 
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introduction of the position that remains in place today in England and Wales; 
namely, that local authorities have a duty of care towards children whose 
parents are unable to look after them and whose welfare requires the 
intervention of the local authority.35  Section 12 of the Children Act 1948 
required local authorities to exercise their powers with respect to the child so as 
to further his best interests and afford him opportunity for the proper 
development of his character and abilities.  The 1948 Act is of particular 
significance because of the large increase in the level of state intervention into 
the sphere of private family life it brought about. 
 
In Scotland a significant piece of legislation was enacted in the form of the 
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 193236 which introduced a number of 
offences pertaining to such matters as cruelty to persons under the age of 
sixteen, causing or allowing persons under the age of sixteen to be used for 
begging, giving liquor to children under the age of five, restrictions on 
employment of children and other child protection measures.  However, 
probably the most significant development in Scots law pertaining to child 
protection and juvenile offending was the creation of the Children’s Hearing 
System37 which was set up following a major review in 1961 ‘to consider the 
provisions of the law of Scotland relating to the treatment of juvenile 
delinquents and juveniles in need of care or protection or beyond parental 
control’. 38  The committee produced what was entitled The Kilbrandon Report 
which recommended the establishment of a Children's Hearings System to deal 
with those who Lord Kilbrandon described as ‘children in trouble’.39  These 
children fell into four categories: a) those with delinquent behaviour, b) those in 
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8 July 2014).  This was the remit of the committee set up in 1961 by the then Secretary of State 
for Scotland. 
39 J. Shaw, Lord Kilbrandon, Children in Trouble, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 1, 1966, 112 
– 122. 
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need of care or protection, c) those beyond parental control, and d) those who 
persistently truant.40  The system which was put into practice and remains 
largely unaltered today was to remove children from the adult criminal law 
procedures and to bring all cases in need of compulsory measures of care before 
a lay panel of three members.  The ideas behind the system were that it would 
allow for proper multi-disciplinary assessment, family and child participation, 
informal procedures and practical disposals.41 It was a significant step in putting 
the welfare of the child at the centre of Scottish society’s concerns. 
 
The last fifty years or so have seen a gradual move towards the idea that 
children have specific rights which are deserving of protection.  Today the UK is 
a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC).42  While the UNCRC has not been incorporated directly into English or 
Scots Law, both jurisdictions are bound by international law to reflect the aims 
of the UNCRC in all of their policies and legislation although it has no direct 
legal effect in UK courts.  That said, in Scotland, the Children and Young People 
(Scotland) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act) will, when commenced on a yet to be 
appointed date, impose certain duties on public authorities in relation to the 
UNCRC.  Section 1 of the 2014 Act requires Scottish Ministers to keep under 
consideration whether there are any steps which they could take which would or 
might secure better or further effect in Scotland of the UNCRC requirements, 
taking into account relevant views of children.43  The 2014 Act will require the 
Scottish Minsters and other relevant public authorities to publish a report every 
three years of what steps it has taken in that period to better secure or further 
                                                             
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 UNICEF described the UNCRC as the most complete statement of children’s rights ever 
produced.  It is the most widely-ratified international human rights treaty in history.  All UN 
member states except for the United States, Somalia and South Sudan have approved the 
Convention. http://www.unicef.org.uk/UNICEFs-Work/UN-Convention/ (accessed 10 September 
2014) 
 
43 Sec. 1 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 
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effect the UNCRC requirements within its areas of responsibility.44  Whilst the 
2014 Act will not mean that the UNCRC is directly enforceable in the same way 
as the ECHR is via the Human Rights Act 1998, the reporting requirements will 
ensure that a significant degree of thought not currently required is given to 
UNCRC compliance. 
 
The UNCRC represents a move towards the idea that children hold certain 
fundamental rights in addition to those of adults which are worthy of protection 
from unwarranted interference.  These rights should protect children from abuse 
and neglect at the hands of those who have responsibilities towards them and 
from overly intrusive interference into their lives by the state. State concern for 
the rights of the child has come a considerable distance since the days of 
medieval guardianship.  The next section will set out the current legal position 
which sets the boundaries to the State’s involvement in the lives of children.  
 
 
4.3 Child Welfare and Best Interests 
In the UK, the term ‘child welfare principle’ is generally now understood as 
referring to the terms of the Children Act 1989 (the 1989 Act) in England and 
Wales, or the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) in Scotland.  Section 
16 (1) of the 1995 Act states:  
 
Where under or by virtue of this Part of this Act, a children’s 
hearing decides, or a court determines, any matter with respect to 
a child, the welfare of the child throughout his childhood shall be 
their or its paramount consideration.   
 
Section 1(1) of the 1989 Act states:  
 
When a court determines any question with respect to the 
upbringing of the child or the administration of a child’s property 
                                                             
44 Sec. 2 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 
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or the application of any income arising from it, the child’s welfare 
shall be the court’s paramount consideration.   
 
Some of the literature in this field also makes reference to the ‘paramountcy 
principle’.45  This term is often used interchangeably with ‘child welfare 
principle’ although it directly refers to the weight to be given to consideration 
of the child’s welfare, while the term ‘child welfare principle’ refers to the 
question that the courts must address; namely, what is conducive to the welfare 
of the child? 
 
Another term that is often used interchangeably with the child welfare principle 
is the ‘best interests principle’.46  So when applying the child welfare principle, 
the domestic courts may ask the question; what is in the child’s best interests?47  
This can lead to confusion, as not only can the three terms be used 
interchangeably to refer to the definition of the principle as understood within 
the narrow confines of the 1989 Act and 1995 Act, but the term ‘best interests 
principle’ can also be used in reference to the more broadly applied Article 3 of 
the UNCRC which provides: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration.48 
 
As this chapter will come on to look at in more detail, while the UNCRC has no 
direct effect in the UK it can be used as guidance as to what the courts should 
                                                             
45 See for example, H. Reece, The Paramountcy Principle – Consensus or Construct?, Current 
Legal Problems, 1996, 49, 267 – 304.  
46 See for example, A. MacDonald QC, The Best Interests Principle Breaks Out, Family Law,  2011, 
851. 
47 See for example, City of Edinburgh Council v B  [2014] CSOH 128 ‘giving her a family and a 
secure identity was plainly in her best interests’; Re: G (A child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1173 ‘I readily 
contemplate that either of the two outcomes could be in E’s best interests’ 
48See  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (accessed on 24 February 2012) 
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have regard to when making decisions affecting children which fall outwith the 
1989 Act and 1995 Act. 
 
The leading case as to the definition of the child welfare principle, J v C49, dates 
back to 1970.  It concerned section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 
which declared that where the custody or upbringing of an infant was in dispute 
the welfare of the infant was the paramount consideration and that this applied 
not only between parent and parent but also between the parents and strangers.  
In his ruling Lord MacDermott defined the child welfare principle as: 
 
A process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, 
claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other 
circumstances are taken into account and weighted, the course to 
be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’s 
welfare.  That is...the paramount consideration because it rules or 
determines the course to be followed.50 
 
Eekelar has stated that family law practitioners hold the child welfare principle 
in particularly high regard: 
 
For family lawyers, particularly those specialising in the law 
relating to children, the ‘best interests’ principle may be 
considered a talisman, a mantra and, more prosaically but more 
appropriately, a fundamental principle of interpretation.  It has 
been said that the best interests principle requires a decision made 
with respect to a child to be justified from the point of view of a 
judgement about a child’s interests, it being inconsistent with the 
                                                             
49 [1970] AC 668. 
50 Ibid., 710. 
155 
 
best interests principle to make a decision that is overtly justified 
by reference to some other interest or interests.51 
 
This approach puts the welfare of the child to the forefront of the decision-
making process.  Mnookin commented that ‘deciding what is best for a child 
poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself’.52   
 
Prior to the introduction of the 1989 Act in England and Wales the State under 
the guise of local authorities, would regularly apply to the courts for wardship of 
children, often when the local authority were unable to prove the statutory 
criteria for a care order yet considered that it was in the child’s best interests to 
be in care, or when they wished to challenge the discharge of a care order.53  
The 1989 Act sought to restrict the use by local authorities of the courts’ 
inherent jurisdiction, particularly in regards to wardship.54  The courts’ inherent 
jurisdiction includes but is not limited to wardship.   
 
Section 100(1) of the 1989 Act abolished the power in the Family Law Reform 
Act1969, section 7, whereby the High Court in exceptional circumstances could 
place a ward in the care, or under the supervision, of a local authority.  The 
enactment of section 100(2) of the 1989 Act meant that the High Court’s 
inherent jurisdiction, including wardship, was not to be used to place a child in 
the care, or put under the supervision of a local authority, or to accommodate a 
child by or on behalf of a local authority, or to make a child who was the subject 
of a care order a ward of court, or to confer power on a local authority to 
determine any question in connection with any aspect of parental responsibility.  
The effect of these restrictions in section 100 prevented the inherent 
                                                             
51 J. Eekelar, Beyond the Welfare Principle, [2002], Children and Family Law Quarterly, 237. 
Note that Eekelar uses the term ‘best interests principle’ when referring to what this thesis 
terms the child welfare principle. This is an example of the interchange in usage referred to. 
52 R. Mnookin, Child Custody and Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 1975, 39, 226 - 293, 260. 
53 M. L. Parry, The Children Act 1989: Local authorities, wardship and the revival of the inherent 
jurisdiction, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 1992, 14:3, 212-222. 
54 Children Act 1989 sec. 100. 
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jurisdiction being used as an alternative to the statutory provisions contained 
within the 1989 Act.  However, subject to obtaining leave of the court55 the 
local authorities could still apply to the High Court to exercise its inherent 
jurisdiction in relation to a child.  Local authorities have continued to apply to 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court with regard to matters concerning children 
which cannot satisfactorily be dealt with under the 1989 Act.56  
 
In the lead up to the introduction of the 1989 Act, the Law Commission looked to 
replace the phrase relating to child welfare in the Guardianship of Minors Act 
1971, that it should be the ‘first and paramount consideration’, with the phrase 
that it should be the ‘only consideration’ in the new legislation.57  This 
recommendation was rejected as, in the opinion of Parliament, it went too far 
since it would have had the effect of completely excluding the interests of the 
parents in any matter relating to children.58  The word ‘first’ was also dropped 
due to concerns that it had ‘led some courts to balance other considerations 
against the child’s welfare rather than to consider what light they shed upon 
it’.59  That the welfare of the child should be the ‘paramount consideration’ was 
the term that eventually found its way onto the statute books. 
 
While the child welfare principle required the courts to make the welfare of the 
child the paramount consideration, the UNCRC only stipulates that the best 
interests of the child should be a primary consideration.  The domestic 
legislation and the international convention require different weight to be 
placed upon the question of what is in the best interests of the child.  There is a 
                                                             
55 Children Act 1989 sec. 100(3). 
56 For Example, In re M (minors) (wardship: publication of information) [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1136) - 
undesirable publicity; In re B (wardship: abortion) [1991] 2 F.L.R. 426) - significant medical 
treatment such as abortion; In re B a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1988] A.C. 199) - 
sterilisation. 
57 H. Reece, The Paramountcy Principle – Consensus or Construct? Current Legal Problems, 1996, 
49, 267 – 304, 269. 
58 Ibid., 270. 
59 Law Commission Report, No. 172, Review of Child Law, Guardianship and Custody (London, 
1988), para. 3.13. 
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clear difference between the domestic legislation and the international treaty in 
the use of the words ‘paramount’ and ‘primary’.  The dictionary definition of 
paramount is ‘Of the greatest importance or significance’60, while the dictionary 
definition of primary is ‘First or highest in rank, quality, or importance; 
principal.’61  The use of the word ‘paramount’ stresses that this one 
consideration outweighs all others, while the word ‘primary’ stresses that the 
child’s interests must be ranked above other considerations, but is but one of 
several considerations, albeit one that must be considered first.   
 
The adoption of the term ‘a primary consideration’ in the UNCRC arose from the 
consideration that, in addition to the child’s best interests, there may be other 
interests competing with those of the child.  The concern was that these 
interests would be excluded from evaluation if the best interests of the child 
were always the paramount consideration.  The requirement that the child’s 
best interests be ‘a primary consideration’ meant that the child’s best interests 
would not always be the single, overriding factor to be considered.62 
 
The case of ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department63 in 
the field of Immigration law provides a good illustration of how Article 3 of the 
UNCRC can influence the UK Courts.  The case is the most recent Supreme Court 
decision which discussed the weight to be placed on the best interests of the 
child in decisions falling outwith the 1989 Act or the 1995 Act.  It is worth 
quoting the views of the court in this case at length as the judges sought to 
clarify the scope of the best interest principle and in what way it differed from 
the child welfare principle.  In this case Lord Kerr said: 
 
It is a universal theme of the various international and domestic 
instruments….that, in reaching decisions that will affect a child, a 
                                                             
60 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/paramount (accessed on 16 February 2012). 
61 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/primary (accessed on 16 February 2012). 
62 A. MacDonald QC, The Best Interests Principle Breaks Out, 2011, Family Law, 851. 
63 [2011] W.L.R. 4. 
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primacy of importance must be accorded to his or her best 
interests.  This is not, it is agreed, a factor of limitless importance 
in the sense that it will prevail over all other considerations.  It is a 
factor, however, that must rank higher than any other.  It is not 
merely one consideration that weighs in the balance alongside 
other competing factors.  Where the best interests of the child 
clearly favour a certain course, that course should be followed 
unless countervailing reasons of considerable force displace them.  
It is not necessary to express this in terms of a presumption but the 
primacy of this consideration needs to be made clear in emphatic 
terms.  What is determined to be in a child’s best interests should 
customarily dictate the outcome of cases such as the present, 
therefore, and it will require considerations of substantial moment 
to permit a different result.64 
 
Baroness Hale of Richmond in her speech made reference to a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Neulinger v Switzerland65, in which the court 
observed that ‘there is currently a broad consensus including in international law 
in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best 
interests must be paramount.’66  Baroness Hale noted that: 
 
...the court had earlier, in paras 49—56, collected references in 
support of this proposition from several international human rights 
instruments: from the second principle of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child 1959; from article 3.1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC); from articles 
5(b) and 16.1(d) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 1979; from General Comments 17 
and 19 of the Human Rights Committee in relation to the 
                                                             
64 [2011] UKSC 4 at para. 46. 
65 (Application no. 41615/07, 6 July 2010). 
66 (Application no. 41615/07, 6 July 2010), para. 135. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; and from 
article 24 of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
All of these refer to the best interests of the child, variously 
describing these as paramount, or primordial, or a primary 
consideration.  To a United Kingdom lawyer, however, these do not 
mean the same thing.67 
 
Baroness Hale went on:  
 
For our purposes the most relevant national and international 
obligation of the United Kingdom is contained in article 3.1 of the 
UNCRC: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.  This is a binding 
obligation in international law, and the spirit, if not the precise 
language, has also been translated into our national law.  Section 
11 of the Children Act 2004 places a duty upon a wide range of 
public bodies to carry out their functions having regard to the need 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. 68 
 
It is clear that the child welfare principle (treating the welfare of the child as 
the paramount consideration) and the best interests principle (treating the best 
interests of the child as a primary consideration) are not the same.  Again 
quoting from Baroness Hale in ZH (Tanzania):  
 
...the Strasbourg court will expect national authorities to apply 
article 3.1 of UNCRC and treat the best interests of a child as a 
primary consideration.  Of course, despite the looseness with which 
these terms are sometimes used, a primary consideration is not the 
                                                             
67 [2011] UKSC 4, para. 22 
68 [2011] UKSC 4, para. 23 
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same as the primary consideration, still less as the paramount 
consideration... questions with respect to the upbringing of a child 
must be distinguished from other decisions which may affect them.  
The UNHCR, in its Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of 
the Child (May 2008), explains the matter neatly, at para 1.1: "The 
term 'best interests' broadly describes the well-being of a child... 
The CRC neither offers a precise definition, nor explicitly outlines 
common factors of the best interests of the child, but stipulates 
that: 
 
 the best interests must be the determining factor for specific 
actions, notably adoption (Article 21) and separation of a child 
from parents against their will (Article 9); 
 
 the best interests must be a primary (but not the sole) 
consideration for all other actions affecting children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies 
(Article 3)."  
This seems to me accurately to distinguish between decisions which 
directly affect the child's upbringing, such as the parent or other 
person with whom she is to live, and decisions which may affect her 
more indirectly, such as decisions about where one or both of her 
parents are to live. Article 9 of UNCRC, for example, draws a 
distinction between the compulsory separation of a child from her 
parents, which must be necessary in her best interests, and the 
separation of a parent from his child, for example, by detention, 
imprisonment, exile, deportation or even death.69  
 
                                                             
69 [2011] UKSC 4, para. 25. 
161 
 
To reiterate, what the Supreme Court recognised in ZH (Tanzania) is that the 
application of the child welfare principle applies to decisions which directly 
concern the upbringing of a child, while the best interests principle applies to 
decisions which may affect the child more indirectly.  When the child welfare 
principle is applied, the process is to identify what is conducive to the welfare 
of the child and make a decision which ensures that this is protected.  When the 
best interests principle is applied, provided the court does not treat any other 
consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of the child 
and considers the child’s best interests first, the court can conclude that other 
considerations outweigh what is in the best interests of the child.  It has been 
said that in relation to the child welfare principle the question asked is not what 
the essential justice of the case requires but rather what the child’s welfare 
requires.70  The requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary 
consideration on the other hand would require the court to carry out a balancing 
exercise between the child’s best interests and the interests of others.71 
 
The importance of ZH (Tanzania) has been said to lie in the fact that it allowed 
the Supreme Court to ‘imbue the best interests principle with a far wider reach 
than the traditional formulation of ‘paramount consideration' that continues to 
apply within the context of proceedings under the Children Act 1989 and the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002.’72  So whilst it has not altered the way in which 
the child welfare principle would be applied it has meant that ‘the best interests 
principle emerges from the narrow confines comprised by those statutes to 
encompass a much broader spectrum of situations and circumstances which 
touch and concern the day to day lives of children.’73  MacDonald ponders the 
question of whether or not we should worry that ‘the domestic application of 
Article 3 will threaten the integrity of the paramountcy principle in that even 
decisions directly concerning the upbringing of children often engage the 
                                                             
70 A. MacDonald QC, The Best Interests Principle Breaks Out, 2011, Family Law, 851 with 
reference to the case of S(BD) v S(DJ) (Infants: Care and Consent) [1977] Fam 109. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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interests of others, most commonly the parents.’74  This thesis takes the view 
that there is little chance of the paramountcy (child welfare) principle being 
threatened by the application of Article 3 and that consideration of the best 
interest of the child as a primary concern in matters which indirectly impact 
upon the child will complement not threaten the domestic legislation.    
 
 
4.4 The Legal Definition of a Child 
Article 1 of the UNCRC is fairly straightforward in regard to its definition of a 
child as anyone under the age of 18.  However, it goes on to state that this is the 
case unless majority is attained earlier under the domestic law applicable to the 
child.  In Scotland the 1995 Act defines a child as a person under the age of 16 
for the purpose of all the requisite parental responsibilities.75  However, a 
person under the age of 18 is included in relation to the parental responsibility 
to provide, in a manner appropriate to the stage of development of the child, 
guidance to the child.  In relation to the powers and duties of the local 
authority, young people between the age of 16 and 18 who are still subject to a 
supervision requirement by a Children’s Hearing can be viewed as a child.76  So, 
it is recognised in Scotland that young people over the age of 16 may still 
require intervention to protect them.  In England, the 1989 Act defines a child as 
a person under the age of 1877 with a narrow exception allowing for orders for 
financial relief to be made in relation to children who have reached the age of 
18.78 
 
In ratifying the UNCRC, the UK declared that it was to be interpreted as applying 
only following a live birth79 and generally the UK has been consistent that for a 
                                                             
74 Ibid. 
75 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 1(a), (b)(i) + (ii), (c) and (d) 
76 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 93(2)(a) and (b) 
77 Children Act 1989 sec. 105(1) 
78 Children Act 1989 sch. 1 para. 16. 
79 The UK Reservation and Declarations. CRC/C/2/Rev 4, at 32, 16 December 1991. 
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‘child’ to be the subject of legal rights and responsibilities it has to have been 
born alive.  The concept of ‘foetal rights’ is an issue which has generated a huge 
amount of academic debate and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it 
is worth setting out the general position of the law in relation to the foetus in 
order to understand why some commentators find the law as expressed in 
section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 to be completely nonsensical.80 
 
The law does not grant full legal personality to a foetus.  In Paton v British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees81 Sir George Baker P. stated: 
 
The foetus cannot, in English law.....have a right of its own at least 
until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother.  That 
permeates the whole of the civil law in this country.82 
 
Nevertheless, the so called ‘born alive’ rule does grant a child a right to seek 
financial damages for injuries sustained prior to birth as a result of the conduct 
of any third party, in England and Wales under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil 
Liability) Act 1976 and in Scotland under Common Law.  For example, in the 
Scottish case of Hamilton v Fife Health Board83 Lord McCluskey held that: 
 
Once the foetus ceases on birth to be a foetus and becomes a 
person there is a concurrence of injuria and damnum and the newly 
born child has a right to sue the person whose breach of duty has 
resulted in the child’s loss.84 
 
                                                             
80 See for example, E. Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, Modern 
Law Review, 65, 2002, 176 – 203, 180. 
81 (1979) 1 QB 270.  The case concerned a husband’s application for an injunction to stop his wife 
having an abortion.  The husband took his case to the European Commission for Human Rights 
which held that Article 2 of the ECHR did not extend to a foetus. 
82 (1979) 1 QB 270 at p. 279. 
83 [1993] S.L.T. 624. 
84 [1993] S.L.T. 624 at p. 629. 
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So, while the action which caused the injury happened at an earlier date, the 
injury and the resulting loss to the child is deemed to have occurred at birth.  
However, although the courts are prepared to recognise that a child’s welfare 
can be adversely affected by an event that occurs prior to birth there is a 
complete unwillingness from the courts to accord the foetus legal personality.85  
In effect the courts are acknowledging the existence of the foetus during 
pregnancy but take the view that this alone does not warrant the recognition of 
legal personality. 
 
In relation to a foetus, then, the child welfare principle as understood by the 
1989 Act and 1995 Act is not applicable.  Where a court determines any matter 
with respect to a child in connection with those Acts, a foetus will not be 
awarded the protection which is afforded a child under these legislative 
provisions.  While no one has tried to argue this specific point, the question was 
dealt with in a case pre-dating the legislation in the context of wardship.   
 
In the case of In Re F (In Utero),86 the local authority was concerned that a 
pregnant woman, who was mentally disturbed and led a nomadic existence, 
would not take sufficient care for the well-being of her child at the time of birth 
and thereafter and would fail to seek medical attention for the child.  The local 
authority applied to make the foetus a ward of court.  The court refused the 
application holding, with reference to Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service 
Trustees, that it had no wardship jurisdiction over an unborn child.  If somebody 
did seek to argue in court that a foetus should be awarded the protection which 
is accorded to a child under the 1989 Act or 1995 Act, it seems inevitable that 
the court would hold that the child welfare principle only applies to live born 
children; it is not applicable at the pre-birth stage.  This is of course significant 
in the context of this thesis where section 13(5) seeks to take account of the 
welfare of child who is yet to be conceived.  It raises the question of why such 
                                                             
85 Kelly v Kelly 1997 S.C. 285 - nothing in the authorities to support the view that a foetus was a 
legal person. 
 
86 [1988] 2 All E.R. 193. 
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an approach is being taken when the law does not grant any legal status to a 
child until birth. 
 
 
4.5 The Legal Definition of a Parent 
The Law Commission Review of Child Law Guardianship and Custody prior to the 
enactment of the Children Act 1989 stated that:  
 
A fundamental principle which guided both the Review of Child 
Care Law and the Government’s response to it was that the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing of children rests with their 
parents.  The State should be ready to help them to discharge that 
responsibility and should intervene compulsorily only where the 
child is placed at unacceptable risk...The present law, however, 
does not adequately recognise that parenthood is a matter of 
responsibility rather than rights, while at the same time it may 
encourage the State (which includes the courts) to intervene 
unnecessarily in the discharge of those responsibilities.87 
 
This matter was addressed in the consequent legislation which, as has been 
discussed, refers explicitly to parental responsibilities and accords rights in 
order to enable these responsibilities to be performed.  If the parents are the 
ones who have the primary responsibility for their children’s upbringing, then it 
is clearly of great importance to these children that their parents are identified 
and held legally responsible for their welfare.  Traditionally, the term ‘parent’ 
applied to the two people genetically responsible for the conception and birth of 
the child.  As has been previously discussed in Chapter Two this traditional 
definition has been challenged both by the development of ART which 
introduced the possibility of a separation in the concepts of ‘natural parent’, 
‘birth parent’, ‘genetic parent’ and ‘social parent’ and from societal changes 
that have been brought about by an increase in ‘social parents’ in the form of 
                                                             
87 Law Commission Report, No. 172, Review of Child Law, Guardianship and Custody (London, 
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step-parents88 and extended family members taking on the principal carer role 
for children.   
 
The Warnock Committee considered the implications in relation to the legal 
status of the child’s parents in each of these scenarios.89  While the Committee 
had no difficulties in relation to artificial insemination using the sperm of the 
woman’s husband, it was of the view that assisted insemination of a woman 
using the previously stored sperm of her deceased husband ‘may give rise to 
profound psychological problems for the child and the mother’.90  In regard to 
artificial insemination by donor, the Committee considered arguments against 
this practice.  These arguments included fears that the practice would be a 
threat to the couple’s relationship,91 fears that keeping the child in the dark as 
to his genetic origins would be damaging to the child92 and fears surrounding the 
danger of a donor passing on a genetically inherited condition to the child.93  
Nonetheless, the Committee recommended that donor artificial insemination 
should be made available94 and the law changed to make a consenting husband 
the legal father of the child.95  In relation to the question of the legal status of 
the parent following egg donation and embryo donation, the Warnock 
Committee was of the view that the same objections existed as in relation to 
donor artificial insemination.96  The Committee’s recommendations on the legal 
status of the parent in relation to a child born via ART were accepted by 
                                                             
88 There are approximately 150,000 divorces each year in England and Wales (Social Trends 33 
(2003). In 1993 it was estimated that 8% of children spent some time as part of a step–family. 
Data produced in 2003 showed that 17% of men were step fathers by the age of 30 (Changing 
Britain, Changing Lives (Institute of Education, 2003)). 
89 The Warnock Report, para. 4.3. 
90 The Warnock Report, para. 4.4. 
91 The Warnock Report, para. 4.10 and 4.11. 
92 The Warnock Report, para. 4.12. 
93 The Warnock Report, para. 4.13. 
94 The Warnock Report, para. 4.16. 
95 The Warnock Report, para. 4.25. 
96 The Warnock Report, para. 6.4 and 7.2. 
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Parliament and were followed in the HFE Act 1990.  As has been discussed in 
Chapter Two these provisions subsequently underwent significant revision with 
the passing of the HFE Act 2008. 
 
It is clear from the provisions within the HFE Act 2008 and those they replaced in 
the HFE Act 1990 that Parliament has grappled with the many different concepts 
of parenthood that the development of ART has created.  The effort that has 
gone into drafting these provisions goes to show the importance that is attached 
to the idea that a child should be able to identify an adult who has parental 
rights and responsibilities towards him or her in order that the child’s welfare 
can be safeguarded and promoted by that adult.  It is even considered important 
that children are able to identify their fathers on their birth certificates if their 
fathers died before implantation of the embryos.  The State is of the view that it 
is the parents of the child who should be expected to be the people primarily 
responsible for the child’s upbringing.  The application of the child welfare 
principle can be viewed in the context of parental rights and responsibilities 
which are necessary to enable the parent(s) to ensure that the welfare of the 
child is being met.      
 
 
4.6 The Application of the Child Welfare Principle in Family Law 
In England and Wales, the Children Act 1989 requires the courts to have regard 
to certain issues when deciding whether to make, vary or discharge section 8 
orders97 in contested proceedings.98  The court is also required to have regard to 
these issues in all public proceedings under Part IV of the 1989 Act which relate 
                                                             
97 Children Act 1989 sec. 8(1). A section 8 order can refer to a child arrangements order which 
means an order regulating arrangements relating to any of the following— (a) with whom a child 
is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact, and (b) when a child is to live, spend time or 
otherwise have contact with any person; a prohibited steps order which means an order that no 
step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his parental responsibility for a child, and 
which is of a kind specified in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of the 
court; and a specific issue order which means an order giving directions for the purpose of 
determining a specific question which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any 
aspect of parental responsibility for a child. 
98 Children Act 1989 sec. 1(4)(a). 
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to applications by local authorities for care and supervision orders in relation to 
children.99  These issues are; (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the 
child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); (b) his 
physical, emotional and educational needs; (c) the likely effect on him of any 
change in his circumstances; (d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics 
of his which the court considers relevant; (e) any harm which he has suffered or 
is at risk of suffering; (f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person 
in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of 
meeting his needs; (g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act 
in the proceedings in question.100  If the court fails to have regard for any one of 
the statutory criteria, that failure may form the basis for an appeal.  
 
Prior to the passing of the 1989 Act, it was difficult to say with any great 
certainty what factors had to be taken into account by the court when applying 
the child welfare principle.  The courts did state:  
 
There is only one rule; that rule is that in a consideration of the 
future of the child the interests and welfare of the child are the 
first and paramount consideration.  But within that rule, the 
circumstances of each individual case are so infinitely varied that it 
is unwise to rely upon any rule of thumb, or any formula, to try and 
resolve the difficult problem which arises on the facts of each 
individual case. 101    
 
In effect, the English legislation now mandates that the welfare of the child 
incorporates his physical, emotional and educational needs; the likely effect on 
him of any change in his circumstances; his age, sex, background and any 
                                                             
99 Children Act 1989 sec. 1 (4)(a). 
100 Children Act 1989 sec. 1 (3). 
101 Pountney and Morris [1984] 4 FLR 381. 
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characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; and any harm which he 
has suffered or is at risk of suffering.  How the court has addressed these issues 
is of interest in establishing how the child welfare principle is applied in 
practice. 
 
In Scotland, under the 1995 Act when considering whether or not to make an 
order in relation to parental responsibilities, commonly referred to as a section 
11 order, the court shall regard the welfare of the child concerned as its 
paramount consideration.102  In effect, the legislation in Scotland simply restates 
the paramountcy principle.  It does not attempt, as in England, to define the 
issues which pertain to the question of the child’s welfare.  However, that is not 
to say that the Scottish courts do not have regard to like issues when making 
decisions in relation to section 11 orders.   
 
In Scotland, the case of Pearson v Pearson103 held that the assessment of a 
child’s welfare is a matter of judgement, not a judge’s discretion, to be based 
on all the relevant facts and circumstances.  In reaching that judgement, the 
courts in Scotland clearly pay particular attention to the same issues that are 
specified in the English legislation.  The Court identified the essential questions 
of fact relating to the father’s drinking, whether or not the evidence warranted 
a conclusion that it was under control and whether or not there was a significant 
risk that the father would be materially affected by drink during access periods 
(parenting capability). The relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
welfare of the child from the perspective of the child are the meeting of the 
child’s needs and the protection of the child from harm. 
 
In relation to determining the needs of the child, the courts have moved a long 
way from the 19th Century focus on poverty equating to a form of neglect.  In 
                                                             
102 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11 (7)(a). 
103 1999 S.L.T. 1364. 
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the case of Re P (Adoption: Parental Agreement),104 the legal representative of 
the child’s mother (who was facing the prospect of her child being adopted 
without her consent) submitted that whenever a mother who lived in poor 
circumstances objected to the adoption of her child by middle-class parents, the 
decision would go against the mother. In rejecting that submission the court 
stated that:  
 
....of course one aspect of the approach of the hypothetical 
reasonable person will be to consider the material circumstances 
which the child is likely to enjoy with the adoptive parents when 
compared with the material circumstances which the child is likely 
to enjoy with the natural mother. But that is only an element and I 
would agree entirely with Mr Sears that it is not an element that 
should be allowed to weigh too heavily in the scale. Anyone with 
experience of life knows that affluence and happiness are not 
necessarily synonymous.105 
 
Therefore, while the material needs of the child, presumably in the context of 
physical needs, may be a factor to be weighted into the balance, it does not 
carry determinative weight.  When assessing the needs of the child, the Court is 
likely to place far greater weight on the quality of the relationship which the 
child has with each parent.106  The strength and depth of the parent-child bond 
is a crucial aspect in determining the child’s welfare, particularly when the 
decision to be made relates to which parent the child is to live with following a 
divorce or a decision on whether to remove a child from parental care 
altogether. 
 
 
                                                             
104 [1985] FLR 635 
105 Ibid at 637. 
106 A. Bainham, Children – The Modern Law, Third Edition, Family Law, Bristol, 2005, 176. 
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4.7 Residence and Contact 
A Government Green paper published in July 2004107 stated that ‘in the event of 
parental separation, a child’s welfare is best promoted by a continuing 
relationship with both parents as long as it is safe to do so’.  The law seeks to 
encourage divorced and separated parents to maintain contact with their 
children, provided that this is something that can enhance the welfare of the 
child.  There is probably no better illustration of the influence of the child 
welfare principle than the way it is used to regulate residence and contact 
between parent and child. 
  
Child arrangement orders were introduced by the Children and Families Act 2014 
and came into force on 22 April 2014.  They replaced Residence orders and 
Contact orders but effectively do the same thing.  They are probably the most 
important orders in relation to the welfare of the child.  They determine with 
whom the child lives and has contact with on a day to day basis.  Clearly, a great 
deal of the parental responsibility to safeguard and promote the welfare of the 
child is affected by the practical matter of where the child lives.  These issues 
take up a significant amount of court time in the UK and have generated a large 
body of case law.  
 
Section 8 of the 1989 Act defined a residence order as an order settling the 
arrangements to be made as to the person with whom a child is to live.108  The 
recently enacted child arrangements order means an order regulating 
arrangements relating to any of the following— (a) with whom a child is to live, 
spend time or otherwise have contact, and (b) when a child is to live, spend 
time or otherwise have contact with any person.109 
 
                                                             
107 Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ Responsibilities (2004) (Cm 6273) 
108 Children Act 1989 sec. 8 (1) as originally enacted. 
109 Children Act 1989 sec. 8 (1) as amended by the Children and Families Act 2014 c. 6 Pt 2 
s.12(3)  
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In terms of section 11 of the 1995 Act, a residence order was ‘an order 
regulating the arrangements as to with whom, or if with different persons 
alternately or periodically, with whom during that period, a child under the age 
of sixteen years is to live’.110  A residence order was not made in favour of one 
parent or another, because both have the parental right to have the child living 
with them.  What the order does it to ‘settle’ or ‘regulate’ the way in which this 
parental right is exercised.   
 
The courts had adopted the attitude that it was not conducive to the welfare of 
the child to have him or her move backwards and forwards between two 
different homes.  The court held in Riley v Riley,111 that the paramount interests 
of the child were that she should have a settled home.  However, in the case of 
A v A (Minors) (Shared Residence Orders),112 it was held that, while the views 
expressed in Riley (that a child should have one settled home and that 
competing homes could lead to confusion) still held some weight, joint residence 
orders were something that had been specifically contemplated by the 1989 Act.  
A joint residence order did not have to be confined to exceptional 
circumstances, although if one was made there would have to be some specific, 
positive benefit to the child for such an arrangement to be put in place.  The 
idea that a child’s welfare is always best served by having an undisrupted, 
constant home life no longer holds such sway in the courts, which are willing to 
look at other less conventional living arrangements for the child as long as it can 
be shown that the living arrangements enhance or protect the welfare of the 
child.   
 
Courts are prepared to restrict the parental right to contact quite severely if an 
alternative arrangement, which has that inevitable outcome, can be shown to be 
                                                             
110 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11 (2)(c)(i)and (ii). 
111 [1986] 2 FLR 429. 
112 [1994] 1 FLR 669. 
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conducive to the welfare of the child.  In the case of M v M,113 the court allowed 
the mother of three children to remove them from Scotland to the United 
States.  This would have the effect of drastically reducing the father’s contact 
with his children.  The father opposed the making of the order.  The court held 
that, on the balance of evidence, various factors outweighed the negative 
factors of reduced contact with their father including: that the children would 
be provided with a materially better life and education and a more stable 
environment; their inheritance would be better protected; and if the mother's 
plans were thwarted, the strong sense of regret that might follow might sour the 
family atmosphere.  The court also expressed an opinion that the father’s 
approach to care was over protective. 
 
A contact order was defined by section 8 of the 1989 Act as ‘an order requiring 
the person with whom a child lives, or is to live, to allow the child to visit or 
stay with the person named in the order, or for that person and the child 
otherwise to have contact with each other’.114  The Children and Family Act 
2014 has in effect subsumed the definitions of a residence order and a contact 
orders into the one definition set out in the child arrangement order definition. 
However, it remains useful to consider case law heard under the previous 
legislation. 
 
In terms of section 11 of the 1995 Act ‘a contact order is an order regulating the 
arrangements for maintaining personal relations and direct contact between a 
child under the age of sixteen years and a person with whom the child is not, or 
will not be, living’.115  The order would be worded in such a way as to stress that 
the parent has a responsibility to the child to maintain contact, as opposed to 
                                                             
113 2000 Fam. L.R. 84. 
114 Children Act 1989 sec. 8 (1) as originally enacted. 
115 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11 (2)(d). 
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the idea that a parent has a right to access.  Contact orders have been far and 
away the most common orders sought in the courts.116 
 
In the case of Re M (Contact): Welfare Test),117 the Court of Appeal held that 
the judge had been entitled to form the view that the risk of distress to the 
children outweighed the strong presumption in favour of contact.  The test, 
having regard to the issues set out in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act, was ‘whether 
the fundamental emotional need of every child to have an enduring relationship 
with both his parents (section 1(3)(b) his physical, emotional and educational 
needs) is outweighed by the depth of harm which in the light, inter alia, of his 
wishes and feelings (section 1(3)(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the 
child concerned) the child would be at risk of suffering (section 1(3)(e) any harm 
which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering) by virtue of a contact order.’118  
This case illustrates the balancing exercise that a court will engage in when 
assessing what is most conducive to the welfare of the child. 
 
What can be taken from the courts’ application of the child welfare principle in 
residence and contact orders is that there is a strong emphasis upon the parental 
responsibility towards the child.  The concept of parental rights is only relevant 
in so far as it is necessary to enable to parent to carry out parental 
responsibilities.  The task of the court is to decide what arrangements will 
provide the best parenting environment for the child.    In the next chapter, the 
thesis will examine whether people seeking to become parents using ART should 
have to satisfy the clinic that they are willing and able to exercise parental 
responsibility adequately/satisfactorily towards a child before treatment can be 
provided to them.  One issue that is considered important for the clinic to assess 
                                                             
116 A. Bainham, Children – The Modern Law, Third Edition, Family Law, Bristol, 2005, 156. 
117 [1995] 1 FLR 274. 
118 Wilson J, [1995] 1 FLR 274. 
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is whether there is any serious discord within the family environment.119 
Presumably this factor is considered to be important to avoid a situation where 
the child’s welfare will be put at risk by future parental conflict and separation.  
This thesis is of the view that the influence of the day to day work in the family 
courts making decisions about residence and contact and assessing what parental 
environment would be in the child’s best interests can be clearly seen within the 
HFEA guidance to clinics on how to apply section13(5).  
 
 
4.8 State Protection of Children at Risk 
The issues considered so far concern the intervention by courts in order to settle 
private disputes between parents when they disagree over matters concerning 
the lives of their children.  However, another important area where the child 
welfare principle plays a significant role is the State’s duty to protect children 
from harm.  A local authority has a duty in terms of section 22 of the 1995 Act 
‘to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their area who are in need, 
by providing a range and level of services appropriate to the children’s needs, 
although so far as is consistent with that duty, the local authority must promote 
the upbringing of children in need by their families.’120  A similar duty is set out 
in the 1989 Act at section 17 which reads: ‘(1) It shall be the general duty of 
every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this 
Part)— (a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area 
who are in need; and (b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the 
upbringing of such children by their families, by providing a range and level of 
services appropriate to those children's needs.’121  
 
                                                             
119 HFEA Welfare of the child: patient history form at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1414.html 
(accessed on 12 December 2013).   
120 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 22(1). 
121 Children Act 1989 sec. 17(1). 
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In Scotland, the court may make an order ‘depriving a person of some or all of 
his parental responsibilities or parental rights in relation to a child’.122  The 
court should have regard to ‘the need to protect the child from any abuse, the 
effect of such abuse and the ability of a person who has carried out abuse to 
care for, or otherwise meet the needs of, the child.’123  Prior to 24 June 2013, in 
terms of section 52 of the 1995 Act a child could be referred to a Children’s 
Hearing to consider whether compulsory measures of supervision are necessary if 
‘the child is beyond the control of any relevant person; is falling into bad 
associations or is exposed to moral danger; is likely to suffer unnecessarily; or be 
impaired seriously in his health or development due to a lack of parental care; is 
a child in respect of whom an offence has been committed or is likely to become 
a member of the same household as a person who has committed offences 
against children; has failed to attend school without reasonable excuse; has 
committed an offence; has misused drugs or alcohol; is being provided with 
accommodation by a local authority; or is the subject of a parental 
responsibilities order in favour of the local authority.’124 Section 52 of the 1995 
Act has since been repealed and replaced with section 83 of the Children 
Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 which gives the Children’s Hearing or court the 
power to make a compulsory supervision order which means an order in relation 
to a child which can requires that the child resides at a specified place125 and 
prohibits the disclosure of such a place.126  A compulsory supervision order can 
also requires the local authority to perform duties in relation to the child’s 
needs, such as  arranging a medical or other examination or treatment of the 
child,127 regulate contact between the child and a specified person or class of 
person,128 or restrict the child's liberty to the extent considered appropriate.129 
                                                             
122 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11(2)(a). 
123 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 11(7B)(a)-(c). 
124 Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 52. 
125 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 83(2)(a). 
126 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 83(2)(c). 
127 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 83(2)(f)(i) and (ii). 
128 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 83(2)(g). 
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Clearly, the State plays a wide-ranging role in ensuring that the welfare of the 
child is protected.  However, the State is not to be viewed as a substitute parent 
and the legislation is clear that, first and foremost, the responsibility for the 
welfare of the child lies with the parents.  The ethos of the domestic legislation 
is that the family unit should be free from unjustified interference by the 
State.130  It is the tradition of the UK that children should be brought up within 
natural families.  Lord Templeman, in Re KD (A Minor Ward) (Termination of 
Access),131 said: 
 
The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent.  It matters 
not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or 
illiterate, provided the child’s moral and physical health are not in 
danger.  Public authorities cannot improve on nature.132 
 
The local authority powers are designed to work in partnership with parents, 
with the aim of returning the child to the care of his or her parents when and 
wherever possible.133  It is of note that the legislation encourages local 
authorities to support parents to raise their children wherever possible, with 
court ordered removal to be treated as a last resort.   
 
The circumstances in which children are taken into care invariably involve a 
finding that the parent(s) have failed to fulfil their parental responsibility to 
safeguard and promote the child’s health, development and welfare.  Sadly, 
these cases all too often involve the physical or sexual abuse of children or 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
129 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 83(2)(b). 
130 A. MacDonald, The Rights of the Child: Law and Practice, Family law - Jordan Publishing 
Limited, Bristol, 2011, 542. 
131 [1988] 1 AC 806, [1988] 2 FLR 139 
132 [1988] 1 AC 806, [1988] 2 FLR 139, at 812 and 141 
133 Children Act 1989 sec. 17(1) (b) and Children (Scotland) Act 1995 sec. 22 actively encourage 
this. 
178 
 
situations of serious neglect.  In England, the court can make what is known as a 
care order or supervision order if it is satisfied that the child concerned ‘is 
suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and that the harm, or likelihood 
of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child being what it would be 
reasonable to expect a parent to give to him.’134  In Scotland, the sheriff may 
grant a child protection order on the application of a Local Authority if satisfied 
that (a) the local authority has reasonable grounds to suspect that (i) the child 
has been or is being treated in such a way that the child is suffering or is likely 
to suffer significant harm, (ii) the child has been or is being neglected and as a 
result of the neglect the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm, 
or (iii) the child will be treated or neglected in such a way that is likely to cause 
significant harm to the child.135  
 
These orders have significant consequences for the parent/child relationship, as 
they invariably remove the child from the parental home and place him or her in 
the care of the local authority.  They are often the first step in the parent/child 
relationship being severed entirely through the removal of parental rights and 
having the child placed for adoption.  The threshold criterion is a fairly high one; 
that of significant harm.   
 
The courts have held that there is no all-embracing definition of significant harm 
and that it is fact-specific.  It has to retain the breadth of meaning that human 
shortcomings requires of it.  For there to be ‘significant harm’, there has to be 
something more than commonplace human failure or inadequacy.136  In Re L 
(Care: Threshold Criteria)137 Hendley J observed: 
 
...society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of 
parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the 
                                                             
134 Children Act 1989 sec. 31. 
135 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 sec. 38. 
136 In re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050. 
137 [2007] 1 FLR 2050. 
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inconsistent.  It follows too that children will inevitably have both 
very different experiences of parenting and very unequal 
consequences flowing from it.  It means that some children will 
experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in 
atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability.  These are 
the consequences of out fallible humanity and it is not the 
provenance of the State to spare children all consequences of 
defective parenting.  In any event, it simply could not be done.138 
 
In the case of A and B (Children), Re139 the issue of the significant harm test was 
fairly clear cut, the court holding that in all cases where one parent had been 
killed by another the threshold criteria would be met.  However, there have 
been a series of more controversial cases; namely, the ‘shaken baby syndrome’ 
cases which have called into question the reliability of medical evidence when 
making a finding that the significant harm threshold has been met.   
 
In A and D (Non Accidental Injury: Subdural Haematomas), Re140 a baby was 
taken to hospital with left side convulsions.  An examination showed that these 
were caused by two acute subdural haematomas and bilateral retinal 
haemorrhages.  The consultant paediatrician was of the view that the injuries 
were non-accidental and had probably been caused by the baby being shaken by 
an adult.  The parents denied this and suggested that the injuries were due to 
either rough play by the baby's older siblings or by a three year old sibling falling 
on top of the baby five days before the convulsions started.  The local authority 
argued that it should be allowed to intervene as the 1989 Act section 31 
threshold (significant harm) had been exceeded.  The court held that this 
threshold had been exceeded so that the local authority was entitled to 
intervene and that expert evidence as to the nature and extent of the injuries 
was such that they could not have been caused by rough play or a toddler 
                                                             
138 [2007] 1 FLR 2050, 2063. 
139 [2010] EWCA 3824. 
140 [2002] 1 FLR 337. 
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accidentally falling onto the baby.  The court held that the most probable cause 
was shaking by the parents and found that their evidence was not credible on 
this issue.   However, the court commented that further research on the 
mechanics of subdural haematomas and the force required to cause them would 
be valuable.  In a recent case, two parents were cleared of murdering their child 
by inflicting head injuries as experts were unable to agree on whether the 
injuries were a result of non-accidental injury or accidental injury exacerbated 
by rickets.141  These cases are of note because the controversy surrounding 
shaken baby syndrome illustrates the difficulties that medical practitioners and 
social workers have in identifying whether or not a child has been deliberately 
harmed, even where the child has clearly suffered severe injury while in their 
parents’ care.   
 
In the case of B (Children) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re,142 it was held 
that the standard of proof in establishing whether the significant harm threshold 
criterion was met was the balance of probabilities.  In this case, the court held 
that neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the 
consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied 
in determining the facts.  There was no logical or necessary connection between 
seriousness and probability.  The inherent probabilities were simply something to 
be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lay.  To 
allow the courts to make decisions about the allocation of parental responsibility 
for children on the basis of unproven allegations and unsubstantiated suspicions 
would be to deny them their essential role in protecting both children and their 
families from the intervention of the State, however well intentioned that 
intervention might be.  It would confuse the role of the local authority in 
assessing and managing risk, in planning for the child, and deciding what action 
to take, with the role of the court in seeking to decide where the truth lay and 
what the legal consequences should be. 
 
                                                             
141 Pair cleared over Jayden Wray death, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-16107085, 9 December 
2011 (accessed 7 June 2012). 
142 [2008] UKHL 35. 
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All these cases highlight the difficulties that the courts and local authorities 
have in determining when and how a child’s welfare may be at risk.  It is clearly 
not an easy task to determine whether the child’s welfare would be safeguarded 
and promoted by the removal of the child from the parental home, given the 
negative impact such an action may have, or safeguarded and promoted by 
allowing the child to remain in the parental home in the face of evidence of a 
possible risk of abuse and neglect.  Given the difficulties faced in applying the 
child welfare principle to cases even where there is a child in existence, it may 
be that any useful, accurate or meaningful assessment of the risk of significant 
harm faces even greater challenges at the pre-conception stage and is simply 
not possible.    
  
 
4.9 Criticism of the Child Welfare Principle 
4.9.1 Indeterminacy 
It has been noted that while the child welfare principle has almost reached the 
stage of being cited as a ‘sacred mantra’143 it does have its critics.  One major 
criticism of the welfare principle is directed towards its inherent 
indeterminacy;144 the difficulty being that it lacks the certainty required of a 
rule of law.  In a case in the High Court of Australia145 a judge commented:  
 
...it must be remembered that, in the absence of legal rules or a 
hierarchy of values, the best interests approach depends upon the 
value system of the decision-maker.  Absent any rule or guideline 
that approach simply creates an unexaminable discretion in the 
repository of the power.146 
 
                                                             
143 A. MacDonald, The Rights of the Child: Law and Practice, Family law - Jordan Publishing 
Limited, Bristol, 2011,  182 
144 R. Mnookin, Child Custody and Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 1975, 39, 226 – 293. 
145 Secretary, Dept of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB FLC 92-3, 191 (1992) 
146 FLC 92-3, 191 (1992), 79 
182 
 
If a legal principle lacks certainty, so the argument goes, it can lead to arbitrary 
and inconsistent decisions.147  This is exacerbated by the value judgement which 
is attached to the question; ‘what is in the child’s best interests’?148  Where a 
question involves a value judgement to be made it is difficult to settle that 
question impartially just on the facts.149  This leaves the answer to the question 
vulnerable to interpretation based on the decision-makers own values.150  
 
It has been suggested that when a judge decides about custody under the best-
interests principle, he is: 
 
Not applying law or legal rules at all, but is exercising 
administrative discretion which by its nature cannot be rule-bound. 
The statutory admonitions to decide the question of custody so as 
to advance the welfare of the child is as remote from being a rule 
of law as an instruction to the manager of a state owned factory 
that he should follow the principle of maximizing output at the 
least cost to the state.151 
 
Mnookin has expanded upon this idea that the judge is exercising an 
administrative function in determining the child’s best interests by 
characterising the process as making a choice between alternative outcomes and 
choosing the one which is in the best interests of the child.152  When making this 
choice, the decision maker requires a great deal of information relating to the 
past behaviour of the parents and the impact that behaviour has had on the 
                                                             
147 A. MacDonald, The Rights of the Child: Law and Practice, Family law - Jordan Publishing 
Limited, Bristol, 2011,  184 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 L. Fuller, Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
(1975), 39, 226. 
152 R. Mnookin, Child Custody and Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 1975, 39, 226 – 293. 
183 
 
child.  The judge then has to make a prediction of which alternative possible 
outcome will be in the child’s best interest. 153  The difficulty the courts face 
when making decisions of this sort is that it is widely recognised by child 
psychologists that there is no set theory capable of predicting the psychological 
and behavioural consequences of favouring one course of action above another.  
The psychologist Anna Freud had said: ‘In spite of...advances there remain 
factors which make clinical foresight, i.e., prediction, difficult and 
hazardous...environmental happenings in a child's life will always remain 
unpredictable since they are not governed by any known laws.’154 
 
The difficulty of making accurate predictions was clearly shown in a study 
undertaken by Joan Macfarlane.155  During a thirty-year period Macfarlane 
studied a group of 166 infants born in 1929.  The objective was to observe the 
emotional, mental, and physical growth of ‘normal’ people.  Commenting on the 
findings, Skolnick concluded that: 
 
Over the years this study has generated several significant research 
findings, but the most surprising of all was the difficulty of 
predicting what thirty-year-old adults would be like even after the 
most sophisticated data had been gathered on them as children.156 
 
Skolnick explained the difficulty in interpreting the data collected as follows: 
 
Foremost, the researchers had tended to overestimate the 
damaging effects of early troubles of various kinds.  Most 
personality theory had been derived from observations of troubled 
people in therapy.  The pathology of adult neurotics and psychotics 
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was traced back to disturbances early in childhood-poor parent-
child relations, chronic school difficulties, and so forth.  
Consequently, theories of personality based on clinical observation 
tended to define adult psychological problems as socialization 
failures.  But the psychiatrist sees only disturbed people; he does 
not encounter ‘normal’ individuals who may experience childhood 
difficulties, but who do not grow into troubled adults.  The 
Berkeley method, however, called for studying such people.  Data 
on the experience of these subjects demonstrated the error of 
assuming that similar childhood conditions affect every child the 
same way.  Indeed, many instances of what looked like severe 
pathology to the researchers were put to constructive use by the 
subjects.157 
 
This psychological study calls into question the ability of a judge (or indeed, 
anyone) to make an accurate prediction as to the circumstances which will most 
likely ensure that the best interests of the child are met.  If it is accepted that 
the child welfare principle does indeed require a judge to make a prediction 
then clearly it cannot be said that the principle can be applied with any degree 
of certainty. 
 
The difficulty created by the indeterminacy of the child welfare principle was 
also expressed by Parker:  
 
At the same time as the best interests standard is deepening its 
hold in domestic and international instruments, we hear that it 
provides a convenient cloak for bias, paternalism and capricious 
decision-making.  Even worse, the open-endedness of the standard 
can legitimate practices in some cultures which are regarded in 
other cultures as positively harmful to children.158 
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Parker examined what it means to say that the child welfare principle was 
indeterminate by examining it in the context of rational choice theory.  Like 
Mnookin, he criticises the child welfare principle on the basis that decision-
makers cannot make a rational choice about how the principle should be 
applied, which leads to a wide variation in outcomes.  If a decision-maker is to 
make a rational choice, s/he must know all of the options available, all of the 
possible outcomes of each option, the probabilities of each possible outcome 
occurring and the value to be attached to each outcome.  If two decision-makers 
are in possession of different information at any of these four stages then 
identical problems can be decided differently. 
 
If the common example is taken of a custody dispute then the options available 
are that the child lives with the mother and visits the father of visa versa, it is 
still difficult to say with any certainty what the outcome will be for the child.  
As Parker notes: 
 
Child custody cases involve the imprecise exercise of appraising 
peoples' characters and dispositions and then trying to work out 
how each possible decision might affect them and thus indirectly 
the child.159 
 
Even then, there remains the difficulty of assigning probability to the outcome 
and attaching a value to all of the possible outcomes.  Mnookin expressed the 
difficulty of attaching a value to a possible outcome in the following terms:  
 
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate 
than the purposes and values of life itself.  Should the judge be 
primarily concerned with the child's happiness?  Or with the child's 
spiritual and religious training?  Should the judge be concerned with 
the economic 'productivity' of the child when he grows up?  Are the 
primary values of life in warm, interpersonal relationships, or in 
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discipline and self-sacrifice?  Is stability and security for a child 
more desirable than intellectual stimulation?  These questions could 
be elaborated endlessly.  And yet, where is the judge to look for 
the set of values that should inform the choice of what is best for 
the child?  Normally, the custody statutes do not themselves give 
content or relative weights to the pertinent values.  And if the 
judge looks to society at large, he finds neither a clear consensus as 
to the best child rearing strategies nor an appropriate hierarchy of 
ultimate values.160 
 
Therefore, the child welfare principle can yield indeterminate results because of 
problems concerning having enough information to make the decision, problems 
with the uncertainty associated with making predictions about the future and 
problems in deciding what values should guide the decision.  All this said, 
however, Mnookin acknowledges that in many cases the question of what is in 
the child’s best interest is a fairly straightforward matter.161  As he puts it, while 
there might be little consensus as to what it good for a child there is a general 
consensus as to what is bad for a child, be that physical abuse, neglect or sexual 
exploitation.  If a judge is to decide a custody case between a capable mother 
and a violent, alcoholic father the decision is straightforward enough. 
 
 
4.9.2 Conflict of Rights 
The indeterminacy of the child welfare principle is not the only criticism 
directed at it.  Eekelar sets out in his article ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ a 
number of other contemporary criticisms.162  The first of these he calls the lack 
of transparency objection.  This criticism states that the child welfare principle 
fails in its child protection purpose because what actually drives the decision is 
the interests of other parties or untested assumptions about what is best for 
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children.  Eekelar suggests that the non-disclosure of origins to children born 
through IVF was one such example where the decision was guided not by what 
was in the best interests of the child but rather in the interests of the donor and 
the wish not to see potential donors put off.163 
 
Another criticism Eekelar calls the lack of fairness objection and is something of 
the opposite to the lack of transparency objection.  This criticism runs that, by 
making the welfare of the child the paramount consideration, the interests of 
others are unjustly ignored.  In effect, the child welfare principle ignores that 
the child is but one party in the process where the interests of others also count.  
This criticism has become particularly pertinent given the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporated the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) into UK law.  This has given rise to the potential difficulty of a 
conflict between the welfare of the child and the human rights of the adult.  
 
In the case of Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access),164 the House of 
Lords held that any apparent conflict between the child welfare principle and 
the right of the parent to have contact with the child was a question of 
semantics and not an actual conflict in practice.  However, Eekelar disagreed 
and expressed his disagreement in these terms: 
 
Suppose (a) that I can exercise my ‘right’ to paint my front door 
only if I submit my colour scheme to a committee of neighbours 
which ‘pays regard’ to it alongside other submissions, but will 
choose the scheme most pleasing to the committee.  It is hard to 
say that I have a ‘right’ to paint my door that colour.  But if (b) I 
can apply my own colours unless, on objection, it is proved that the 
result will devalue property prices, the ‘right’ appears altogether 
stronger.  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the view of 
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the welfare principle...as explained by Lord Oliver, is closer to 
model (a) than (b).  Its potentially devastating effect on parental 
rights is obscured only by the facts that parents do not live under 
daily threat of its application to their conduct and that there is 
acceptance of a wide scope of different, but acceptable, means of 
enhancing children’s interests.165 
 
The criticism argues that the way in which the child welfare principle is applied 
cannot be reconciled with the need to uphold the rights of others.  This was 
expressed by Reece in her statement that:   
 
...the paramountcy principle must be abandoned, and replaced 
with a framework which recognises that the child is merely one 
participant in a process in which the interests of all the participants 
count.166 
 
The case of Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions)167 provided a good 
illustration of the type of conflict which can arise between the application of 
the child welfare principle and the rights of a parent under the Human Rights 
Act 1998.  In this case, the parents of a child had separated.  The child was 
living with the mother under a residence order.  Both parents lived in London 
and the father had regular and beneficial contact with the child.  The mother, 
however, wished to move to Liverpool.  The father applied to the court for a 
condition to be attached to the mother’s residence order requiring her to stay in 
London.  There was clearly a potential clash here between the right of the 
mother to her private life under Article 8 and the parental rights of the father, 
also under Article 8, while both impacted upon the child’s best interests.   
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Herring has suggested that the courts would reach two different decisions if 
applying the child welfare principle or applying the Human Rights Act 1998.168  If 
applying the child welfare principle, the court would likely hold that the 
condition was in the child’s best interests as it would have the effect of keeping 
in place beneficial contact between father and child, while on the other hand a 
move to another city would have no direct benefit for the child, although this 
may not always be the case as the earlier example illustrated.  However, if the 
matter was considered with reference to the mother’s right to a private life, an 
order requiring her to stay in London would infringe that right.  The court 
ultimately held that that, as a residence order had been made in the mother’s 
favour, attaching a condition was an unjustified interference with the mother's 
right to choose where to live within the UK and with whom.  Clearly, the court 
took the view that the question of the child’s welfare had been settled by the 
decision to make a residence order in the mother’s favour; it was then 
appropriate to go on and consider the mother’s human rights. 
 
While the child welfare principle and the human rights of adults may appear to 
be set up for a collision Herring points out four ways in which the domestic 
courts have avoided such clashes.169  The first is that the child welfare principle 
is quite loosely applied, at least with respect to private law matters.  The 
welfare of the child is only ever considered if the matter is actually brought to 
court.  While child minders, nurseries and schools may be subject to State 
regulation and inspection, the family home is free from such scrutiny.  This, 
Herring believes, ensures that the parents’ right to privacy is upheld.  The 
second way that the domestic courts have ensured that the child welfare 
principle does not clash with the parents’ human rights is referred to in the first 
section of this chapter; namely, that the scope of the child welfare principle is 
confined to matters arising from the 1989 Act and 1995 Act.  The various issues 
to which the child welfare principle does not apply, even though the interests of 
the child may still be an important consideration, include the granting of a 
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divorce; domestic violence remedies; financial redistribution of property on 
divorce; and biological paternity tests.  The third way that the domestic courts 
have got round the issue according to Herring is by associating the interests of 
the child with the interests of the parent.  Fourthly, the courts have protected 
parents’ interests by explicitly limiting their jurisdiction to make certain 
orders.170  
 
Herring is of the view that although the ECHR makes no specific reference to 
children it does actually protect the welfare of children.171  The Human Rights 
Act 1998 provides that the ECHR is enforceable against all public authorities; 
public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with the ECHR and all 
domestic legislation must be interpreted in line with the ECHR, and decisions of 
the ECtHR should be taken into account by domestic courts.  What this means 
for the child welfare principle is that orders under the Children Acts in England 
and Scotland should not infringe the rights of individuals protected by the ECHR, 
unless this is required by the domestic legislation.  Fortin has argued that: 
 
It is of fundamental importance that the judiciary shows a 
willingness to interpret the European Convention in a child-
centered way, as far as its narrow scope allows.  It would be 
unfortunate in the extreme, if such a change heralded in an 
increased willingness to allow parents to pursue their own rights 
under the Convention at the expense of those of their children.172 
 
Children are obviously ‘human beings’ and enjoy the same rights as adults under 
the ECHR.  The approach of the ECtHR has been to hold that the human rights of 
parents can be interfered with if necessary in the interests of children.  National 
courts should always consider the interests of children, but only if those 
interests are of significant weight will they justify invasion of the rights of 
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adults.  The precise balance between parents’ and children’s rights is left to the 
national courts.  This position was well summarised in the case of Olsson v 
Sweden (No 2)173 where it was held that:  
 
...the interests as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned 
must be taken into account, notably the children’s interests and 
their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.  Where contacts with 
the natural parents would harm those interests or interfere with 
these rights, it is for the national authorities to strike a fair 
balance.174 
 
Bainham has addressed the problem of a conflict of parental and child interests 
by suggesting that parents’ and children’s interests should be categorised 
further into either primary or secondary interests.175 A child’s secondary 
interests would have to give way to a parent’s primary interests and vice versa.  
However, Herring criticises this approach on the grounds that it conceives 
parental interests and children’s interests as being in direct competition with 
each other and that it provides no answer to the problem should primary 
interests clash.176  Herring instead suggests ‘a broader vision of the welfare 
principle which could allow consideration of the parent’s interests, which I will 
call relationship-based welfare.’177  The relationship-based welfare principle 
would require some recognition that children when growing up do have to make 
some limited sacrifices in the interests of family cohesiveness.  It recognises that 
child welfare is not enhanced by placing unreasonable demands upon parents.  
As Herring puts it: 
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It is in the child’s welfare to be brought up in a family whose 
members respect each other, and so, on occasion, sacrifices may be 
required of the child.  As the preamble to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child states, ‘the child, for the full and harmonizing 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding’.  A relationship based on placing unjust demands on 
a parent is not furthering a child’s welfare.  So the effect of a 
relationship-based welfare approach is to move away from 
conceiving the problem as a clash between children and parents 
and in terms of weighing two conflicting interests, and towards 
seeing it rather as deciding what is a proper parent-child 
relationship.  The child’s welfare is promoted when he or she lives 
in a fair and just relationship with each parent, preserving the 
rights of each, but with the child’s welfare at the forefront of the 
family’s concern.  So understood, the welfare principle can protect 
children while properly taking into account parents’ rights.178 
 
What this quote from Herring highlights well is that the welfare of a child cannot 
be viewed solely from the perspective of the child.  What is good for the 
parent(s) more often than not may seen as good for the child, or at very least 
the family.  As the next chapter will come on to discuss the requirement that 
clinics take into account the welfare of the child to be born can be criticised by 
placing too much emphasis upon the welfare of the child at the expense of the 
creation of a family unit within which the child can be nurtured and raised.  
 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The historical development which saw a move away from the idea of paternal 
rights to children’s rights has resulted in substantial beneficial consequences for 
children in the UK.  The law now compels the State to afford children far greater 
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protection from abuse, neglect and exploitation.  It also expects parents to 
exercise their right to direct the upbringing of their child in such a way as to 
promote the child’s welfare.  While children in the UK and more globally still 
suffer at the hands of sadistic, exploitative or neglectful adults, children may 
now have the expectation that the law will intervene to protect them from such 
behaviour.  On the whole, the introduction and development in law of the child 
welfare principle and the UNCRC have had a positive influence upon society.  
That said, when a legal principle has beneficial consequences there is always a 
danger in believing that it will have these beneficial consequences wherever it is 
applied. What this chapter has also set out to do is to outline the historical 
development and the modern application of the child welfare principle in family 
law cases.  In doing so it aims to highlight the growing influence and persuasive 
nature of the child welfare principle which to a large extent explains why it was 
introduced and remains largely unchallenged as part of the HFE Acts.   
 
What this chapter also aims to illustrate is that even when it is applied in the 
way it was envisaged it would be - to questions of residence, contact and State 
protection of children at risk - it still has its critics on the basis that it is a 
speculative and uncertain question to ask how this decision will impact upon the 
welfare of this child going forward.  As was alluded to in the introduction and 
will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter, one of Emily Jackson’s 
arguments for the repeal of section 13(5) is that it is ineffective because of the 
difficulties associated with assessing risk of harm to children and god or bad 
parenting.  This thesis takes the view that these criticisms are amplified when a 
child welfare assessment is attempted at a pre-conception stage. 
 
The next chapter will evaluate how the child welfare principle has influenced 
the provision of ART, examine whether the child welfare principle can 
appropriately be applied in this area and ask whether or not legislators have 
fallen into the trap of applying a beneficial principle to an area where its 
application is actually inappropriate and unfair.  As has been said above a 
number of the criticisms of the child welfare principle which this chapter has 
addressed may be increased when the principle is applied to the question of 
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allowing access to ART, so it is worth bearing in mind that the child welfare 
principle requires the decision maker to make a prediction about the future, 
based on limited information about the present and past, while carrying out a 
subjective value judgement of the life circumstances of the parent(s), in the 
face of no clear consensus about what actually amounts to the best interests of 
the child in terms of appropriate parenting. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – CHILD WELFARE AND ACCESS TO TREATMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
As the last chapter made clear, the importance of the child welfare principle in 
family law is widely acknowledged.  Furthermore, if a child is suffering or likely 
to suffer from abuse, harm or neglect at the hands of an adult, then a duty is 
incumbent upon the State to intervene to protect that child.  However, there 
are a number of difficulties in treating the assessment of the welfare of a ‘child’ 
yet-to-be-conceived and the assessment of the welfare of a child as comparable 
exercises, as this chapter will seek to examine.  The child welfare principle as 
applied in the context of legal decisions which directly impact upon a child’s 
life, as discussed, is founded upon a solid mandate which allows the State to 
interfere with parental rights when to do so is in the best interests of the child.  
The question is whether or not it can reasonably be said that the State has a 
mandate to interfere with patients’ access to ART when to do so may be in the 
‘best interests of the yet-to-be-conceived child’.  Does the phrase ‘best 
interests of the yet-to-be-conceived child’ have any logical and applicable 
meaning?   
 
In attempting to answer that question, this chapter will examine the thinking 
behind the inclusion of the child welfare provision within the HFE Act 1990.  It 
will then examine whether the provision as currently drafted is actually doing 
what it purports to do, namely, protecting children, or is simply acting to vet 
people and exclude certain ‘undesirables’ from conceiving children.  The 
proposition is essentially that the difficulty with section 13(5) as currently 
drafted lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of the breadth and scope of the 
child welfare principle and that the child welfare principle is being misapplied in 
the context of access to ART.  While the child welfare principle can be usefully 
applied in the field of family law although, as has been shown, it is not without 
difficulties even there, it does not necessarily follow that it can be applied in 
any meaningful sense to the question of whether patients should be granted 
access to treatment services.  Given these significant difficulties it will be 
argued that section 13(5) should be amended to exclude reference to ‘the need 
for supportive parenting’.  In addition, a narrower definition of ‘welfare of the 
child’ in the guidance given by the HFEA, including its Code of Practice, should 
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be stipulated to exclude child welfare considerations arising from questions 
surrounding the suitability or ability of the patient(s) to parent being taken into 
account.  Emily Jackson has called for the removal of section 13(5) in its entirety 
describing its inclusion in the legislation as ‘unjust, meaningless and inconsistent 
with existing legal principle’.1  This thesis supports that view point, but only in 
so as far as it argues for amendment to remove references to supportive 
parenting.  This chapter will set out to explain why. 
 
This chapter will begin with an evaluation of how section 13(5) is to be 
interpreted and applied.  When is account to be taken of the welfare of the 
child to be born?  What level of risk of harm has the future child to be 
potentially exposed to before treatment is denied?  Can useful and accurate 
predictions about the wellbeing of a future child be made anyway?  It is 
important to address these questions in order to get an idea of what it is that 
section 13(5) has purportedly been put in place to achieve.  
 
Chapter Three has already set out the provisions of section 13(5), both as 
originally enacted and as amended by the HFE Act 2008.  That chapter explained 
the evolution of the legislation and how the justification for it has altered so it is 
now the child's ‘need for supportive parenting’ that is assessed and not the 
child's ‘need for a father’.  As noted in Chapter Three, when the HFE Act 1990 
was being debated in Parliament both MPs and Lords accepted the wisdom of 
incorporating a child welfare principle into the legislation without a great deal 
of question.2 Jackson has attributed this to the fact that: 
    
The welfare principle, which is derived from family law, has been 
in the ascendancy in recent years - few people, now, are prepared 
to question its universal relevance.  It seems to have become the 
received wisdom that children’s welfare must always be a central 
consideration when we make any decision that may affect their 
lives...The incorporation of the welfare principle in the rules 
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governing the provision of infertility treatment has gone largely 
unnoticed.  In the parliamentary debates leading up to the passage 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 1990, the 
inclusion of a welfare principle was neither challenged nor 
defended.3  
 
Looking at the Parliamentary debates Jackson’s view is supported by a number 
of quotes.  Lord Mackay, the then Lord Chancellor, said: ‘A fundamental 
principle to our law about children…is that the welfare of children is of 
paramount consideration.  I think that it is…entirely right that the Bill should be 
amended to add that concept’.4  Lord McGregor described it as ‘a happy 
extension of a principle which has now been part of English law for more than 
half a century’.5  Tory MP Ann Winterton asserted that ‘the interests of the child 
in matters of artificial insemination should be paramount’.6  The generally held 
view as expressed in these statements was that because the child welfare 
principle as applied in a family law context was so well established, it made 
complete sense that a like clause should be included in the legislation regulating 
ART.  However, as Jackson has pointed out, just because the child welfare 
principle was an established part of the law when addressing issues which 
impacted upon the lives of existing children, that did not necessarily justify its 
inclusion in legislation which will determine whether a child is conceived or not.7 
It is certainly true that the inclusion of section 13(5) in the HFE Act 1990 has 
generated considerable controversy over the 24 years of its existence.8     
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What this chapter will do is examine the difficulties which confront the practical 
application and utility of section 13(5) as it seeks to take into account the 
welfare of the yet-to-be-conceived child on parental ability grounds.  In looking 
at this question the chapter will examine a philosophical theory which calls into 
question one of the justifications for the purported aim of section 13(5) - to 
protect the welfare of the child to be born - when the practical outcome of it 
being applied is to prevent the conception of the child which therefore will 
never come to be born.  The so-called Non-Identity Problem, which was first 
highlighted by the philosopher Derek Parfit in his book Reasons and Persons,9 
poses interesting questions for those who support the retention of section 13(5) 
in its current form.  In addition to the philosophical argument, from a legal 
perspective the coherence of section 13(5) has been called into question with 
reference to the so-called ‘wrongful life’ actions which this chapter will also 
examine and consider how rulings in this area reflect upon section 13(5) as 
currently drafted. 
 
The chapter will then move on to look at one of the main arguments put forward 
as a justification for section 13(5) - that it is comparable to the child welfare 
assessment carried out when people are assessed as being suitable for adoption 
or not.  Adoption is one area where it is generally accepted that a parenting 
assessment of prospective adoptive parents is justified on grounds of child 
welfare.  This chapter will therefore examine whether there is an analogy to be 
drawn between this type of parenting assessment and the child to be born 
welfare assessment under section 13(5), or whether any such comparison is 
essentially meaningless.   
 
A further major criticism of section 13(5) is that it discriminates against the 
infertile by placing upon them a requirement that is not present when the fertile 
procreate.  However, what if natural procreation was the subject of State 
interference through the imposition of a parental licensing requirement for all 
who were planning to conceive?  This chapter will examine the work of Hugh La 
Follette who proposed that very thing.10  The purpose of looking at the work of 
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La Follette is to explain why such State interference in the right to procreative 
liberty of either the fertile or infertile is unjustified. 
 
Finally the chapter will examine another of the main arguments put forward in 
support of section 13(5) – that the involvement of third parties in the procreative 
process places a responsibility upon them towards the child to be born and it will 
be explained why this thesis rejects that position. As Chapter Two explained, 
this thesis does not seek to argue that people have a positive right to demand 
access to ART, but what it does seek to argue is that people’s procreative 
choices deserve respect and should not be interfered with using a speculative 
and esoteric assessment of the ability of a patent to safeguard the welfare of a 
yet-to-be-conceived child which section 13(5) represents.  
 
 
5.2 Evaluating a Child’s Welfare 
As previously alluded to in Chapter Three the consultation paper ‘Tomorrow’s 
Children’ the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) set out the 
harms they thought that children born as a result of ART might face.11  The HFEA 
separated the possible harms into four categories; medical, physical, 
psychological and social.  In the report12 which followed the consultation paper 
the HFEA decided that:  
 
...in order to take into account the welfare of the child, centres 
should consider factors which may pose a risk of serious medical, 
physical or psychological harm, either to the child to be born or to 
any existing child of the family.  Although social circumstances 
have been removed from the guidance as factors to consider, we 
expect that where adverse social circumstances are severe enough 
either to be likely to pose a risk of serious psychological harm to 
                                                     
11 Tomorrow’s Children, A Consultation on Guidance to licensed fertility clinics on taking into 
account the welfare of the child to be born of assisted conception treatment, Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, January 2005, para. 2.3 (henceforth ‘Tomorrow’s 
Children Consultation Paper’). 
12 Tomorrow’s Children, Report of the Policy Review of welfare of the child assessments in 
licensed assisted conception clinics, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, November 
2005 (henceforth ‘Tomorrow’s Children Report’). 
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the child or to make the parents unable to care for a child, they 
will be caught by this new policy.13 
 
This thesis is really concerned with the risks associated with the risk of a child 
being subjected to abuse or neglect after birth as this thesis takes the view that 
this is where the strongest link with the child welfare principle as applied in 
family law is to be found. 
 
The consultation paper also discussed three different ways of evaluating whether 
or not the level of risk of harm a child may be exposed to would justify a refusal 
of ART.14  These were the maximum welfare principle, the minimum threshold 
principle and the reasonable welfare principle.  This section will come on to 
explain what each of these principles mean in practice.  In doing so the issue 
which this section will examine is how clinics should evaluate the result of any 
assessment they actually carry out.15  What is the threshold for saying when a 
child might actually be harmed by being born through ART?  
 
In Penning’s view ‘The maximum welfare principle implies that one should not 
knowingly and intentionally bring a child into the world in less than ideal 
circumstances’.16  The HFEA for their part stated that:  
 
The maximum welfare principle places a significant responsibility 
on those who assist in the creation of children to ensure that any 
child born has a good chance of living a happy and fulfilled life and 
is not disadvantaged in any foreseeable way.  This approach 
considers a child’s welfare to be of paramount importance and, 
borrowing from the approach taken in adoption, places the burden 
of proof upon the prospective parents to demonstrate their 
competence.17 
 
                                                     
13 Tomorrow’s Children Report, 8. 
14 Tomorrow’s Children Consultation Paper, para. 2.4. 
15 G. Pennings, The Welfare of the Child – Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle, Human Reproduction, vol. 14, no. 5, 1999, 1146-1150, 1146. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Tomorrow’s Children Consultation Paper, para. 2.4. 
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These two definitions are not identical but the references to bringing a child 
into the world in less than ideal circumstances and ensuring that any child born 
is not disadvantaged in any foreseeable way highlight the threshold which is to 
be reached if the maximum welfare principle is to be applied.  In essence if 
applying the maximum welfare principle ART services should be refused if any of 
the issues identified by the HFEA as harms, whether medical, physical or 
psychological are present.  The idea is that once the child is brought into 
existence it is harmed if it is brought into the world in less than ideal 
circumstances or is disadvantaged in any way.   
 
The maximum welfare principle is of course a very high standard to meet.  It 
would be extremely difficult for prospective parents to prove that their yet-to-
be-conceived child would not be disadvantaged in any foreseeable way by being 
brought into the world.  There are so many factors which come in to play which 
might be held against prospective parents when evaluating their suitability to 
parent that the maximum welfare principle becomes discriminatory, particularly 
if the ‘ideal’ is still envisaged as a heterosexual, married couple with genetically 
related children, as was evidently the view of some MPS during the debates that 
led to the HFEA 1990, referred to in Chapter Three and below.  Pennings has 
criticised the maximum welfare principle and rejected it as the appropriate 
standard on the basis that: 
 
When we take the time to scrutinize the consistent application of 
this rule, we will soon find out that this standard would exclude the 
overwhelming majority of the population from procreation.  People 
who are poor, unemployed, handicapped, obese, workaholics 
and/or old should all be rejected as potential parents since the 
child they will have would have had a better life had it been born 
to other parents.18 
 
The difficult with this is that this particular child could not have been born to 
other parents, and this issue will be returned to later.  For the moment, though 
it supports the view that the maximum welfare principle is in effect far too high 
                                                     
18 G. Pennings, The Welfare of the Child – Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle, Human Reproduction, vol. 14, no. 5, 1999, 1146-1150, 1147. 
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a standard to set for assessing whether or not people should be allowed or 
refused access to ART on the basis of the potential risk they might pose to the 
welfare of the child to be born through inadequate parenting.   
 
During the debate in the House of Commons on whether it was necessary to 
insert the words ‘including a child’s need for a father’ into what became section 
13(5) Peter Thurnham MP said: ‘We all want the ‘ideal’ family, and are 
considering the welfare of the child with that in mind’.19  As Golombok observed 
in 1998: 
 
In spite of the changes that have taken place to the structure of 
the family in the latter part of this century, it remains the case 
that a family headed by two heterosexual married parents who are 
genetically related to their children represents the ideal, and that 
deviations from this pattern are commonly assumed to result in 
negative outcomes for the child.20  
 
Golombok set out to investigate whether or not this common assumption could 
be supported by factual evidence.  In one particular study Golombok set out to 
examine the parent-child relationship and the emotional and gender 
development of a group of 7-year old children with lesbian parents.21  The study 
compared lesbian-mother families, two-parent heterosexual families and single 
heterosexual mother families using interviews and questionnaires to access the 
parent-child relationship within these different family structures.  Some of the 
lesbian mothers had conceived via artificial insemination by donor (AID) and 
others whilst in a heterosexual relationship that they had since left.  The results 
of this study were that no statistical differences were found on factors such as 
the mother’s warmth towards her child, frequency or severity of disputes with 
the child, overall parenting quality, enjoyment of motherhood, maternal anxiety 
or stress, supervision of outside play, gender development of the children, 
                                                     
19 Thurnham, HC Deb. Vol. 174, col. 1027, 1990 (20 June). 
20 S. Golombok, New families, old values: considerations regarding the welfare of the child 
Human Reproduction, 1998, vol. 13, no. 9, 2339 – 2355. 
21 S. Golombok, B. Perry, A. Burston, C. Murray, J. Mooney-Somers, and M. Stevens, Children 
with Lesbian Parents: A Community Study, Developmental Psychology, 2003, vol. 39, No. 1, 20 – 
33. 
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abnormal behaviour of the children, psychiatric disorder in the children and the 
children’s peer relations when the mother’s sexual orientation was the factor 
being analysed.  There was a significant difference between lesbian mothers and 
heterosexual mothers with regard to the frequency of smacking and imaginative 
play, with lesbian mothers smacking less and engaging in more imaginative play.   
 
The research, then, did not support the denial of access to ART to lesbians on 
the basis that the clinic would be knowingly and intentionally bringing a child 
into the world in less than ideal circumstances in terms of being without a male 
parent contributing to the care of the child.  It may therefore be argued that to 
apply the maximum welfare principle would indeed be discriminatory without 
the corresponding justification that it protected children from negative 
outcomes. From the example given, and others could be suggested, if seeking to 
impose a maximum welfare threshold there is a clear risk that prejudices and 
preferences about what constitutes ideal parenting, rather than evidence, might 
be used to determine the criteria for access to ART and exclude many people 
who would be perfectly adequate parents. 
 
For their part, the HFEA in the Tomorrow’s Children report decided to reject an 
interpretation of the child welfare principle within the HFE Act 1990 which took 
the approach that ‘clinics should not provide treatment unless they are satisfied 
that the welfare of the child to be born will not be affected negatively.’22  This 
was because it ‘placed too much emphasis upon the interests of the prospective 
child at the expense of patient choice’.23  The HFEA went on to acknowledge, 
possibly with a nod to Golombok’s research, that ‘Although this may have been 
the most appropriate interpretation to take of the welfare principle in the early 
1990s, the experience of the past 14 years suggests that, as a group, children 
born of assisted conception are no more likely to be disadvantaged than their 
naturally conceived counterparts’.24  The HFEA therefore dismissed a version of 
the maximum welfare principle as the correct interpretation of the child welfare 
principle in the HFE Act 1990. 
 
                                                     
22 Tomorrow’s Children Report, 6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
204 
 
 
The minimum threshold principle emphasises the importance of protecting 
children from serious harm.  The HFEA describe it in these terms: 
 
In the minimum threshold approach to considering a future child’s 
welfare, the emphasis is upon protecting the child from serious 
harm.  Doctors should withhold treatment, thereby preventing a 
child from coming into existence, only where the quality of the 
child’s life would fall below a minimum threshold of acceptability. 
This approach places great importance upon the autonomy of the 
prospective parents and seeks to override their wishes only when 
their child would be at high risk of serious harm.25 
 
Langdridge is of the view that the minimum threshold approach is the 
appropriate one to take to consideration of the welfare of the child at the pre-
conception stage because ‘it relies on a very basic level of welfare with which 
there is a strong degree of consensus’.26  As Pennings points out: 
    
One of the most frequently used minimum thresholds can be called 
the ‘wrongful life’ or the ‘worse than death’ standard: ‘A child 
should not be brought into the world if and only if it would have 
been better never to have been born at all.’27   
 
This chapter will come on to look in more detail at so-called ‘wrongful life’ 
cases which illustrate what the minimum threshold standard means in practice.  
Interestingly, Pennings accepts that this might be appropriate as ‘an acceptable 
reference point for legal rules’28 but insists it ‘should be rejected for the moral 
evaluation of procreation’.29  That position will be examined in more detail also.   
Langdridge on the other hand sees no other acceptable alternative to the 
minimum threshold principle because it is the only standard which avoids the 
                                                     
25 Tomorrow’s Children Consultation Paper, para. 2.4. 
26 D. Langdridge, The Welfare of the Child: problems of indeterminacy and deontology, Human 
Reproduction, vol. 15, no. 3, 2000, 502 - 504, 502. 
27 G. Pennings, The Welfare of the Child – Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle, Human Reproduction, vol. 14, no. 5, 1999, 1146-1150, 1149. 
28 Ibid., 1149. 
29 Ibid., 1148. 
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influence of ‘subjective moral opinions and culturally specific normative 
beliefs’30 coming into play. 
 
Pennings is supportive of a reasonable welfare principle, which was described by 
the HFEA in these terms: 
 
The reasonable welfare approach says that the provision of assisted 
conception treatment is acceptable when the child born as a result 
of the treatment will have a reasonably happy life.  This approach 
requires those providing assisted conception services to satisfy 
themselves that any child born of treatment that they provide will 
have at least an adequate future, cared for by a ‘good enough’ 
family.  The reasonable welfare principle takes a relatively 
thorough approach to the welfare of the child, whilst also attaching 
some importance to the autonomy of the prospective parents.  
Although it is difficult to determine exactly what this approach 
might mean in practice, it would require clinicians to consider a 
patient’s or couple’s social circumstances, but would only prevent 
treatment from going ahead if those circumstances meant that the 
couple were unable to provide a satisfactory level of parenting.31 
 
Pennings is of the view that this approach is the preferred option because: 
 
On the one hand, we do not have to reject or criticise people for 
bringing a normal child into the world because they could have had 
a happier one.  On the other hand, we are not forced to accept 
decisions which result in the birth of seriously handicapped children 
because the net result is a life still worth living.  Our standard is 
not the perfectly happy child but the reasonably happy child.32 
 
                                                     
30 D. Langdridge, The Welfare of the Child: problems of indeterminacy and deontology, Human 
Reproduction, vol. 15, no. 3, 2000, 502 - 504, 504. 
31 Tomorrow’s Children Consultation Paper, para. 2.4. 
32 G. Pennings, The Welfare of the Child – Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle, Human Reproduction, vol. 14, no. 5, 1999, 1146-1150, 1148. 
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In support of this position Penning points out that we do not criticise parents 
when they make decisions which might have a negative influence on their 
children if there are good reasons for doing so.33  He is of the view that common 
sense can be applied to ascertain what is an acceptable threshold for allowing 
access to ART and is of the view that ‘an individual has a decent welfare level 
when he has the abilities and opportunities to realize those dimensions and goals 
that in general make human lives valuable’.34  
 
Langdridge is critical of Pennings’ approach because of the difficulty in 
determining possible outcomes for a child, determining the probability of one 
outcome over another and attaching values to these possible outcomes.35  In 
Langridge’s words ‘it is a ridiculous exercise to attempt to predict the future 
welfare of a child (and then adult) when there are so many variables at play’.36  
In Langridge’s view it is nonsensical to try to assess what level of welfare a yet-
to-be-conceived child will have regardless of whether that might be the ‘ideal 
upbringing’ or the ‘good-enough upbringing’. 
 
As noted, Pennings rejected the minimal threshold principle because in his view 
‘The concept of parental responsibility would be a hollow notion if bringing, 
knowingly and willingly, children into existence who suffer devastating illnesses 
cannot be denounced’.37  This, in his view, is a potential consequence of 
accepting a principle which espouses that a child is only harmed if it is brought 
into existence with a life not worth living.  On the other hand Langdridge makes 
the point that it is impossible to compare the welfare of a child born in one 
circumstance with the same child born in another, since that is not a possible 
option in reality,  and as such calls into question Pennings’ acceptance of the 
reasonable welfare approach.   
 
Following the consultation period the HFEA published their report within which 
they appeared to come down in favour of the minimum welfare principle.  They 
                                                     
33 Ibid., 1148. 
34 Ibid., 1148. 
35 D. Langdridge, The Welfare of the Child: problems of indeterminacy and deontology, Human 
Reproduction, vol. 15, no. 3, 2000, 502 - 504, 503. 
36 Ibid., 503. 
37 G. Pennings, The Welfare of the Child – Measuring the welfare of the child: in search of the 
appropriate evaluation principle, Human Reproduction, vol. 14, no. 5, 1999, 1146-1150, 1148. 
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stated that the preferred interpretation of the welfare of the child principle in 
the HFE Act 1990 was as follows: 
 
...that clinics should only refuse to provide treatment where there 
is evidence that the child is likely to suffer serious physical or 
psychological harm.38 
 
This, they said, was due to the importance of patient autonomy. The reference 
within the report to ‘serious physical or psychological harm’ corresponds closely 
to the reference in the consultation paper when linking the minimum welfare 
principle to ‘serious harm’.  It is worth noting here that the Pennings/Langdridge 
debate together with the changes brought about following the Tomorrow’s 
Children Report highlight the point that answers to the questions: ‘What level of 
risk of harm has the future child to be potentially exposed to before treatment 
is denied?’ and – ‘Can useful and accurate predictions about the wellbeing of a 
future child be made anyway?’, are not universally agreed upon and that the 
justification or otherwise for section 13(5) is dependent upon the answer given.   
 
This thesis takes the view that access to ART should not be denied on the 
grounds of concern for the welfare of the child to be born arising from the 
potential for inadequate parenting.  It is only in extreme and rare circumstances 
where to bring a child into existence would inevitably cause it extreme suffering 
that the refusal of treatment would be justified.  In other words when it can be 
predicted with some degree of certainty that the harms of existence would 
outweigh the benefits of existence a child should not be brought into existence.  
This thesis takes the view that parental ability concerns do not meet that 
threshold.  It argues that making useful and accurate predictions about the 
wellbeing of a future child based on the ability of the patient to parent is so 
difficult that any attempt to do so becomes a meaningless task.  Even if such 
predictions were possible, there are no situations where concern that the child 
will be harmed by inadequate parents should be used to conclude that non-
existence is preferable and hence that ART should be refused on child welfare 
grounds.   
 
                                                     
38 Tomorrow’s Children Report, 6. 
208 
 
 
The law already has sufficient protections in place to ensure that a child can be 
removed from the care of abusive and neglectful parents.  This is not to say that 
very serious cases of abuse and neglect of children are to be taken lightly.  The 
significant political and public support for the child welfare principle is usually 
at its highest when a desperately sad case of a child's death at the hands of a 
parent or carer is highlighted in the news.39  However, denying the opportunity 
of children being born because they might suffer abuse or neglect even when 
they can be taken into care at birth, so that the means of ‘protection’ is to 
prevent them coming into existence in the first place, is not in the view of this 
thesis a sensible or justified way of protecting children from harm.  It amounts 
to an unjustified interference with procreative liberty.  What follows will expand 
on why this thesis takes these positions, initially with reference to the Non-
Identity Problem.   
 
 
5.3 The Non-Identity Problem and Section 13(5) 
The philosopher Derek Parfit illustrated the non-identity problem in his book 
Reasons and Persons40 where he considered the choice of a 14-year-old girl to 
have a child rather than wait a few years and have a different child who would 
have better opportunities in life.  What Parfit seeks to explore with this example 
is whether or not it can be said that the 14-year-old girl has made the wrong 
decision in respect of the interests of the child by having a child at such a young 
age.  He suggests that intuitively most people would say that she had.  A child 
born to a 14-year-old girl may have a bad start in life as her mother might 
struggle to meet the child’s needs.  If the 14-year-old girl had waited a few 
years until she was in a better position to provide for a child’s emotional and 
economic needs, the child born at that time would not have had to face such 
difficulties.  It would seem then that in not waiting the 14-year-old girl has 
made the wrong decision in so far as the welfare of the child is concerned.  
However, what Parfit points out is that if the 14-year-old girl had waited, the 
later child would not have been the same person as the earlier child.  The 
                                                     
39 The Victoria Climbie and Peter Connolly (Baby P) cases which both involved the London 
Borough of Haringey were two particularly high profile and widely reported cases. The Guardian 
Newspaper, (12 November 2008) Squabble over Baby P was not the Commons at its best 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/nov/12/pmqs-baby-p (accessed 29 June 2013). 
40 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, 359. 
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earlier child would never have been born.  The 14-year-old girl has had a child 
who, but for her decision to have a child at that particular point in time, would 
not have existed.  If the child, despite the difficulties of being raised by a 14-
year-old girl, has overall a life worth living then is the 14-year-old girl’s decision 
wrong in terms of the interests of the child?  The answer would appear to be no 
because the child who has been born to the 14-year old girl has not been 
harmed.41 
 
The non-identity problem arises in the context of section 13(5).  In his book 
Defending the Genetic Supermarket Colin Gavaghan describes the child the girl 
could have had later in life as a ‘never-existing potential future person’.42  If 
section 13(5) was to be applied to prevent access to ART then the child whose 
welfare the clinic is required as part of its licence to take into account is in 
effect a never-existing potential future person.  There can be no harm inflicted 
on a non-existent entity.  As Gavaghan points out ‘It never possessed, nor will it 
ever possess, any interests to be taken into account, and to speak in terms of its 
having an interest in being allowed to have interests seems circular and 
ultimately nonsensical’.43   
 
Conversely, if the child is conceived and born after access to ART is provided, 
can the child be said to have been harmed by his or her existence, since the 
alternative was not to have been brought into existence?  The child certainly has 
interests once born and those who support section 13(5) would say that what it 
does is legislate for our moral obligation to take into account the impact our 
procreative choices might have on the future child’s interests, even though 
these interests may not crystallise until birth.  However, this does not avoid the 
point made by Parfit that but for a particular reproductive choice at a particular 
point in time that particular child born would not have existed.  The interests 
                                                     
41 There is a caveat of course that the 14-year-old-girl may be said to have harmed herself by her 
decision to have a child. Indeed if a 14-year-old-girl was engaging in sexual intercourse she may 
very well be assessed as being at risk of harm in terms of the child welfare statutes discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
42 C. Gavaghan, Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
Generation, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007, 71.  
43 Ibid., 72. 
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that the child has at birth can only arise because of the prior decision to bring 
the child into existence.  
 
There is a clear difficulty which arises in seeking to compare existence with non-
existence.  As Gavaghan points out there are no interests to be taken into 
account in regards to a non-existent entity, so there are no benefits or harms 
done to a never-existing potential future person.  Therefore it is not really 
possible to compare the benefits and harms of existence with the benefits and 
harms of non-existence and decide which state it is best to be in.  All that can 
be done is to weigh up the benefits from existence against the harms of 
existence and only if the harms outweigh the benefits can it be said that a 
person is harmed by being brought into existence.  That is why as already stated 
this thesis takes the view that ART should only be denied in extreme and rare 
circumstances where to bring a child into existence would cause it such suffering 
as to make existence unbearably cruel. In other words, so that harms of 
existence are weighed against benefits of existence.   
 
As previously discussed in Chapter One, treatment clinics are now expected to 
assume that parents will be supportive of their children unless evidence to rebut 
that presumption is obtained.  If a couple with a history of drug and alcohol 
abuse whose relationship has elements of serious discord within it seek assess to 
ART, then these factors are likely to be treated as evidence rebutting the 
supportive parenting presumption and that couple may very well be refused 
treatment and no child would come into existence.  If that couple were to be 
given access to ART treatment, like the child in Parfit’s 14-year-old-girl 
example, it could reasonably be anticipated that the child would have a bad 
start in life.  The child may be neglected or abused if the parents lapse into drug 
and alcohol misuse.  Social services may decide to take the child into care.  
However, as awful as that abuse and neglect might be, the child may form good 
friends, have loving grandparents, enjoy play and learning, or benefit from a 
host of other positive experiences.  Overall, in spite of the abuse and neglect, 
the child may be considered to have a life worth living.  The refusal of ART 
treatment based on section 13(5) would therefore have prevented the existence 
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of a child who would have a life worth living, which is a very extreme measure if 
the aim of the legislation is to protect the welfare of the child.   
 
Answering the question of whether or not the child would have a life worth living 
also depends of course upon being able to make an accurate predictive 
assessment of future harms and benefits.  It is extremely difficult to determine 
and weigh the benefits from a predicted existence against the harms of a 
predicted existence.  This is a difficulty which renders section 13(5) a somewhat 
meaningless exercise.  Nevertheless, this thesis argues that only rarely would 
such an assessment allow the conclusion that the child would be so harmed by 
existence that this should be prevented and never on parental ability grounds 
when the law allows the child to be removed from the care of inadequate 
parents at birth.  
 
There is thus an important distinction which can be drawn between section 13(5) 
and the child welfare legislation discussed in Chapter Four.  No one, it is 
proposed, would deny that the child’s parents in the above example have caused 
the child harm if they neglected and physically abused the child.  Reasonable 
people would believe that it is entirely right that the State exercise its mandate 
and intervene to protect that child.  However, at the pre-conception stage the 
position is rather different as the State is intervening to prevent a child coming 
into existence.  They are preventing the bringing into the world of a child that 
would have a life that overall is worth living.  This is arguably not an approach 
that properly takes into account the welfare of the child and indeed the 
consequences of a decision to refuse access to ART means there will be no child 
whose welfare can be taken into account.  The parental choice to have a child in 
less than ideal circumstances would not be in this sense a harmful choice to that 
child, although behaviour which does harm a child after birth is morally 
blameworthy. 
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The case of A (A Minor) v A Health and Social Services Trust44 was a case which 
interestingly saw the non-identity problem arise in a real life court situation. 
The basic facts of this case were that two Caucasian parents had gone through 
IVF treatment.  As a consequence of human error the sperm used to fertilise the 
egg was Caucasian (Cape Coloured) which resulted in the children being half 
Caucasian and half Caucasian (Cape Coloured).  The children claimed damages, 
the primary focus of the alleged injury being that they had a noticeably darker 
skin colour than their parents.  The children claimed that the clinic owed them a 
duty of care as the people who resulted from the IVF process.  The difficulty for 
the children’s claim was however that they were not the people who were in the 
contemplation of the clinic during the IVF process.  The mix-up of the sperm 
meant that the children who did come into existence were not the same children 
who were envisaged.  The children who were created owed their very existence 
to the mix up of the sperm.  Any negligence on the part of the clinic related to 
the ‘children’ who were never brought into existence – Gavaghan’s never-
existing potential future people. 
 
In dismissing the appeal the Court held that the children’s claim had to fail 
because they could not point to any damage or injury resulting from the health 
authority's error.  Since the children in this case suffered from no damage in 
law, it was unnecessary to consider the question of whether a theoretical duty 
of care arose on the part of the health authority.  It would have been interesting 
if the Court had considered the question of whether a theoretical duty of care 
arose on the part of the health authority.  The Court did state that 'inadequate 
and careless screening may result in the use of male sperm from a donor with 
genetic defects which may result in the child suffering from serious long term 
conditions that may reduce the quality of life of the child. Such a situation 
appears to be now governed by the provisions the Congenital Disabilities (Civil 
Liability) Act 1976.'45  However, this thesis surmises that the Congenital 
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 would not apply if sperm was used which 
resulted in a child being born with a disability because using such sperm would 
not amount to an occurrence before its birth which affected either parent of the 
                                                     
44 [2011] NICA 28. 
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 Ibid., 
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child in his or her ability to have a normal, healthy child.46  This thesis would 
argue that a duty of care does not arise in circumstances where the child is 
brought into existence, even in a harmed state, when but for the mistake, that 
particular child would not have been brought into existence at all.  The 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 only covers situations where the 
child brought into existence was disabled by an occurrence before birth which 
affected either parent of the child in his or her ability to have a normal, healthy 
child, not an occurrence before birth which resulted in a disabled child being 
born, when that child would not have been born at all but for the occurrence. 
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps there are those who question the rationale behind the 
non-identity theory.  Woodward is of the view that it can be coherently claimed 
that the 14-year-old girl’s choice to have a child violates duties owed to the 
child and that this is an important part of explaining why the girl’s choice is 
wrong.47  As Gavaghan explains Woodward questions whether the fact that the 
benefit of existence can out-weigh harms of existence is sufficient justification 
for the harms.48  What Woodward argues is that: 
 
...people have relatively specific interests...that are not simply 
reducible to some general interest in maintaining a high overall 
level of well-being...That an action will cause an increase in 
someone’s overall level of well-being is not always an adequate 
response to the claim that such a specific interest has been 
violated.49 
 
If we look at Woodward’s argument in terms of the reproductive choice of the 
volatile couple with a history of alcohol and drug abuse seeking access to ART, 
they could be said to have acted wrongly (and the State criticised for not 
intervening) as they know in advance that if they were to have a child they 
                                                     
46
 Section 2(a) Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 
47 J. Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, Ethics, 1986; 96: 804-831, 806. 
48 C. Gavaghan,  Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
Generation, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007,  77. 
49 J. Woodward, ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, Ethics, 1986; 96: 804-831, 809. 
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would owe that child duties of care which they would not be in a position to 
meet adequately.  Woodward would argue that the failure to be able to meet 
these duties constitutes an important reason not to have the child.50  However, 
while the couple might be criticised for acting wrongly this is not the same as 
saying that they are harming the child by bringing it into existence, because in 
the grand scheme of things the child is likely to have a life worth living.  In the 
context of allowing access to ART Woodward may argue that it is justifiable to 
refuse treatment on the basis that the prospective parents were behaving 
wrongly in seeking to have a child when they are not in a position to fulfil their 
duties of care to that child.  This, some might argue, provides a different basis 
for refusing patients access to ART which does not rest upon harm the child.  
However, this thesis takes the view that if the prospective parents wrong is that 
they would be breaching a duty of care owed to the child to be born, then a 
decision to refuse them access to ART would still be based on child welfare 
grounds, as the wrong would be that they presented a risk to the future child's 
welfare. 
 
In response to Woodward Gavaghan asks - what exactly is the standard that a 
parent is expected to reach in meeting their obligations to a future child?51  An 
absolute standard would set definitive levels for emotional stability and 
economic security which if parents could not meet them, then they should not 
have children.  Nevertheless, as Gavaghan points out, this is like saying that 
those in the third world are acting wrongly when they procreate because their 
children will be raised in poverty.  A relative standard on the other hand would 
hold the parents to a duty to meet their parental obligations to the extent that 
it is possible for them to do so.  If the parents have done their best to meet the 
child’s needs then they cannot be criticised.  This harks back to the discussion in 
the previous section which looked at the maximum, minimum and reasonable 
welfare principle thresholds.  In doing their best to meet the child’s needs the 
parents have probably reached the minimum welfare threshold and arguably 
                                                     
50 This is really paraphrasing what Woodward had to say about Parfit’s 14-year-old girl but 
applies to those prospective parents who may cause licensed clinics to reach the view that they 
would not be supportive parents. 
51 C. Gavaghan,  Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
Generation, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007,  79. 
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have also reached the reasonable welfare threshold.  Even if a minimum 
standard threshold is not met and the parents are not doing their best, the 
proper course of action would be to remove the child after birth, not act so as to 
prevent that child coming into existence. 
 
Velleman is also a critic of the non-identity theory.  In regard to Parfit’s 14-year-
old girl having a child scenario he says as follows: 
 
In creating human lives, then, we must take care that they afford 
the best opportunity for personhood to flourish.  We are obligated 
to give our children the best start that we can give to children, 
whichever children we have; and so we are obligated to have those 
children to whom we can give the best start.  A child to whom we 
give a lesser initial provision will have been wronged by our lack of 
due concern for human life in creating him — our lack of concern 
for human life itself, albeit in his case.52  
 
Velleman argues for a general right which each person has to be created with 
‘due consideration for his or her humanity’ where a ‘child has a right to be born 
into good enough circumstances, and being born to [e.g.] a fourteen-year-old 
mother isn't good enough’.53  That the child was ‘glad to be born’ does not mean 
that that child has waived ‘his birthright’.54  According to Velleman the child 
would be justified in feeling that he was not given due consideration at his 
conception and what has been ignored is not his interests but his importance as 
a human being.  Once more this relates back to the discussion on welfare 
thresholds.  Velleman is looking for the child to be born into ‘good enough’ 
circumstances which is arguably what the reasonable welfare threshold requires. 
 
                                                     
52 D. J.  Velleman, Persons in Prospect, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2008, 36, 221–288, 276. 
53 Ibid., 277. 
54 Ibid., 278. 
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Parfit counters Woodward’s and Velleman’s objection to the Non-Identity 
Problem by arguing that interests and rights can be waived.  In the case of our 
child born into a family of serious discord he might55 one day come to regard 
that difficult start in life as a price worth paying for the life worth living he now 
enjoys.  He would have waived his right to an emotionally stable upbringing 
because overall he does not regret the fact that he was born.  Gavaghan puts it 
in these terms: 
 
If it is reasonably foreseeable that you will regard the violation of 
your right as a price worth paying for some benefit you accrue (as 
Parfit puts it, that you will retrospectively waive your right) then it 
would be unusual to regard that violation as wrongful.56   
 
There is a difficulty however with talking in terms of a child waiving his rights at 
some time in the future because the decision to bring the child into existence is 
made in advance without knowing whether or not the child will eventually come 
to be grateful for being brought into existence.  If the child does not reach this 
state of mind but instead suffers from suicidal ideation because of adverse 
treatment inflicted upon him in childhood then it might be argued that he has 
not retrospectively waived his right and has been wronged by being brought into 
existence.  This could arguably be seen as one of the extreme examples where 
the harms of existence outweigh the benefits from existence.  The non-identity 
problem does acknowledge that such extreme examples could arise, but making 
predictions prior to conception about how a child might respond in adulthood to  
adverse treatment inflicted upon him in childhood is undoubtedly a seriously 
problematic exercise and carries to much uncertainty to justify a child not being 
brought into existence. 
 
                                                     
55 Gavaghan felt that Parfit was being unduly tentative and though that an adult not reaching 
this conclusion was ‘a turn of events so unlikely as to lie outwith the realm of reasonable 
forseeability’. 
56 C. Gavaghan,  Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
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Even when the non-identity problem is accepted – that a potential future child is 
only harmed by being brought into existence if that existence is so awful as to 
constitute a life not worth living – many commentators still seek to explain what 
is wrong about harmful reproductive choices.  In order to do so they move away 
from person-affecting explanations to non-person affecting explanations.57  In 
Buchanan’s view: 
 
This principle for the prevention of suffering applies not to distinct 
individuals, so that the prevention of suffering must make a distinct 
individual better off than he or she would have been... but to the 
class of individuals who will exist if the suffering is or is not 
prevented.58  
 
In rejecting the argument that children who are brought into existence in less 
than ideal circumstances through the use of ART are not harmed because the 
alternative would be non-existence, Peters uses the real-life example of a sperm 
bank in Italy who failed to screen a donor who was infected with hepatitis C and 
genital herpes.59  Peters claims that to say ‘no harm was done by the failure to 
screen unless the affected children would have been better off never existing at 
all...defies common sense’60 as ‘Better screening would have avoided needless 
suffering’.61  In Peter’s view the analysis which says children are not harmed 
because the alternative would be non-existence focuses too much on the 
individual future child at the expense of looking at the harm that can be 
inflicted on future children as a class.  
 
In Peters’ opinion while the question of harm to an identifiable future child is 
necessary if legal actions for damages are what is at stake, such a viewpoint 
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should not guide public health regulation.62  In Peters’ view harm can be caused 
by the use of a dangerous or risky procedure when a safe one is available.  For 
Peters, the non-existence threshold for harm is too high and there is an 
obligation on people who bring children into existence to ensure that the 
children have a minimally-decent existence.  Peters’ uses a phrase which stands 
out.  He talks of the ‘collective welfare of future children’.  That this might be 
something which States strive to ensure is a nice thought and if Peters’ approach 
is accepted it could perhaps be used as a basis to justify section 13(5) and avoid 
the non-identity problem.  Such an approach may still be criticised on the 
grounds that it amounts to a restriction on procreative liberty, but it would not 
be based on the specific test of child welfare as set out in section 13(5).  The 
real difficulty in the context of section 13(5) is, as Harris has pointed out, that 
the notion of collective welfare of future children is not what it is directed to: It 
is focused very clearly on the individual child who would result from 
treatment.63 
 
The problem with section 13(5) is that it is worded in such a way as to 
definitively say that it is the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of 
the treatment which has to be taken into account as it refers to the welfare of a 
specific child.  It is the conflation between general questions of what may or 
may not be good for children and the personal question of what is good for the 
welfare of a particular child that causes difficulties for section 13(5).  If 
Parliament did not intend that section 13(5) be applied to safeguard the 
collective welfare of future children but be applied to, as it says, safeguard the 
welfare of the child to be born, then Peters’ views cannot be put forward as 
providing justification for its continuation. 
 
Harris and Feinberg also take a non-person affecting approach in seeking to 
explain just what harm a disabled child with a life worth living might actually 
have suffered.64  Harris describes Feinberg’s ‘central idea as expressing the 
judgement that it is a wrong to the child to be born with such serious handicaps 
                                                     
62 Ibid. 
63 J. Harris, The Welfare of Children, Health Care Analysis 8: 27–34, 2000. 
64 J. Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology, Oxford, Oxford 
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that many very basic interests are doomed in advance’.65  Harris also quotes 
Steinbock, who Harris says follows Feinberg in suggesting: 
 
Talk of a ‘right not to be born’ is a compendious way of referring to 
the plausible moral requirement that no child be brought into the 
world unless certain minimal conditions of well-being are assured.  
When a child is brought into existence even though those 
requirements have not been observed, he has been wronged 
thereby.66 
 
Harris on the other hand is of the view that the only plausible answer to the 
question of whether a child is harmed by being brought into existence is as 
follows: 
 
...unless the child’s condition and circumstances can be predicted 
to be so bad that it would not have a worthwhile life, a life worth 
living, then it will always be in that child’s interests, to be brought 
to being.  If future children may be said to have interests at all, 
then it is palpably in the interests of any child whose life will likely 
be worth living overall, that the threshold is crossed bringing it into 
being.  It is, after all, that child’s (“the child who may be born as a 
result of the treatment”) only chance of existing at all.67 
 
Gavaghan looks at the views of Harris and Feinberg but rejects them.68  As 
Gavaghan points out Harris and Feinberg both recognise that the disabled child 
with a life worth living will have no cause for complaint.  However, both are still 
of the view that a mother will have acted wrongly by bringing a disabled child 
into the world.  For Harris the wrong lies in ‘the wrong of bringing avoidable 
suffering into the world, of choosing deliberately to increase unnecessarily the 
amount of harm or suffering in the world or of choosing a world with more 
                                                     
65 J. Harris, The Wrong of Wrongful Life, Journal of Law and Society, 1990, 17, 90-105, 93. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 30. 
68 C. Gavaghan, Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Laws and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
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suffering rather than one with less.’69  For Feinberg the difficulty lies in 
‘wantonly introducing a certain evil into the world, not for inflicting harm on a 
person.’70  Gavaghan rejects the idea that people have what he calls ‘a duty to 
the world’.71  If the duty is to minimise the amount of suffering in the world 
regardless of any offset against happiness then that leads to the problem that 
anyone would do wrong when they bring any child into existence because every 
life has some suffering in it.72  If the duty does offset the suffering we introduce 
into the world against the happiness brought, that still raises the problem that 
such a duty would lead us to conclude that refraining from having a child is the 
morally wrong thing to do as to have a child would increase the aggregate 
happiness in the world.73  This chapter will return to the work of Harris and 
Feinberg to examine how their views on the wrongness of bringing a child into 
the world impact not only on the question of the wrongness of a decision to 
bring a child into the world but on the consequences which should flow from 
that in terms of imposing duties on others.  
 
Jackson contrasts two different interpretations of section 13(5).74  The first is 
what she calls the ‘thin’ interpretation, meaning that the welfare principle 
should only be applied to deny treatment in situations where not being born 
would be preferable to life.  The parallels with the Non-Identity Problem here 
are clear.  She describes the thin interpretation of section 13(5) in these terms: 
 
So to decide that it would be better not to be born than to have 
parents such as these is to decide that a particular couple or 
individual present an immediate threat to their offspring so grave 
that not being conceived could plausibly be considered 
preferable.75 
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This would require clinics to assess parents based on a minimum level of 
parenting ability and only refuse treatment on the basis that it would be better 
for the child’s welfare not to be brought into existence.  Jackson is of the view 
that if a literal interpretation of the wording of section 13(5) is taken, then this 
should be how it is applied.  However, she contends that this is not how it has 
been interpreted and instead what has been applied is a ‘thick’ interpretation.  
The thick interpretation according to Jackson: 
 
Enjoins clinics to take into account factors such as the would-be 
parents’ commitment to having and bringing up a child; their ability 
to provide a stable and supportive environment; their future ability 
to look after or provide for the child’s needs and the possibility of 
any risk of harm to their child.76 
 
The HFEA may argue that the situation changed following the Tomorrow’s 
Children recommendations and that they have now guide clinics only to refuse to 
provide treatment where there is evidence that the child is likely to suffer 
serious physical or psychological harm.  Clinics are now not expected to take 
into account social factors unless they might be severe enough either to be likely 
to pose a risk of serious psychological harm to the child or to make the parents 
unable to care for a child.  However, whilst the approach to the child welfare 
principle contained within the HFE Act 1990 has been watered down following 
the Tomorrow’s Children review, it is still some way off from only being applied 
to deny treatment in situations where not being born would be preferable to 
life.  The language used in the current Code of Practice is still very much 
language which would be recognised by any family lawyer applying the child 
welfare principle: ‘The centre should refuse treatment if it concludes that any 
child who may be born or any existing child of the family is likely to be at risk of 
significant harm or neglect’.77  If the thin interpretation is applied then section 
13(5) would only really be justly applied in situations where it could be 
predicted that the child would inevitably suffer horribly in life, with any 
countervailing predicted advantages being insufficient to offset the suffering to 
such an extent that access to treatment would be acceptable.  It is clear from 
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the Parliamentary debates discussed in Chapter Three that the approach to 
section 13(5) was not to require clinics to assess whether there was the risk of 
harm so grave as to justify non-existence but, as Jackson points out, to carry out 
a child welfare assessment very much in line with what the Courts are required 
to do when deciding on family law issues such as residence and contact.78 
 
Before going on to set out definitively why this thesis takes the position that 
section 13(5) should be amended it will be illustrative to look at the approach 
the Courts have taken to the Non-Identity Problem in the so-called ‘wrongful 
life’ cases.  The wrongful life cases considered the difficulties with the 
philosophical problem of non-identity already discussed.  As will be explained 
the Courts were reticent to make judgements about whether or not it is better 
for a child to be born than to never come into existence.  This lends weight to 
the suggestion that Parliament did not intend that section 13(5) require clinics 
to assess whether there was the risk of harm so grave as to justify non-
existence. Even if the intention of Parliament was that the child welfare 
assessment set out in the HFE Act 1990 was to be given a thick interpretation, 
there is still a problem with its practical application when the consequence of 
that is to prevent a child being brought into existence. 
 
 
5.4 Wrongful Life and Section 13(5) 
Jackson criticises section 13(5) on the grounds that it is incoherent from a legal 
perspective as well as from a philosophical one.  What is highlighted by this 
criticism is the conceptually difficult idea of the non-identity problem discussed 
above.  In developing her incoherency argument Jackson makes reference to the 
so-called ‘wrongful life’ cases.  She specifically cites the case of McKay v Essex 
Area Health Authority79 in which the child raised an actions for damages on the 
basis that, but for the defendant’s negligence in failing to diagnose and treat 
her mother for a rubella infection during pregnancy, her mother would have 
been offered the option of a termination.  She would not have been born and 
therefore her injuries would have been avoided.  One judge commented that it 
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was impossible to compare existence with injury against the alternative of non-
existence: 
 
The disabilities were caused by the rubella and not by the 
doctor...What then are her injuries, which the doctor's negligence 
has caused? The answer must be that there are none in any 
accepted sense...What the doctor is blamed for is causing or 
permitting her to be born at all.  Thus, the compensation must be 
based on a comparison between the value of non-existence (the 
doctor's alleged negligence having deprived her of this) and the 
value of her existence in a disabled state.  But how can a court 
begin to evaluate non-existence, ‘the undiscovered country from 
whose bourn no traveller returns?’ No comparison is possible and 
therefore no damage can be established which a court could 
recognise. This goes to the root of the whole cause of action.80 
 
Another took the view that when faced between a choice of a disabled existence 
and non-existence the former would almost always be preferable:  
 
If a court had to decide whether it were better to enter into life 
maimed or halt than not to enter it at all, it would, I think, be 
bound to say it was better in all cases of mental and physical 
disability, except possibly...extreme cases However that may be, it 
is not for the courts to take such a decision by weighing life against 
death or to take cognisance of a claim like this child's.81 
 
In Jackson’s view these two judgments do not sit right with section 13(5).82  If 
the first Judge’s view is taken as valid, that carrying out a comparison between 
the value of non-existence and the value of her existence is impossible, then 
what section 13(5) requires of treatment clinics is to engage in an impossible 
task.83  If we take the second Judge’s view as valid, that in almost all cases 
existence would be preferable to non-existence, then treatment clinics will 
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nearly always have to come to the conclusion that allowing access to treatment 
and thereby bringing a child into existence is the right decision.  Jackson 
concludes that legislation which means that a decision can be taken not to bring 
a child into existence because it would be contrary to that child’s welfare is 
incoherent.  What section 13(5) effectively requires treatment clinics to do is 
weigh up whether or not the welfare of the child would be best served by being 
brought into existence.  According to the approach taken to wrongful life 
litigation, this is either an impossible task or one which the answer will nearly 
always be yes.  Only where the life of the future child could be said to be truly 
awful – the thin interpretation discussed above - would denying access to 
treatment be justified. 
 
In Jackson’s view even if it is the thick interpretation which is applied to section 
13(5) decisions, the thrust of the wrongful life judgments make it fare no better. 
As she puts it: 
 
…section 13(5) rests upon the assumption that assessing the welfare 
of any child that might be born to particular parents is not merely a 
filter to exclude individuals whose baby is inevitably going to suffer 
from horrifying disabilities.  Rather, it is directed towards judging a 
couple or individual's likely parenting ability before deciding 
whether to offer them treatment. However this 'thick' version of 
the welfare principle is plainly inconsistent with the judgements of 
both Stephenson and Ackner LJJ.  If it is accepted that it will 
invariably be in a child's best interests to be conceived and born, 
applying the welfare principle prior to conception is essentially 
meaningless.84 
 
Feinberg has looked at the wrongful life cases from the angle of Mill’s harm 
principle.85  Feinberg first defines what he takes Mill to have meant by harm for 
the purposes of the harm principle.  In Feinberg’s view: 
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...‘harming’ must mean adversely affecting another party's interest 
in a way that wrongs him or, alternatively, wronging him in a way 
that adversely affects his interest.  It is a necessary element in all 
harming, then, that it have an effect on someone's interests.86 
 
Feinberg suggests that wrongful life claims should not succeed on the basis that 
no harm has been done to the ‘victim’ in such cases and that no wrong has been 
done unless the consequences for the child are so severe as to render his life not 
worth living.87  In Feinberg’s view a child can be wrongfully conceived but not 
harmed even if the child’s life is not worth living because whilst the child has 
been born into a condition harmful to it, the harm suffered is not as a result of a 
prior act of harming.88  However, Feinberg is of the view that a child wrongfully 
conceived is wronged if the child’s life is not worth living because the child 
‘comes into existence with his most basic ‘birth rights’ already violated and he 
has a genuine moral grievance against his parents.  So while Feinberg takes the 
view that the child has had a moral wrong done to it, this does not give rise to a 
legal action.  In doing so Harris states he leaves the child with no legal 
complaint.89  Harris summarises Feinberg’s views in the following: 
 
Feinberg insists that the child has only been wronged where non-
existence is preferable and has not been harmed at all, for the 
simple reason, and for Feinberg sufficient, reason that it has not 
been made ‘worse off’.90   
 
However, Harris takes the view that: 
 
Where someone has caused another to be in a harmed condition 
and is moreover morally responsible for having caused such harm, it 
is natural and logical to say that they have harmed the other 
person. 
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Harris is taking issue with Feinberg’s view that wrongful life legal claims should 
not succeed on the basis that no harm, only a wrong, has been done to the 
victim of wrongful life.  For Harris the wrong in wrongful life is as already 
alluded to in the section on the non-identity problem the ‘wrong of bringing 
avoidable suffering into the world’.91  Harris has attempted to identify the 
precise nature of the alleged harm and wrong in wrongful life cases.92  In doing 
so he casts some further light on what is conceptually wrong with section 13(5) 
in requiring treatment clinics to weigh up whether or not the welfare of the 
child would be best served by coming into existence.  Harris is of the view that 
wrongful life cases should not succeed.93  In his view even if a child is harmed by 
the negligent actions of a mother and/or doctor, if that child has a life worth 
living then the child cannot claim to have been wronged by the fact of his birth 
because the child has received a net benefit from being born, albeit with 
disabilities, and their rights have not been violated.94  Harris is also of the view 
that in cases where the child has been harmed to such an extent that life is not 
worth living, where it can be said that the child has been both harmed and 
wronged, the child should still not have a legal remedy.  Harris is of the view 
that in such cases resources should be provided by society to assist the child in 
having a life worth living but that child should not be granted a legal remedy 
which other disabled children do not have.  The only legal remedy which Harris 
supports if it is really the case that the child does not have a life worth living is 
legalisation of euthanasia.  
 
Feinberg also addresses the problem that the idea of prenatal harm seems to 
involve legal duties to not yet existent persons.  He talks of cases which involve 
what he calls a harming act which occurs before conception which results in the 
child being born in a harmed condition.  One example he gives is of a hospital 
which gives an infected blood transfusion to a woman so that she contracts 
syphilis and one year later she conceives and the child is born syphilitic.  
Feinberg is of the view that the ‘legal duties to not yet existent persons’ 
difficulty can be got around by affirming that: 
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...a person has a duty of care toward anyone who is likely to be 
harmed as a consequence of his conduct (a ‘foreseeable victim’), 
and in the case of some actions, that includes persons not yet born 
nor even conceived...One of its implied consequences, incidentally, 
is that when you are dealing, medically or commercially, with a 
woman of a certain age, you've got to think of her as potentially 
pregnant, and her merely potential future child as a ‘foreseeable 
victim’ of your transaction with her now.95 
 
It might be said by proponents of section 13(5) that Feinberg’s view lends it 
some justification because by requiring that the clinic take into account the 
welfare of the child the State is fulfilling its duty of care to prevent harm to 
future people – the ‘foreseeable victims’.   
 
There are two problems with this argument in so far as section 13(5) is directed 
at ensuring a child is not put at a significant risk of harm as a consequence of a 
poor parental environment.  The first is that while the State could be criticised 
for an omission if it did not ensure through enacting such a provision that the 
clinic take into account the welfare of the child to be born, that omission would 
not be the cause of the harm which befalls the child.  The harmful act comes 
after birth at the hands of the abusive or neglectful parent(s).  The State has 
enabled the child to be born into circumstances where there is a risk of harm 
but their omission is not the cause of the harm.  This is a different set of 
circumstances to Feinberg’s example where there is a direct causal link between 
the negligence of the hospital and the child’s suffering.  The second problem is 
that even if the State has a duty of care towards a foreseeable victim, the only 
way that harm could be prevented is by preventing the person being born. 
 
Is the State therefore entitled to treat the yet-to-be conceived ‘child’ as a 
person that falls under their mandate to protect given that it is possible that the 
child may be harmed as a result of the potential parent’s decision to seek access 
to ART?  In addressing the issue of whether or not existence might ever be said 
to be less preferable to non-existence Feinberg is of the view that:  
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What we must ask, then, in wrongful life cases is ‘whether 
nonexistence or nonlife is preferable to life attended by certain 
hardships’.  If nonexistence in a given case would have been 
objectively preferable to existence, as judged for example by the 
law's convenient ‘reasonable person’, then any wrongful act or 
omission that caused (permitted) the child to be born can be 
judged to have harmed the child.96 
 
How this might reflect on section 13(5) is that what the treatment clinic is being 
asked to do is not to weigh up whether or not the welfare of the child would be 
best served by coming into existence but whether to prevent the child’s 
existence would avoid the child coming to harm in the future. 
 
 
5.5 Further Criticism of Section 13(5) 
Jackson also argues that section 13(5) is unfair because it invades the ‘decisional 
privacy’ of an infertile couple seeking access to ART when ordinarily such an 
invasion of ‘decisional privacy’ of a fertile couple deciding to try for a child 
would not be contemplated.97  In Jackson’s view the decision to try for a child is 
a ‘self-regarding decision’ which takes place within the privacy of a relationship.  
As the name suggests self-regarding decisions are decisions which are taken with 
the focus being upon how the outcome of that decision will impact upon one’s 
own life.  In a paper looking at respect for autonomy in medical decisions 
Gauthier is of the view that: 
   
...medical treatment decisions are most often self-regarding... 
As long as these decisions do not lead to a breach of specific 
duties to others or otherwise cause harm to others, they are self-
regarding and are clearly in the sphere of absolute liberty.  
Exceptions may arise in cases involving third parties, for 
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example, when a parent's death from the refusal of a blood 
transfusion would leave small children without needed care.98 
 
However, Jackson is of the view that when an infertile couple seek access to 
ART their decision to try for a child is treated by section 13(5) as an 'other 
regarding decision' which must be judged with regard to the potential impact 
that decision may have on the yet-to-be-conceived child.99  It might be argued 
that this is because the decision to seek to access ART treatment is an exception 
along the lines of that noted by Gauthier.  If the decision to access medical 
treatment is with the intention of  that it will result in the birth of a child, then 
the welfare of that child is something which has to be had regard to.  However, 
that argument does avoid the difficulty of why the decision to access medical 
treatment with the intention of giving birth to a child should be treated any 
differently to the decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the intention of 
giving birth to a child – the consequences of the two decisions are the same.     
 
In his work On Liberty John Stuart Mill also considered the distinction between 
self-regarding and other-regarding behaviour by noting that when a ‘person is 
led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, 
the case is taken out of the self-regarding class and the sanctions of the law or 
public opinion may be used to force the behaviour that would meet those 
obligations’.100  Mill recognised that the freedom to act on self-regarding 
decisions is limited and can only be exercised ‘when a person's conduct affects 
the interests of no persons besides himself, or need not affect them unless they 
like’.101  Mill’s argument is that human beings will only be able to develop and 
exercise their individuality and life plan if they are permitted the freedom to 
make self-regarding decisions.  The point which Jackson is making is that in 
treating the decision of an infertile couple to try for a child using ART as an 
other-regarding decision, whilst treating the decision of the fertile couple as a 
self-regarding decision, the State is imposing an unfair restriction on the 
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101 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 281. 
230 
 
 
autonomous decision-making capacity of the infertile.  In terms of this thesis, 
this would be regarded as an unfair restriction on procreative liberty. As Jackson 
points out there is no necessary correlation between biological fertility and a 
child’s welfare so the future child’s welfare should not be a consideration in 
determining whether access to ART is granted.102 
 
Jackson also criticises section 13(5) on the grounds that it is disingenuous 
because clinics being asked to make the decision whether to offer treatment or 
not are not given sufficient information and do not have the necessary skill set 
to make a complex child welfare assessment.  This does however raise the 
question - if the clinics were given better information and employed suitable 
experts to make these assessments, would that provide greater justification for 
section 13(5)?  This question will be examined in greater detail in the next part 
of this chapter when a comparison of adoptive parenting assessments and 
section 13(5) assessments is carried out. 
 
In the context of a parental environment which could subject a child to neglect 
or abuse, since removal of that child this situation would be an option post-
birth, it is difficult to see when section 13(5) could be applied at all.  There is a 
counter to that position - that child abuse may only be discovered too late to 
prevent irreparable damage or even death of the child and accordingly, where 
there is clear evidence of the potential for a significant risk of harm to be 
caused to the child in the future, then account must be taken of that to prevent 
it happening.  Such a situation would at best justify the application of Jackson’s 
thinly interpreted section 13(5).  If there was clear evidence that it truly would 
be better for the child not to be born to such parents then the parents should be 
denied treatment.  As Gavaghan puts it: 
 
A narrow construction of the welfare test would require fertility 
clinics to refuse treatment only in cases where it is foreseeable 
                                                     
102 E. Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, Modern Law Review, 65, 
2002, 182. 
231 
 
 
that the life of the resulting child would be subjectively worse than 
nothing.103  
 
Gavaghan is writing in the context of genetic conditions and makes the point 
that ‘it is often impossible in individual cases to make an accurate 
pronouncement on the quality of life until the child is born...the range of 
conditions to which section 13(5) would actually apply would be narrow 
indeed’.104  In the context of parental environment which this thesis is 
concerned with it is submitted that the ability to accurately predict whether a 
potential parent might come to abuse, neglect or even murder their child is so 
difficult and based on so much subjectivity that the number of situations where 
section 13(5) would actually apply would be negligible to the point of making the 
entire exercise pointless. 
 
 
5.6 The Adoption Comparison 
In terms of the Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005 which apply to England only, 
prospective adopters have to go through a very rigorous vetting process before a 
child can be placed with them for adoption.  An adoption agency is required to 
collect a significant amount of information on a prospective adopter, including a 
photograph and physical description; information as to racial origin, cultural and 
linguistic background and religious persuasion; a description of the prospective 
adopter’s personality and interests; details of any previous family court 
proceedings in which the prospective adopter has been involved; the names and 
addresses of three referees who will give personal references on the prospective 
adopter; the details of any current and previous marriage, civil partnership or 
relationship; a family tree; a chronology; the observations of the prospective 
adopter about his own experience of being parented and how this has influenced 
him; details of any experience the prospective adopter has had of caring for 
children; and an assessment of his ability in this respect.105  An extensive 
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criminal records check is also made in relation to the prospective adopter.106  
Clearly, it is a very wide-ranging and intrusive process.  However, that process 
has been put in place as a means of meeting the State mandate to protect 
children.   
 
There are clearly some parallels to be drawn between the parenting assessment 
carried out on potential adopters and the requirement upon an infertility clinic 
to into account the need of the child for supportive parenting deciding whether 
or not to allow access to treatment.  In both cases the focus is upon the ability 
of the parent to raise a child.  In both cases the opportunity to raise a child can 
be denied if the parent does not ‘pass’ the capability assessment.  However, 
there is also a huge difference between assessing the ability of a potential 
adoptive parent to take on the role of raising another person’s existing child, 
and assessing the ability of a potential parent to raise a child at the pre-
conception stage.   
 
There is also a clear difference as to the thoroughness of the parental 
assessment which is carried out.    The Adoption and Children Act 2002 which 
applies in England and Wales107describes the child’s welfare as the ‘paramount 
consideration of the court or adoption agency’.108  The Court or adoption agency 
must have regard to, among other things, any harm (within the meaning of the 
Children Act 1989) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering.  Harm in 
the context of the Children Act 1989 means ‘ill-treatment or the impairment of 
physical or mental health or development’ and development means ‘physical, 
intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development.’109  Government 
guidance in regard to these regulations110 does not shy away from stating that 
these assessments are absolutely necessary.  It states that the guidance is 
                                                     
106 Regulation 23 of the Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005 requires the adoption agency to 
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intended to help practitioners ‘assess potential adoptive parents so that their 
adopted children can benefit from confident, positive and resilient parenting 
throughout their childhood and beyond.’111 
 
In Scotland the provisions of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 are 
broadly similar.  Section 14(3) states that ‘the court or adoption agency is to 
regard the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout 
the child’s life as the paramount consideration’, with the court or adoption 
agency, so far as is reasonably practicable, having regard in particular to the 
value of a stable family unit in the child’s development, the child’s 
ascertainable views regarding the decision (taking account of the child's age and 
maturity), the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic 
background, and the likely effect on the child, throughout the child’s life, of the 
making of an adoption order.112  Interestingly in Scotland the child has to live 
with the prospective adopters before an adoption order113 is made and home 
visits114 and court reports115 provided on the suitability of the prospective 
adopters.  I would suggest that this may be regarded as what a practical and 
sensible parental ability assessment requires. The approach taken to these 
assessments would be difficult and in many cases impossible to carry out prior to 
the conception of the ‘child’. 
 
If the statutory requirements in relation to the adoption process in the different 
parts of the UK are compared with the statutory requirements set out in section 
13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 (as amended) it is apparent that section 13(5) makes 
no reference to the welfare of the child being the paramount or primary 
consideration.  Instead section 13(5) states that: ‘a woman shall not be provided 
with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of the 
child or any existing child’.  However, when the amendment to the HFE Bill 1990 
(which sought to incorporate the child welfare assessment a condition of a 
licence) was tabled in the House of Commons by Ann Winterton MP in 1990, she 
specifically said:  
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112 Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 sec 14(4). 
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I have tabled the amendment because the interests of the child in 
matters of artificial insemination should be paramount.  That term 
has been used most successfully in the Children Act 1989.116 
 
It has been suggested that one explanation for Parliament’s preference for the 
‘taking account of’ approach over the ‘paramount consideration’ approach was 
the differences between the legal status of the potential child in assisted 
conception on the one hand and the status of actual children in family law 
practice on the other.117  For example, when a decision is being made on 
whether or not it is in the child’s best interest to remove that child from its 
family and take it into care, several factors have to be taken into account, 
including the wishes of the parents and the child, evidence of the child’s 
developmental milestones, evidence of any abuse or neglect, school or nursery 
reports if relevant and evidence of any substance abuse problems.  In contrast, 
what the licensed clinic has to assess is the risk of harm that a yet-to-be-
conceived child might face if it is born to those particular parents.  The only 
approach that the licensed clinic can undertake is an assessment of the potential 
parent(s) ability to care for a hypothetical child if that hypothetical child was to 
be born.118 
 
It is also important to note that the State requires that some form of parenting 
ability assessment is carried out for those seeking to adopt and those seeking 
access to ART treatment, but not those fertile couples who engage in sexual 
intercourse with the intention of having children.  This thesis takes the position 
that the adoption assessment process can be distinguished from these other 
situations because the parental assessment process is being carried out at the 
post-birth stage where the welfare of an existing child is at issue.  The State 
mandate to protect that existing child is engaged.  The adoption assessment 
process is not unlike the child welfare assessment carried out under the Children 
Acts if the State has reason to believe that a child may be at risk of significant 
harm.  It is justifiable for the State to ensure in advance that an existing child 
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would not be put at risk of significant harm if placed with adoptive parents.  
This is very much in line with the rights of the child discussed in Chapter Four 
which are enjoyed by all children post-birth.   
 
The fact that the potential adoptive parents are assessed at the post-birth stage 
but fertile individuals are not assessed at the pre-conception stage does not 
make a difference to the argument of this thesis that section 13(5) is an 
unjustified interference in the right to procreative liberty.  This is because this 
thesis takes the view that any parental assessment of fertile individuals at the 
pre-conception stage would also be an unjustified interference in their right to 
procreative liberty.  By contrast, the parental assessment carried out at the 
adoption stage is a justified interference with a right to chose to be a parent 
because it protects an existing child from the potential risk of harm.         
 
Nevertheless, Ryburn and Fleming writing in 1993119 referred to a study which in 
their view highlighted a fact that: 
 
The actual track record of professionals in assessing both for 
parenthood and the future best interests of children is quite 
unproven.  The limited research on assessment for parenthood in 
adoption for example indicates that those approved as suitable by 
one agency may be declined by another and even within single 
agencies discrepant views were discovered amongst different 
members of staff.120 
 
In other words even with adoption assessments the task of assessing parental 
ability without subjectivity coming into play is a very difficult task which calls 
into question the reliability of the assessment of future parenting ability process 
and its practical usefulness in either the adoption or ART treatment contexts.   
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As discussed in the previous section Jackson criticised section 13(5) on the basis 
that it is disingenuous to even attempt in practice to distinguish between 
adequate and inadequate parents.121  As Jackson points out the treatment clinic 
is not required to carry out anything like the level of assessment which a couple 
seeking to adopt a child are required to go through.122  The adoption process is 
also of course entirely different as it is a matching process between prospective 
parents and an existing child.  It is a genuine child welfare assessment not a 
future child welfare assessment.  This makes a difference because adoption 
agencies are asking the question: are these parents suitable for this particular 
child?    
 
Jackson also makes the point that the rigour of the section 13(5) assessment 
process varied between clinics123, although she was writing prior to the 
introduction of the standardised ‘Welfare of the child: patient history form’ 
referred to in the introduction of this thesis, so that problem has diminished.  
Jackson notes that those who work in clinics are not qualified to carry out such 
assessment or have the information available to them124, as social workers are 
and do.  Jackson adds that the factors which may impact upon the welfare of 
the child are not necessarily the ones which have been identified by research, 
for example, being raised in a one-parent family may not be as detrimental to 
child welfare as first imagined if that single parent is nurturing and 
supportive.125  As she points out, without the rigorous assessment process carried 
out in adoptions it is very difficult to predict the adequacy of proposed parents 
with any degree of accuracy and even within the rigorous adoption process it is 
the case that placements fail. 
 
The disingenuousness of section 13(5) which Jackson alluded to in 2002 can still 
be found.  The very fact that section 13(5) does not require that the welfare of 
the child be the paramount consideration raises a question mark over its 
effectiveness in being able to fulfil a similar function to the child welfare 
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principle in family law in general and in comparison with adoption in particular.  
The Tomorrow’s Children consultation appeared to suggest that because a more 
rigorous assessment was not possible at the pre-conception stage then child 
welfare could not be given the same status as a post-birth child welfare 
assessment:   
 
One explanation for the preference for the ‘taking into account’ 
approach in the HFE Bill might be the differences between the 
status of the potential child in assisted conception on the one hand 
and its status in areas of practice relating to actual children on the 
other.  When a local authority considers whether or not to remove 
a child from its family and take it into care, the authority must 
take into account several factors including the wishes of the 
parents and the child and decide where the best interests of a 
living child lie.  In order to inform this decision, the authority must 
assess the level of harm that the child is likely to face if it stays in 
the family home, based upon current family circumstances.  In 
assisted conception, by contrast, the treating clinician must 
balance the wishes of the prospective parents against the interests 
of a child who does not yet exist.  The clinician must assess the 
harm that the child is likely to face if it is born to those patients, 
based upon what the family circumstances might be once the 
family is created.126 
 
There is something unpersuasive about this explanation.  The welfare of the 
child is surely the paramount consideration in family law because of the 
perceived overriding importance of the welfare of the individual child being 
considered.  What this thesis concludes is that it is only given the ‘taken into 
account’ status under section 13(5) because the legislators were really aware 
that it cannot be meaningfully assessed in the absence of an actual child.  It is 
as if there was an  acknowledgement  that section 13(5) is generally ineffective 
but wish to retain it anyway possibly because it is, as Jackson describes it, ‘a 
cosmetic provision’127 and because as she says ‘it would have been politically 
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unthinkable not to support the inclusion of a welfare principle, despite its 
incoherence and practical inefficiency’.128  This goes back to the point that the 
child welfare principle has become something which is now widely approved and 
virtually beyond reproach. 
 
It is reasonable to expect, from the point of view of the child and of society, 
that a child who is being placed for adoption will not be knowingly placed into a 
harmful situation by the State.  The adoptive parenting assessment is therefore 
a justifiable means of ensuring that the welfare of a child is protected.  On the 
other hand the aim of section 13(5) can only be to ensure that a child is not born 
into a harmful situation.  This is an entirely different question which raises the 
issue of when it can be said that it is better not to be brought into existence at 
all as opposed to being brought into an existence which may involve harm being 
caused to the child.  As was discussed in the previous section the harm principle 
in respect of a particular child cannot be said to extend to the need to prevent 
people from bringing him or her into existence unless, at best, it can truly be 
shown that it would be better for a child not to exist in the circumstances which 
are envisaged. These circumstances are likely to be extremely rare when it 
comes to questions of parenting ability, provided adequate post-birth protection 
systems are in place. 
 
The fact that society does not carry out parental ability assessments on fertile 
couples who seek to have a child by engaging in sexual intercourse has been 
alluded to in this section.  The next section will look in more detail at a paper 
which proposed that in actual fact such a system would be desirable.  This paper 
is interesting in this context because it highlights the discriminatory nature of 
carrying out a parenting ability assessment of the infertile and also some of the 
other arguments in favour of a pre-conception parenting assessment.  
 
 
5.7 Discrimination and Parental Licensing 
As has been discussed the fact that potential parents seeking access to assisted 
reproduction treatment are treated differently from those conceiving naturally 
has led to criticism that section 13(5) is inherently unfair and discriminatory as it 
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imposes conditions upon potential parents for no other reason than it is more 
possible to do so, while at the same time leaving fertile individuals to reproduce 
freely, regardless of how unsuitable parents they might appear to make.129  
However, in 1980 Hugh La Follette argued that the State should require all 
parents to be licensed, saying that this was not only theoretically desirable but 
was actually possible.130  La Follette’s arguments for licensing all parents are 
pertinent to many of the arguments put forward for denying people access to 
assisted reproduction treatment on the grounds of child welfare. 
 
In developing his argument, La Follette first pointed out that society regulates a 
great many activities already, such as driving or the practice of medicine.  
Society prohibits these activities until a license is obtained in order to limit the 
potential for harm caused by incompetent, incapable or dishonest people 
undertaking these activities.  La Follette then made the claim that, given the 
fact that society licences these activities it is theoretically desirable to licence 
any activity that is potentially harmful to others and requires a certain 
competence to perform safely, provided there is a moderately reliable (but not 
necessarily perfect) procedure for determining that someone is competent.131  
La Follette also pointed out that society insists on licensing in these areas even 
when a failure to secure a licence would seriously inconvenience or upset the 
individual in question. 
 
La Follette made the argument that these regulatory criteria could be applied to 
parents.  There was ample evidence that parenting can be harmful to children, a 
significant number of whom suffer neglect and abuse at the hands of their 
parents.  Therefore, a parent must show a minimal level of competence in order 
to obtain a licence to carry out the role of parenting without harming the child.  
La Follette argued that many people do not have the requisite level of 
competence to raise a child without inflicting harm and for that reason parents 
should be licensed.  He argued that any intrusion into people’s lives would be 
justified and minimal provided the people in question make good faith efforts to 
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rear children without causing them harm.  The only people who would suffer a 
major intrusion into their lives would be those who wished to have children in 
bad faith.132   
 
La Follette then went on to argue against various practical objections put 
forward which suggest that a parental licensing scheme could not be effectively 
and justly implemented.  These objections were that there are no adequate 
criteria for assessing a good parent; that there is no reliable way to predict who 
will maltreat their children; that even if a reliable test for ascertaining who 
would be an acceptable parent were available, administrators would 
unintentionally or intentionally misuse the test; and any system would be 
impossible to enforce.  La Follette countered the first objection by saying that a 
licensing system would only act to ‘weed out’ the truly bad parents.  It would 
not seek to make complex value judgements about the benefits of different 
methods of parenting.  What it would do is prevent people at a high likelihood of 
being bad parents from becoming parents based on recognisable criteria such as 
previous convictions for child abuse.  The license would not demand a gold 
standard of parenting.   
 
There is some force in what La Follette said in this regard when analysing what 
is required of licensed clinics by the Code of Practice.   Licensed clinics are 
advised to look for previous convictions related to harming children, child 
protection measures taken regarding existing children, violence or serious 
discord in the family environment, mental illness and drug or alcohol abuse.  The 
presence of any of these factors would seem to put a child at a higher risk of 
abuse or neglect.  Therefore if society can identify what makes a bad parent, 
then why should people who are likely to harm their children not be prevented 
from becoming parents? The difficulties of parenting and welfare of the child 
assessments being undertaken prior to conception have been discussed 
previously. However, putting these difficulties aside, preventing people from 
becoming parents because of definitive indicators that they would present a 
serious risk to children is not quite the same thing as requiring all potential 
patients to submit to the assessment on the grounds that the welfare of the 
child has to be taken into account.  It should also be remembered that the 
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current welfare assessment requires the licensed clinic to address the question 
of whether there is any concern that the prospective parents may not be 
supportive parents by, for example, showing a lack of commitment to the 
health, well being and development of the prospective child.  This goes beyond 
the serious identifiable and objective risk factors like previous convictions and 
drug addiction into a far wider and more subjective assessment of the parents.  
 
With regard to the other objections, La Follette’s responses were even less 
convincing.  He argued that the predictive tests do not have to be 100% accurate 
and in any case accurate tests could be developed through the use of 
longitudinal studies to ascertain what factors were predictive of child abuse and 
neglect.  However, La Follette did not tackle the valid criticism that a licensing 
system had the real potential to prevent perfectly capable people from 
becoming parents.  With regard to the three other objections, he tended to 
downplay the practical difficulties, merely stating that he did not see how these 
objections should undermine his licensing proposal because of the importance of 
protecting children from harm. 
 
La Follette’s arguments, while interesting, seek to minimise the great 
importance people attach to having children and the fact that a great many 
pregnancies are unplanned and unforeseen.  In his essay, he uses the examples 
of a driving licence and obtaining a licence to practice medicine or law to 
illustrate that licensing in other areas is acceptable.  He proposes that to argue 
against licensing parents means arguing against these other types of licences.  
However, there is no strong biological drive to learn to drive or become a doctor 
and while possessing a life skill like driving or practising a profession may be an 
important aspect of a person’s sense of identity and worth they are not the life 
affirming activities that many see parenthood as being. Further, not all 
pregnancies are necessarily planned in the same way that sitting a driving test or 
studying medicine is planned.  It may be the case that some women become 
pregnant who would not be eligible for a licence.  It is also of note that in China, 
where a one-child policy has been in place for a number of decades with serious 
social and economic consequences for those who do not comply, many people 
have continued to have more than one child.  Government attempts to control 
the very personal decision of how many children one will have has led to serious 
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human rights abuses not least toward infants born outside the one child 
policy.133 
 
La Follette himself asked: How would one deal with violators of the licensing 
system and what could we do with babies so conceived? His answer is that we 
might not punish parents at all, but we might just remove the children and put 
them up for adoption.  It is rather fanciful to suggest that taking a child from the 
care of its biological parents and placing it up for adoption is not punishing the 
parents at all.  Further, if this is all that a licensing program would achieve then 
it is not greatly different from the system currently in place which would remove 
children thought to be at risk of harm, although it may be the case that these 
measures would be implemented more often and at an earlier stage in the 
child’s life.   
 
If La Follette’s proposals are to mean anything it would be to prevent women 
from becoming pregnant.  While La Follette poses an interesting question there 
is virtually no possibility of his proposals being put into practice in any liberal 
democracy, for reasons considered in Chapter Two.  However, whilst preventing 
people from conceiving in the natural way is a rather different proposition to 
stopping people receiving licensed treatment, the infringement upon the right to 
procreative liberty of the infertile should not be treated any less lightly than the 
right to procreative liberty of the fertile.  That is why the existence of section 
13(5) as presently enacted which in effect places licensing requirements on 
infertile couples seeking assistance to conceive is deeply flawed on the basis 
that it is discriminatory and rather than serving to protect children from harm 
only serves to stop children being born at all. 
 
 
5.8 Section 13(5) and Third Party Involvement 
The HFEA Tomorrow’s Children consultation paper asked how assisted 
conception children compared with their naturally-conceived counterparts and 
answered as follows: 
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http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/may/06/chinas-barbaric-one-child-policy (accessed 
on 18 March 2014). 
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When children are conceived naturally, the parents of the child 
usually make a private decision between themselves to proceed 
(unless the pregnancy is unplanned)...Parents seeking to adopt a 
child also make a private decision to proceed, but the decision 
about whether their desire to become adoptive parents will be 
realised is made by an adoption agency.  In this situation, the 
agencies involved must make a judgement about the suitability of 
the prospective adopters to parent an adopted child.  How should 
assisted conception children be regarded in the light of these 
examples?  For couples needing assisted conception treatment, the 
initial decision to have a child is also a private one.  But, as with 
adoptive parents, the realisation of the desire to have a child is 
achieved with the involvement of third parties: in this case, the 
medical and laboratory staff in an assisted conception clinic...Most 
would agree that they have a responsibility to protect a child from 
any significant medical risks associated with a particular procedure. 
But do they also have a responsibility to protect the child from any 
physical, psychological or social harm which might befall them after 
they are born?134 
 
In 1993 the medical journal the Lancet when discussing whether or not 
postmenopausal women should be allowed access to ART to enable them to 
conceive a child said as follows: 
 
The long term well-being of the child should be of overriding 
importance. Research shows that children need a stable home with 
mature caring adults who themselves have a sound relationship.  
This need extends into the late teens, and even people in their 20s 
benefit from the love and support of their parents.  Of course, 
many fertile couples have unplanned conceptions and some of their 
babies are born into circumstances that are far from ideal; we have 
little control over such ‘natural’ events.  However, ethical 
considerations inevitably enter into the decision to use high 
                                                     
134 Tomorrow’s Children Consultation Paper, para. 2.2. 
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technology to give a woman a pregnancy.  Thus the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) insists that those providing 
in-vitro fertilization must take into account the welfare of the 
child, including the need of that child for a father.  Since we can 
control (at least to a certain extent) the circumstances in which a 
child is made when the candidates are infertile, we ought to 
restrict our cooperation to those cases which maximize the welfare 
of the child. At the same time this fact explains why the standard 
for medically-assisted procreation must and can be higher than for 
natural reproduction.135  
 
This assumption that because ART is controlled by medical professionals that 
offers the opportunity to only offer treatment in circumstances where the 
child’s welfare is maximised, has been criticised on the basis that it does not 
explain why those seeking ART treatment have to meet such a high standard of 
parenting, it merely explains that medical professionals are in a position to 
demand this high standard.136  What the Lancet article appears to be saying is 
that whilst babies are born into circumstances that are far from ideal in 
‘natural’ reproduction circumstances doctors have little control over that, but as 
they do have control over assisted reproduction they should exert it.  It is 
unclear what the ‘ethical considerations’ which ‘inevitably enter into the 
decision to use high technology to give a woman a pregnancy’ might be that 
separate ART from natural reproduction beyond making sure that children born 
using ART are born as a result of appropriate standards of professional 
knowledge and skill.  
 
Widdows and MacCallum have looked at the issue of third party involvement in 
the ART process and whether that can distinguish natural reproduction from 
assisted reproduction and adoption.  In regards to this question they have said: 
 
Furthermore, in both adoption and embryo donation we have shown 
that social criteria are thought important in order to safeguard the 
                                                     
135 Editorial, (1993), Too old to have a baby?, Lancet, 341, 344-345. 
136 D. Langridge, ‘The Welfare of the Child: Problems of indeterminacy and deontology’, Human 
Reproduction, vol. 15, no. 3, 502-504, 2000. 
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welfare of the child.  This responsibility stems from the necessity of 
third party involvement in these methods of family creation.  The 
involvement of third parties marks a fundamental difference between 
natural conception on the one hand and NRTs and adoption on the 
other.  It could be argued that third parties are involved in the care of 
parents who conceive naturally—for example, advice from GPs and so 
criteria should be applied in these cases also if consistency is to be 
maintained.  This argument is unconvincing as there is a difference 
between caring for women who conceive naturally and those who 
become parents by virtue of, and as a direct result of, the 
practitioners’ actions.  Without the practitioners’ (clinicians or social 
workers) intervention, the parents would not be caring for a child.  
This instrumental role in family creation makes third parties (and 
society, insofar as these practitioners are society’s representatives) 
responsible for the child’s welfare in way that they are not 
responsible in natural conception. 137 
 
Cutas and Bortolotti have looked at the claim that third party involvement gives 
rise to some kind of shared responsibility for the outcome of treatment in more 
detail.  They state that: 
 
According to the positive responsibility thesis, agents are only 
responsible for the morally significant actions they perform or the 
morally significant events they bring about.  In virtue of the 
involvement of a third party (e.g. doctors, lawyers, other members 
of society) in assisted reproduction or parenting, it is justifiable to 
expect prospective parents to satisfy some criteria in order for 
them to gain access to the relevant form of assistance.  The same 
requirement does not seem to apply to people engaging in natural 
reproduction and parenting, because no third party has positive 
responsibility in bringing it about that a child is conceived or enters 
a permanent relationship with her natural parents.  Interference 
                                                     
137 H. Widdows and F. MacCallum, ‘Disparities in parenting criteria: an exploration of the issues, 
focusing on adoption and embryo donation’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2002 28: 139-142, p. 142. 
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with natural reproduction and parenting is considered unnecessary 
and unjustified, unless neglect or abuse becomes known.138 
 
However, Cutas and Bortolotti go on: 
 
However, if we endorse a negative responsibility view, according to 
which agents are responsible not only for the morally significant 
events they bring about, but also for those they allow to happen, 
when they can sensibly prevent them, the difference between 
natural and assisted forms of reproduction and parenting with 
respect to the issue of third party responsibility becomes at most a 
practical one.  It is easier to intervene in assisted reproduction and 
parenting than in natural reproduction and parenting.  But this 
difference in itself does not seem to carry any ethical weight.  If 
the welfare of children (of all children, regardless of the way in 
which they were conceived or entered a child-parent relationship) 
is important enough to allow intervention in assisted reproduction 
and parenting, and in natural reproduction when there are reasons 
to believe that neglect or abuse or both have taken place, it is hard 
to justify the exemption from scrutiny that people engaging in 
natural reproduction and parenting currently enjoy.139 
 
Cutas and Bortolotti criticise Widdows and MacCallum’s view on the basis that 
assistance in reproduction comes in different degrees.140 So even if the positive 
responsibility view is preferred over the negative responsibility view, the claim 
that no third party has positive responsibility in bringing it about a child that is 
conceived naturally is not as simplistic as claimed.  Emily Jackson has also made 
the point that the distinction between natural reproduction and assisted 
reproduction is not always as clear cut as might be imagined.141   
 
                                                     
138 Cutas and Bortolotti, Natural versus Assisted Reproduction, Studies in Ethics, Law, and 
Technology, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2010, Article 1, 3. 
139 Ibid., 4. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Jackson, Regulating Reproduction, 171. 
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A medical practitioner can provide hormone treatment to increase fertility, or 
surgery to unblock Fallopian tubes, treatments without which there is no 
pregnancy and yet these medical procedures are not regulated by Parliament 
and yet are a direct provision of treatment by a third party.  This thesis takes 
the view that the involvement of a third party – be it the GP giving advice, the 
surgeon unblocking Fallopian tubes or the embryologist fertilising the donor egg – 
does not provide justification for any sort of interference on procreative liberty, 
be it of the fertile or the infertile.  Widdows and MacCallum fail to explain why 
an ‘instrumental role in family creation makes third parties responsible for the 
child’s welfare’ nor do they explain to what extent the third party is responsible 
for the child’s welfare.  It is not enough to point to an increasing level of 
medical assistance to justify an increasing level of responsibility for the child’s 
welfare.  There is no immediately obvious relationship between the two.  The 
clinic is not after all going to be involved in parenting the child after birth; 
providing a good parenting environment for the child is the responsibility of the 
parents.  This thesis agrees with Cutas and Bortolotti that the child welfare 
requirement in medically assisted reproduction exists because it is easier to 
intervene but that this fact does not carry any ethical weight.  It is not a reason 
to continue with section 13(5) as currently in force. 
 
The HFEA Tomorrow’s Children report set out their position on this following 
consultation by considering two interpretations of the welfare of the child 
principle: (1) that the involvement of a medical team in assisted conception 
means that certain third parties have responsibility towards the child to be born. 
However, the importance of patient autonomy means that clinics should only 
refuse to provide treatment where there is evidence that the child is likely to 
suffer serious physical or psychological harm; and (2) the involvement of a 
medical team in assisted conception means that certain third parties have 
significant responsibility towards the child to be born.142 Consequently, clinics 
should not provide treatment unless they are satisfied that the welfare of the 
child to be born will not be affected negatively.   
 
                                                     
142 Tomorrow’s Children, Report of the Policy Review of welfare of the child assessments in 
licensed assisted conception clinics, 6.  
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The HFEA report concluded that (2) placed too much emphasis upon the 
interests of the prospective child at the expense of patient choice.143  Therefore 
the HFEA concluded that (1) was the preferred interpretation of the welfare of 
the child principle in the Act, stating that: 
 
Whilst the involvement of a medical team in conception brings 
some responsibility towards the child who may be born as a result 
of their assistance, this responsibility should not outweigh the 
important responsibility that clinicians have towards respecting 
patient choice. It is the Authority’s view that there should be a 
presumption towards providing treatment to those who request it, 
but that treatment should be refused in cases where clinics 
conclude that the child to be born, or any existing child of the 
family, is likely to suffer serious harm.144 
 
The HFEA taking the position still does not really explain why the involvement of 
a medical team brings responsibility towards the child who may be born as a 
result of their assistance or what the extent of that responsibility might be.  This 
thesis takes the view that the medical team have responsibility to provide 
treatment in the ART context in accordance to ethical principles, such as 
respect for autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, which bind medical 
practitioners when providing any sort of treatment and in accordance with legal 
principles, such as providing treatment to the required standard of care to 
patients.  Whilst the presumption towards providing treatment was a welcome 
change in direction, it is still the case that the presumption can be rebutted on 
grounds pertaining to the parental environment into which the child might be 
born.  This thesis takes the view that just because medical intervention is 
required that does not provide adequate justification for the continuing state of 
affairs. 
 
The arguments put forward by supporters of section 13(5) that because a third 
party is involved in ART this places a responsibility on the State to ensure that 
the welfare of the child is taken into account  does not stand up to closer 
                                                     
143 Ibid. 
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scrutiny.  The lack of regulation of other medical procedures which assist women 
to become pregnant highlights the fact that third party involvement cannot 
serve as a justification for the continuation of section 13(5) as currently 
enacted.  The Parliamentary process in introducing the legislation has never set 
out what distinguished third party involvement in some areas from others and 
has therefore failed to show that section 13(5) as applied to 'treatment services' 
is justified in that it specifically prevents significant harm being caused to 
children born as a result of these procedures and not the other unregulated 
procedures.  
 
 
5.9 Alternatives to section 13(5)  
Eric Blyth is one commentator who has argued that ‘there are defensible welfare 
arguments for curtailing unrestricted access to New Reproductive 
Technologies’.145  However, while he mentions the effect of provision of assisted 
conception services to particular individuals or groups, such as single people, 
people in same-sex partnerships, or post-menopausal women as a factors 
concerning parenting environment which may have  a questionable impact upon 
children his discussion as to the impact of ART on children is principally focused 
on the issues of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI); multiple births; pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and selecting the characteristics of 
children, and donor conception.  Blyth cites lack of space in his article to look at 
the parenting environment factor; however it is clear from what he writes that 
he includes parenting environment as a child welfare concern. 
 
What Blyth proposes however is not the continuation of legislation based on the 
welfare principle which he characterises as the acceptance that while being 
brought into existence inevitably poses some risks, these risks are acceptable so 
long as the child will have a reasonably happy life, which he is of the view 
section 13(5) is based upon.  Instead he champions a greater ‘stakeholder voice’ 
so that the ‘promotion of children’s rights to be heard and to participate in 
decision-making concerning their own lives is not only legitimate, but is integral 
                                                     
145 E. Blyth, To Be or not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children Conceived through 
New Reproductive Technologies, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 16 (2008) 505–522. 
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to contemporary orthodoxy in many jurisdictions.’146  Blyth of course recognises 
that children cannot have a say in their own conception, but what he calls for is 
greater information gathering from those who have been born using ART, a 
retrospective approach, so that their views as to the impact upon them as to the 
means of their birth can be taken into account by future decision makers.  
 
Solberg is of the view that ‘the principle of the welfare of the child confuses the 
ethical framing of ART’.147  He is of the opinion that the ethical argument should 
not be framed in terms of potential conflict between the right to procreative 
liberty of the potential parents and the welfare of the child, but instead argues 
that ‘futile care’ should be the guiding ethical principle when determining 
whether or not to allow access to ART.  Solberg begins his argument by setting 
out the problem which the principle of the welfare of the child in the context of 
ART runs into when confronted by the non-identity problem.  In his view:       
 
There is no child that may be better off depending on our decision.  
By not creating a child we have not benefitted the child, and by 
creating the child we have not harmed the child—simply because 
‘the child’ must be actual before it can be harmed or benefitted.  
It is not meaningful to compare existence with non-existence.  
Towards a potential child we cannot have a moral obligation to 
create it or not create it.  Potential children seem to be outside 
morality.148 
 
In proposing an alternative ethical framework Solberg borrows from the idea of 
futile treatment in end of life cases.  Solberg argues that it is generally accepted 
by the medical profession that futile treatment should be avoided if it were to 
expose the patient to harm without any benefit.  He then goes on to define the 
goal of ART as not merely the delivery of a child but to make the patient a 
parent so that she can experience family life with her child.  He then goes on: 
                                                     
146 E. Blyth, To Be or not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children Conceived through 
New Reproductive Technologies, International Journal of Children’s Rights, 16 (2008) 505–522, 
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Delivering a baby to a drug addict would not be a fulfilment of the 
goal of ART treatment.  She will not be able to function as a parent 
and allow the child to be part of a functioning family.  We can state 
this even more strongly: the goal of the treatment is not just to 
produce parents in the biological sense of the word—the drug 
addict could become a biological parent.  Rather, the goal is to 
produce parents in the social meaning of the word — by way of 
biological intervention—and in that sense, building functional 
families is the primary goal of the treatment.149 
 
Solberg’s opinions are helpful because they highlight that treatment could be 
refused in certain exceptional cases where the goal of ART – to produce social 
parents and functioning families – would not be met.  However, it is perhaps 
questionable whether this is a real alternative to section 13(5) as presently 
enacted because medical practitioners in assessing whether or not treatment 
would be futile because a drug addict could not be able to function as a parent 
are still carrying out a parental assessment.  This thesis takes the view that the 
only just way of proceeding is to amend section 13(5) to remove restrictions 
upon access to ART on parental ability grounds. This would leave clinics open to 
refuse treatment for reasons of risk to the health and welfare of the woman 
undergoing treatment, futility of treatment on medical grounds, a lack of 
resources, such as the availability of donor eggs and sperm, significant harm to 
the child or any existing child which might arise as a consequence of the ART 
process itself Harm as result of genetic make up?  
 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
When placed under proper scrutiny the justification for the continued inclusion 
of section 13(5) as currently enacted is found wanting.  This is a statutory 
provision which has its origins in a proposal to exclude all but married couples 
for access to ART, developed on the basis that it would serve to put obstacles in 
the way of lesbian and single women being allowed access to ART and then 
retained in its current form without at any stage serious consideration given to 
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the real ethical basis for its inclusion beyond that it was good to include the 
principle of the welfare of the child wherever possible. 
 
Its two principal flaws are to be found in the misguided belief in the universal 
applicability of the child welfare principle and a misunderstanding that concerns 
about the welfare of children provide adequate justification for preventing a 
child being brought into existence.  The child welfare principle as applied in 
family law is a justifiable and useful tool which allows Courts to settle disputes 
involving children’s lives in a way which safeguards their interests.  The child 
welfare principle as presently applied in the context of access to ART treatment 
interferes with the autonomy of the prospective parents to make their own 
procreative choices and has the potential to result in the conclusion that 
preventing a child from coming into existence at all is better than a flawed 
existence when child protection measures are already available to protect the 
child’s welfare once born.   
 
To the extent that a comparison between existence and non-existence is 
possible at all, it would appear to be in extremely rare circumstances that 
existence could be envisaged to carry more burdens than benefits such as to 
enable an argument to be made that ART should be denied on the grounds of 
concerns for child welfare arising from inadequate parenting.  Even where the 
interpretation of section 13(5) rests on it being intended to enable an 
assessment of the kind that takes place in family law cases, the applicability of 
such a test in this context appears discriminatory and ineffectual.  The next 
chapter will seek to draw the strands of all that has been discussed in the 
previous four chapters together and set out the thesis conclusion. 
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION 
6.1 Why Amend Section 13(5)? 
In 2001 a case was brought concerning a couple in Scotland who had 
approached their local National Health Service Trust to obtain fertility 
treatment.  In terms of their duty under section 13(5) of the HFEA 1990 the 
Trust made inquiries of Edinburgh City Council's social work department, in 
whose area the man had formerly lived, about his background.  In September 
2004 the Council responded to the Trust to the effect that in the social work 
file kept by the Council there was noted an allegation that the man had been in 
prison for murder.  The consequences of this were that the Trust told the man 
that treatment would not be offered to him and his partner.  This was despite 
the fact that the Trust had previously indicated that treatment would be 
provided.  Subsequently, the Council indicated to the Trust that despite an 
extensive investigation, it had not been possible to confirm what had been said 
about the man and concluded that the allegations should be regarded as 
unfounded.  The offer of fertility treatment was not renewed.  The couple 
went abroad for private treatment, for which they paid, and which proved to 
be successful.  The man tried to raise an action against the Council for solatium 
and the cost of the private treatment, but as a consequence of legal aid rules 
was prevented from doing so.1 
 
This case is an interesting example of where the application of section 13(5) 
has gone seriously wrong.  The case raises serious questions as to the ability of 
licensed clinics, and other third parties, to carry out a proper child welfare 
assessment.  While a great deal should not hang on one very unfortunate 
example of administrative error, the case still serves as a warning to those who 
are of the view that the licensing condition imposed upon clinics by section 
13(5) is workable, justified and fair.   
 
It is very easy to have sympathy for the couple in W v The Scottish Ministers 
because the allegations of a previous conviction for murder were unfounded.  
However, the question might arise – what if the information had been correct? 
Would the clinic’s decision have been justified?  It would certainly appear to 
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have been in line with its licensing requirements and the purported aims of 
section 13(5).  However, what this thesis concludes is that whilst cases of 
convicted murderers, child abusers or parents with children already in care 
seeking access to ART may arise on rare occasions, these difficult cases do not 
provide adequate justification for the blanket requirement to carry out a 
parenting assessment at the pre-conception stage for all patients seeking 
treatment.  There are child protection measures in place to ensure that a child 
is protected from harm after birth which can be implemented to protect the 
child born to a convicted child abuser, instead of this infringement upon an 
individual’s right to procreative liberty.  If a parent is not able to safeguard the 
welfare of their child once that child is born then the State can justifiably 
interfere with that person’s parental rights and indeed is under a duty to do so.  
The legislative basis for this duty was examined in greater detail in section 1.2 
of Chapter One. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that interference with the right to procreative 
liberty on the basis of parental environment is not justified.  The thesis has not 
looked at factors, such as the impact on the child to be born of pre-
determining the genetic make-up of that child, or the welfare of existing 
children of the family, that might be prayed in aid of interfering with 
procreative liberty on child welfare grounds.  However it has argued that the 
State cannot justifiably interfere with a person’s right to procreative liberty 
when there is no child yet born because to do so would simply mean that the 
child would not come into existence.  Whilst this of course would prevent the 
child from suffering serious harm it would also prevent the child from being 
born and enjoying the benefits of existence.  If it is accepted that only in very 
extreme circumstances would non-existence be preferable to existence then 
there is no justification for legislation, the consequence of which if applied, 
would be the non-existence of the very child whose welfare the legislation 
purports to be protecting.  The argument can be made from what is examined 
in this thesis that to prevent access to ART on the grounds that the patient 
might be an unsuitable parent is not justified.  In respect of the circumstances 
of the potential parents, this thesis accepts that clinics should make 
assessments based on medical evidence at the pre-conception stage to address 
the questions of whether attempting treatment would be futile, or dangerous 
255 
 
 
to the patient, and can justifiably refuse access to treatment on these grounds. 
However, such assessment has nothing to do with the welfare of the child to be 
born.  It is raised here to highlight the fact that there are some circumstances 
where a right to procreative liberty can be justifiably interfered with, but that 
does not weaken the argument that an interference in a right to procreative 
liberty on the basis of parental environment is not justified.  Refusing access to 
treatment on these limited medical grounds does not require that a parenting 
assessment purportedly taking into account the welfare of the child to be born 
is carried out.   
 
This thesis also argues that it is not the extent of or the skill applied to carrying 
out the pre-conception child welfare assessment that is at issue either.  Even if 
qualified social workers were employed by clinics to carry out the child welfare 
assessment and it is done carefully and professionally, to the same extent say 
as an adoption placement, that does not get rid of the overarching difficulty 
that to apply section 13(5) following an assessment results in no child being 
born.  Section 13(5) might be described as 'a hammer to crack a nut' approach 
to child protection which is not apparent when the child welfare principle is 
applied in cases of abuse and neglect. 
 
 
6.2 ART and Incest 
There is one scenario which illustrates quite well the different issues which 
arise when considering the different factors - parental environment and pre-
determined genetic make-up - upon which a right to procreative liberty might 
justifiably be interfered with.  The current HFEA Code of Practice sets out rules 
on donor recruitment, assessment and screening which would prevent centres 
from performing treatment that involves mixing gametes of close relatives who 
are genetically related.  A brother and sister seeking treatment together using 
their own gametes would be prevented from doing so.  One justification for this 
would be grounded in the desire not to create children from a shallow gene 
pool who might be at greater risk of medical problems associated with in-
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breeding.  The other is that it would be contrary to the spirit, if not the actual 
letter, of the laws prohibiting incest.2   
 
As was discussed in Chapter Two the State has for many years preceding the 
development of ART passed laws prohibiting incest.  The question arises as to 
whether reproduction using ART between close family members can be 
objected to on the grounds that it amounts to incest.  This thesis agrees with 
de Wert and others that: 
 
…first - or second-degree consanguineous Intrafamilial Medically 
Assisted Reproduction (IMAR) would be at odds with the spirit of 
laws and regulations forbidding consanguinity and incest and should 
therefore be rejected.3 
 
Whilst this thesis has deliberately not made any arguments about whether 
genetic make-up should be taken into account in a welfare assessment, 
restricting its analysis to parental environment concerns, it does take the view 
that the Code of Practice prohibition on the mixing of gametes of close 
relatives may be argued to be a justified interference in the right to 
procreative liberty, given the increased risk to the child to be born of being 
born with an inherited disorder and the fact that it would be at odds with at 
least the spirit of laws prohibiting incest.  As mentioned above there are some 
circumstances where a right to procreative liberty can be justifiably interfered 
with that do not weaken the central argument of the thesis. 
 
However, the Code of Practice only prevents centres from performing 
treatment that involves mixing gametes of close relatives.  If a brother and 
sister seek treatment whereby they used only the gametes of the brother and a 
donor egg to create an embryo to be implanted in the sister, should clinics 
refuse to treat them and if so on what grounds, as this would raise no issues of 
concern about the genetic make-up of the child and an increased risk of 
inherited disorders.  
                                                     
2 The criminal offence of incest is a prohibition of sexual intercourse between close relatives.  
This is of course not what is happening when IVF is used. 
3 Ibid., 509. 
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However, does the use of the brother's gametes and the sister’s uterus to 
create a child go against the spirit of the laws prohibiting incest and harm the 
resulting child?  This is a question which was asked in a case in France in 2001 
where a 47-year-old woman became pregnant after treatment in the UK by 
using an egg from an anonymous donor and her brother’s sperm.  She had come 
to the UK for the procedure because French law did not allow treatment on 
post-menopausal women.4  Chapter Two spent some time at the outset setting 
out the different definitions of a parent which the science of ART has created, 
such as a genetic, gestational and social mother, all of whom could be different 
people.  So called intrafamilial ART can create a scenario whereby a sister 
agrees to act as a surrogate in a situation where her sister-in-law cannot 
conceive.  In that scenario a child may be born with a genetic and social father 
and a gestational mother who are siblings, as well as a genetic and social 
mother who is married to the brother.  It raises the question - should your aunt 
also be your mother?  The other possible scenario is where a sister's egg and 
donor sperm are used to create an embryo which is then implanted into her 
sister-in-law, thereby giving rise to a situation where the genetic mother and 
social father of the child are siblings, and the child also has a gestational and 
social mother who is married to the brother.  Such situations, it was been 
argued potentially put the welfare of the child to be born at risk.  As de Wert 
and Others5 have said: 
 
…risks…for the (future) child first and foremost regard psychosocial 
risks of growing up in the unconventional familial environment thus 
created.  Relationships may be confusing for the child…The risk of 
identity problems of the child may increase in case of role 
confusion on the part of a collaborator wanting to take up part of 
the parental responsibilities.6 
 
                                                     
4 The Guardian Newspaper Website, IVF to give woman a baby by brother, 27 August 2001, 
www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/aug/27/medicalscience.health (accessed 28 May 2015). 
5 ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law including G. de Wert, W. Dondorp, G. Pennings, F. 
Shenfield, P. Devroey, B. Tarlatzis, P. Barri, and K. Diedrich, Intrafamilial medically assisted 
reproduction, Human Reproduction, Vol.26, No.3 504–509, 2011. 
6 Ibid., 506. 
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However, where there is no mixing of genetic material between close family 
members, intrafamilial assisted reproduction is not sufficiently ‘incest –like’7 to 
justify prohibition. This thesis takes the view that fears about the potential 
psychological harm to the child are speculative and in any event would not lead 
to such significant harm that the harm of existence was outweighed by the 
benefit of existence.  The ‘need for a father’ requirement was introduced 
largely because of fears about the impact on the child to be born in being 
raised within an unconventional familial environment.  Just as that 
requirement has been removed because it created an unjustified interference 
in the right to procreative liberty, so to would preventing close family members 
from engaging in collaborative ART which does not involve the mixing of 
gametes.  Speculative fears about the welfare of the child raised in an 
unconventional family unit are unjustified as a ground for restricting access to 
ART.  This would also apply to families created by intrafamilial medically 
assisted reproduction which does not involve the gametes of people in 
prohibited consanguineous relationships.    
 
As Wert and others have said: 
 
IMAR involving the mere semblance of first- or second-degree 
consanguinity may still raise concerns about incest. However, 
without further arguments establishing that these concerns refer to 
serious moral objections, providing assistance to such arrangements 
may well be justified. 
 
The concerns which ART raises about children born in ‘incest-like’ 
circumstances highlight well the different factors which can and cannot justify 
interference in the right to procreative liberty.  Parental environment, 
including being raised in an unconventional family unit, does not provide such 
justification because potential harm to the child is to a large extent 
speculative. 
 
  
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
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6.3 A Right to Parent and a Right to Procreative Liberty 
Alghrani and Harris are of the view that removing section 13(5) from the 
statute books does not preclude: 
 
...the introduction of certain clear disqualifications from parenting 
whether through sexual reproduction, adoption, fostering or 
artificial reproductive technologies.  Convicted paedophiles, serial 
child abusers, those with a history of recklessly abandoning children 
could be precluded from parenting (as opposed to producing 
offspring) as indeed they usually are.  Alternatively, they could be 
subject to stringent review.  This does not mean that we need the 
welfare provision, adoption agencies or parental licensing schemes 
to achieve this.  In short, there is only one reliable criterion for 
inadequate parenting; it is the palpable demonstration of that 
inadequacy, in terms of cruelty, neglect or abuse of children.8  
 
Alghrani and Harris are saying that no one should be precluded from 
reproduction on child welfare grounds but some should be precluded from 
parenting on child welfare grounds: that any assessment of the welfare of the 
child must wait until such time as the child is born.  As was mentioned in 
Chapter One Alghrani and Harris have argued for a full repeal of section 13(5) 
on the basis that it amounts to a violation of a right to procreative liberty.  
They argue that post-birth checks are enough.  This is the point being made in 
section 6.1, however, it is worth repeating as it is such a fundamental criticism 
of section 13(5) - that the legislation is simply unnecessary as part of a 
coherent child protection system.  Further, Alghrani and Harris expand on the 
point made in section 6.1 by distinguishing a right to parent from a right to 
procreative liberty.     
 
Alghrani and Harris also point out that there are good reasons for our 
reluctance to introduce a parental licensing system for all as suggested by La 
Follette and that: 
 
                                                     
8 A. Alghrani and J. Harris, Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be 
regulated?, 2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 191, 202. 
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Some of these good reasons have to do with the inadequacy of 
speculative or prospective criteria about good parenting.  More 
importantly they have to do with the importance and value that 
most people attach to the freedom to have children, coupled with 
our reluctance to place the comprehensive powers that licensing 
would involve in the hands of anyone at all, whether that person be 
some central authority or an individual doctor or social worker. 
 
This thesis has not sought to argue that the child welfare principle applied to 
existing children is fundamentally flawed and ought to be abandoned.  However 
Chapter Four did highlight some difficulties with its application, difficulties 
which this thesis argues are amplified when a child welfare assessment is being 
carried out at the pre-conception stage.  It is the case that there are some 
question marks as to the adequacy of  utilising  prospective criteria about good 
parenting even where they are being used by the courts to determine issues 
regarding children in the family courts.  However, despite these difficulties, 
the child welfare principle as applied to existing children can and does act as a 
means of protecting those at risk of significant harm.  That does not mean 
however that this principle can therefore simply be transplanted by taking into 
account child welfare concerns at the pre-conception stage.  This thesis has 
argued that section 13(5) as applied to children to be born amounts to an 
unjustified interference in a right to procreative liberty when the reason for 
refusing treatment is that a child may be born into a harmful parenting 
environment and that this unjustified interference has arisen as a result of a 
misapplication of the child welfare principle at too early a stage.  The 
pervasive influence of the child welfare principle in family law, which this 
thesis summarised in Chapter Four, has enabled the introduction of section 
13(5) to go largely unchallenged and unquestioned.  The desire to send out a 
message that the State takes its duties to protect children from harm seriously 
has led politicians down a path where they have sought to apply the child 
welfare principle at an inappropriate time with the effect that it acts to 
unjustifiably infringe the procreative liberty of its citizens. 
 
Chapter Four outlined the historical background to highlight the way in which 
the child welfare principle became and remained an established part of UK 
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law.  Whilst not without its problems when being applied in the context of 
decisions affecting existing children, there can be little doubt that the child 
welfare principle is a very widely applied and highly regarded legal principle.  
However, as explained, what this thesis argues is that just because the child 
welfare principle can be applied in one area it does not mean it seamlessly 
transfers to another.  The impact of the child welfare principle on access to 
ART is apparent from the continued requirements of section 13(5).  This thesis 
argues that there has been a conflation of a right to procreative liberty with a 
right to parent which has led to the situation where we have a meaningless and 
ineffectual child welfare provision in the HFE Act 1990 which bears little 
conceptual relationship to the child welfare principle as articulated in the 
Children Act 1989 and Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  What is meant by that is 
that circumstances which justify interference in a right to parent do not 
automatically provide like justification for interference in a right to 
procreative liberty. 
 
In Chapter Five this thesis looked at the question of whether the parenting 
assessment carried out in adoption cases could be argued to be analogous to 
the exercise being carried out by infertility clinics when applying section 13(5).  
However, this thesis concludes that the adoption parenting assessment is not a 
valid comparator.  There is a fundamental difference between the two, 
namely, that in adoption it is parent-child matching exercise which is being 
carried out.  There is a child in existence whose needs are known and can be 
assessed in a very concrete way.  The parents are not being assessed as 
suitable parents in a general sense but suitable parents for that particular 
child.  What is being carried out when section 13(5) is applied is a generalised, 
speculative assessment of the ability of the patient(s) seeking assistance to 
ensure that the welfare of a future child, who is not at that point in existence, 
is safeguarded.  The continued existence of section 13(5) in its current form 
says a great deal about the all-encompassing nature of the child welfare 
principle in law.  Whilst this principle developed for very sound and laudable 
reasons in the family court context it has been expanded for reasons of 
political expediency into areas where its application is illogical. 
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Some may argue that allowing harm to happen rather than preventing it is 
ethically objectionable.  This thesis takes the view that the child welfare 
principle as applied to living children does not require that harm be allowed to 
happen before action can be taken so is therefore robust enough to protect 
children as soon as they are born.  As outlined in Chapter Four, a Local 
Authority in Scotland, for example, can apply for a child protection order 
removing the child from the care of the parent and only have to satisfy the 
Sheriff that the child will be treated or neglected in such a way that is likely to 
cause significant harm to the child.  Actual harm does not have to befall an 
existing child before the State can intervene.  The child welfare principle 
applied post-birth is in itself a preventative measure and does not have to be 
applied at an earlier pre-conception stage to prevent harm. 
 
The most fundamental criticism I have made of section 13(5) in its present form 
is that what it requires clinics to engage in is essentially a meaningless exercise 
in gathering evidence to rebut a perfectly reasonable presumption that 
potential parents will be supportive parents.  The requirement to gather this 
evidence is intrusive and whether what is then done with it is useful is highly 
questionable.  This thesis concludes that all that can be done is for the clinic to 
engage in speculation as to what may or may not turn out to happen in the 
future.  Further even if the parents were found seriously wanting once a child 
is born, then suitable child protection measures are in force to ensure that the 
child is not placed at risk of harm and these can be applied from the moment 
of birth.   If Parliament feels it necessary to take into account the welfare of 
the child brought into existence by the application of ART services then there is 
no reason why this cannot be carried out at the post-birth stage. As it currently 
stands section 13(5) undermines the procreative liberty of patients seeking 
access to ART services and this thesis argues that it does little or nothing to 
ensure that the child to be born whose welfare it purports to take into account 
is protected from harm.  Those who might argue that section 13(5) acts to 
prevent avoidable harm miss two crucial points, firstly, that the child welfare 
principle applied to an existing child is sufficient to prevent avoidable harm 
and secondly, that preventing a child from coming into existence may prevent 
avoidable harm but only by preventing the birth of a child. This creates 
conceptual and practical difficulties in assessing whether the parental 
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environment could be considered to be so harmful to a child that it is better 
that no child is able to be conceived by prospective parents. This has raised 
further issues. 
 
 
6.4 The Interference with a Right to Procreative Liberty 
A right to procreative liberty is founded upon the importance of procreative 
choice to an individual's own life plan, to their own sense of identity and 
meaning to life.  In short the desire to have children is for some a very strong 
desire indeed and it was concluded in Chapter Two that it should not be 
undermined unless there is a very clear reason for doing so. Two aspects of 
procreation are of particular importance, firstly the basic biological imperative 
to pass on our genes to the next generation and secondly the desire to nurture 
and rear children.  Evolutionists would argue that parents nurture and rear 
their children in order that the child can grow and pass their genes to the next 
generation and so on it goes.  However, the nurturing and rearing of one's own 
children is likely to be seen by those making the procreative choice to conceive 
and raise children in far broader and deeper terms than that.      
 
As discussed in Chapter Two there is a presumption in Western Liberal 
Democracies that people are free to act without interference from the State, 
unless the State has justifiable reasons for interfering. Justification for 
interference can be found if there is significant harm likely to be caused to 
others, where the definition of ‘significant’ relates to both the extent of the 
damage which might be caused and the immediacy of the threat.  A right to 
procreative liberty as articulated in Chapter Two is of such fundamental 
importance that it should only be interfered with by the State in circumstances 
where not to do so would undeniably lead to significant harm being caused to 
others.  The burden of showing that section 13(5) prevents significant harm 
being caused to children is on the legislators.  Based on these propositions I 
would assert that patients seeking access to ART services should not have to 
enter into a parental ability assessment process to establish that they do not 
present a risk to a yet-to-be-born child.  They should be free to make the 
choice to attempt to have children without having to satisfy an adequate 
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parent test.  This is because procreative liberty should be the starting point, 
the presumption on which decisions about regulation of access to procreative 
treatments are based. 
 
What is outlined in the preceding chapters of this thesis highlights that section 
13(5) is an unjustified interference in the presumption of a right to procreative 
liberty because its application simply cannot identify a sufficiently serious level 
of real and immediate harm being caused to children on the basis of 
assessment of parental environment. At best section 13(5) might be able to 
identify in some extreme cases the potential for some future and speculative 
serious harm but this can be addressed sufficiently by the application of 
current child welfare measures that would be implemented once any child was 
born. 
 
The right to respect for a person’s right to procreative liberty is not an 
absolute right.  There are and always have been certain situations, such as the 
prohibition against incest as discussed above, which have been seen as serving 
proper justification for the State to interfere with a right to procreative 
liberty.  However, there is inadequate justification for a blanket requirement 
that every person seeking infertility treatment has to satisfy the clinic that the 
welfare of the future child will not be harmed by them.  This is a degrading, 
insulting and overly-intrusive exercise which the State demands and cannot be 
justified on the basis of protecting a yet-to-be-born child.  Further, even if 
there was strong evidence which pointed towards a potential risk of harm to a 
future child the question arises as to whether preventing that future child from 
coming into existence at all is the most appropriate way of ensuring that child 
is protected from harm. 
 
The parental assessment which section 13(5) requires clinics to carry out is 
worrying because it has echoes of the practice of eugenics where certain 
people were judged to be unfit to parent.  Whilst this thesis does not suggest 
that the aim of the legislation is to prevent specific groups of people from 
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having children, what is does do is allow others to make value judgements as to 
the fitness to parent of infertile individuals.  It is clear that when this 
legislation was introduced certain politicians were happy to make value 
judgements based on no definitive evidence as to the fitness to parent of single 
women and homosexuals.  A legislative provision which sought to require a 
parenting assessment at a pre-conception stage to apparently protect the 
welfare of a future child was misconceived from the beginning and should not 
have been introduced in 1990 in that form.  It has been argued that the reasons 
behind its inclusion were in fact less to do with evidence based child welfare 
concerns and more to do with the Conservative government of the day looking 
to uphold ‘traditional family values’ and an antipathy towards single mothers 
and single-sex families, along with concerns about an apparent diminishing role 
of fathers in the upbringing of children.  As the years have passed these 
prejudices and worries have diminished to a large extent, but that is not to say 
that given the continued existence of the legislation they have been eradicated 
entirely.  The continuation of section 13(5) in its current form means that there 
is an ongoing risk that those tasked with carrying out these value judgements 
when taking into account the welfare of the child will be swayed by their own 
beliefs and prejudices about who and what makes a good parent.  
 
The conclusion to this thesis is that the supportive parenting provision in 
relation  to the child to be born, as set out at section 13(5) of the HFE Act 
1990, represents unjustified State interference in the right to procreative 
liberty of UK citizens when used as part of a welfare of the child assessment 
The fundamental discrimination inherent in the treatment of people with 
fertility problems, together with the illogicality of assessing potential harm to a 
‘child’ at the pre-conception stage, is essentially what renders section 13(5) in 
its current form unsuitable as a licensing condition for clinics to adhere to.  
This thesis proposes that section 13(5) should be amended and the next section 
will discuss what that amendment should be. 
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6.5 Amendment to Section 13(5) 
In Chapter Three of the thesis the current position in relation to the regulation 
of ART was set out along with the history behind the regulatory process and 
introduction of the legislation.  What was highlighted in Chapter Three is that 
the regulation of ART has been a process which has developed as views about 
the practice, scientific advances and societal attitudes have changed.  This is 
not a process which has ended and this thesis takes the view that further 
amendment should be considered given the soundness of the argument that 
concerns about the welfare of a children to be born is not a justifiable reason 
for the parenting ability assessment.  
 
It is clear that section 13(5) was introduced in the first instance as a 
consequence of an ideology which opposed the raising of children outwith two-
parent, heterosexual families.  The ‘need for a father’ consideration betrayed 
the true purpose of the clause.  It was not introduced principally to protect the 
welfare of the child but to restrict access to ART services for those considered 
to be less than ideal parents.  Whilst assertions were made that being born into 
a family without a father would be harmful to a child’s welfare, these concerns 
were largely subjective and unsupported by the evidence.  The default position 
for Parliament should have been that people are free to exercise their right to 
procreative liberty in whatever way they choose.  However, because of an 
unease about the creation of alternative family units Parliament voted to pass 
legislation which set up a barrier to the exercise of free choice. 
 
This thesis has not examined in detail the arguments that single parent or same 
sex parent families might be harmful to children because it has been argued 
that such claims have largely not been borne out by research.  The negative 
attitudes towards single parent and same sex parents has faded into the 
background as the acceptance and recognition of alternative family units has 
grown and explicit provisions in the HFE Acts for different types of family unit 
with legal parenthood have been introduced.  Further, the amendments 
introduced by the HFE Act 2008 to section 13(5) and the changes to the Code of 
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Practice, have altered the approach to be taken by licensed clinics in respect 
of assessment of potential parents.  As was noted in Chapter One the 
presumption now is that people will be 'supportive parents' in the absence of 
‘reasonable cause for concern’.  What this thesis takes from the earlier 
structure of section 13(5) and why it was set out in detail in Chapter Three is 
that its existence for 18 years highlights how the State can be driven to 
interfere with a right to procreative liberty for spurious reasons and also how 
legislation can be amended when attitudes change.  There is no reason to 
assume that the remnants of section 13(5) which still require licenced clinics to 
take into account how supportive a parent a patient might be cannot be 
amended and the infertile allowed to make the decision to attempt to have 
genetically related children without undue interference in that decision based 
on the assessment of their fitness to parent. 
 
What this thesis argues for is an amendment to section 13(5) which would see 
the current reference to supportive parenting in relation to the child to be 
born being removed.  This thesis argues that the revised form that section 
13(5) could take given the arguments put forward in this thesis is that: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be 
born as a result of the treatment, and the welfare of any other 
child who may be affected by the birth.  Taking account of the 
welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment 
shall not include any assessment of the parenting ability of the 
woman who is provided with treatment or anyone who is or may 
be deemed to be the legal parents of a child who may be born as 
a result of treatment. 
 
The Code of Practice would also need to be amended so that factors to be 
taken into account during the assessment process do not include factors 
relating to the parental environment within which the child who might be born 
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as a result of ART is to be raised.  Whilst this thesis does not necessarily 
support the retention of section 13(5) in any form, it has not been argued that 
the State does not have a mandate to take into account at the pre-conception 
stage the child to be born physical or mental health.  If it was thought 
appropriate to retain section 13(5) at all, the criteria for assessing the 
potential impact upon the physical or mental health of the child to be born 
could also be further defined in statute or within the Code of Practice.  This 
could encompass such factors as the risk to any child who may be born 
suffering from a serious medical condition, or the potential psychological harms 
on the child to be born of a pre-determined genetic make up.  Arguments that 
the welfare implication for a child to be born utilising PGD are not sufficient to 
justify taking into account the welfare of the child to be born have been made 
elsewhere.  This thesis has focused on the parental environment aspect of the 
child welfare assessment given its similarity to factors which are taken into 
account in abuse and neglect cases when the child welfare principle is applied.  
 
This thesis has also not argued that the State does not have a mandate to take 
into account whether a existing child might be harmed by the birth of another 
child as a result of ART.  This could also be considered further in the Statute or 
in the Code of Practice. There are unlikely to be many incidences where that 
could be shown to be to such an extent as to deny treatment, but one possible 
example might be parents who seek access to treatment when existing children 
are already in a state of neglect and the introduction of another child might 
reasonably be seen as increase the risk of yet more serious neglect.  This is not 
the same as taking into account the welfare of the child to be born because the 
assessment of harm is far less speculative.  There is actual evidence of a child 
suffering from significant harm and it is reasonable to assess that risk as being 
increased by the introduction of another child into the family.  It would still 
prevent the birth of another child, but the ground for doing so would not be to 
preventing harm befalling a future child, but preventing significant harm to an 
existing child who has far greater rights and interests than a non-existent 
being.  It should be pointed out however that this thesis does not argue for the 
retention of the existing child provision, merely that an argument cannot be 
made for its removal on the basis that it seeks to take into account the welfare 
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of a non-existent being.  That said, fertile people with existing children do not 
have to have the welfare of that child taken into account prior to engaging in 
sexual intercourse with the aim of having a second child.  The existing child 
provision can therefore be attacked on the grounds that it is discriminatory.  
 
The UK Government Department of Health published a paper in March 2014 
entitled Memorandum to the Health Committee: Post-Legislative Assessment of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.9 In the section dealing with 
the Welfare of the Child Assessment the Memorandum states: 
 
The requirement for clinics to consider the welfare of any child 
that might be born as a result of treatment, or any existing child 
that might be affected by the birth, before making the offer of 
treatment has been a cornerstone of the 1990 Act and is retained 
by the 2008 Act amendments.  This requirement was never 
intended to be a test of the patients’ potential to be “good 
parents”, as many have assumed.  Rather, as treatment may 
result in a child that would otherwise not be brought into that 
environment, it was to examine whether there were any factors 
that might indicate that treatment would not be appropriate in 
that particular case.  This is why the assessment has been 
retained. 
 
This thesis takes the view that this statement is disingenuous.  It has not just 
been assumed that section 13(5) is a test of the patients’ potential to be good 
parents.  It has been coherently argued by various commentators, and this 
thesis has reached the same conclusion in the chapters where it has been 
discussed, that it was intended and has been interpreted as doing just that.  
With the exception of medical welfare issues, how can an examination of 
‘factors that might indicate that treatment would not be appropriate in that 
                                                     
9 At www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-fertilisation-and-embryology-act-2008-post-
legislative-assessment (accessed 14 May 2014). 
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particular case’ be carried out without testing the patients’ potential to be 
good parents?  It is abundantly clear that the distinction which the Department 
of Health seeks to draw is mere semantics which is no distinction at all in 
practice.  
 
It is unfortunate that almost a decade later it is necessary to still be making 
the point that section 13(5) should be amended on the grounds set out in this 
thesis.  The UK Government had the opportunity to amend or repeal the 
requirement in 2008 but instead found itself directed into a much narrower 
debate on the child’s need for a father against a child's need for supportive 
parenting.  In the 2014 memorandum they have stuck to their position that it is 
necessary without providing a coherent reason as to why.  The possibility that 
the power to regulate ART might be devolved to the Scottish Parliament has 
been mooted recently.10  It may be that the legislation in this area has to be 
looked at afresh in Scotland which would provide another opportunity to 
question whether patients seeking access to ART should have to undergo this 
parenting assessment.  The matters raised in this thesis are still very much live 
issues which legislators should not shy away from tackling.  As has been shown 
in the past the regulation of ART services has been a process not an event and 
it is hoped that this process will continue. 
 
The suggested amendment of course does not deal with the difficulty which the 
term 'treatment services' poses for the legislation.  As was discussed towards 
the end of Chapter Five the main difference between natural conception and 
assisted conception is that the assistance of a third party is required in the 
later.  Section 13(5) does not even treat all third party assistance as justifying 
interference in reproductive choices.  Fertility drugs are prescribed and 
operations performed without any regard having to be given to the welfare of 
the child who might be born.  So why should IVF patients be subjected to such 
an assessment?  Why should the welfare of any existing child of the family who 
                                                     
10 See S. Hardbottle, Better Together: Why devolution of fertility legislation is not a good thing, 
Bionews, (24 October 2014) http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_462801.asp (accessed 5 July 
2015). 
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may be affected by the birth be taken into account when IVF is provided but 
not when and operation to unblock fallopian tubes is provided?  If the 
legislators wish to have legislation which is fair and consistent across the board 
then it is incumbent upon them to explain what is different about the 
treatment services which fall under the HFE Act 1990 and other treatments 
which do not.  This thesis argues that there is no distinction to be drawn as far 
as child welfare issues are concerned.  All these treatments aim to bring about 
a successful pregnancy and the birth of a child.  The decision to seek to 
undergo the treatment required is a decision with goes to the heart of a right 
to procreative liberty.  There is no justification for interfering with this right 
merely on the basis of the type of treatment given.  This thesis argues that 
section 13(5) applies only to certain treatment services because what is 
involved is scientific work with genetic material and embryos which some argue 
have a special status.  Whilst the treatment services which fall under section 
13(5) may be distinguished in this way from other treatments, the distinction is 
not one which in anyway relates to the welfare of the child to be born. 
 
This thesis has argued that the reason why section 13(5) was able to be 
introduced in the first place and why it remains in place today, despite the 
obvious logical difficulties which arise in protecting a child from harm by 
preventing that child from being brought into existence, is that it purports to 
act as a strong child welfare measure.  This thesis argues that the UK 
Government are either blinded by or hiding behind the issue of child welfare in 
continuing to require licensed clinics to adhere to section 13(5).  It would be a 
brave politician indeed who would stand up in the House of Commons or 
Scottish Parliament debating chamber and argue that child welfare concerns do 
not have to be taken into account.   
 
6.6 Possible Impact on the Fertile  
One of the reasons this thesis was embarked upon was due to a subjective 
awareness in my professional life as a solicitor with a Scottish local authority, 
who was tasked with applying to court to have children at risk removed from 
their parent(s), that social workers were frequently approaching the legal 
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department for advice about putting child protection measures in place during 
a woman’s pregnancy.  The legal advice was always the same - nothing could 
be done by way of application to the courts until such time  as the child was 
born.  However, given the availability of emergency child protection orders a 
child could be removed from the mother's care within hours of its birth.  Very 
robust child protection measures exist.  However, for some this is still not 
enough.  One of the aims of this thesis was to highlight how the development of 
ART has provided the State with an opportunity to impinge upon the 
procreative liberty of individuals and couples seeking access to ART and to 
submit that there is always the potential there for the procreative choices of 
fertile people to be impinged upon in certain circumstances if the opportunity 
arose.  
 
One reaction to the distressing incidences of child abuse and neglect of recent 
years has been to question whether or not a ‘proven unfit mother’ should have 
restrictions placed upon her procreative choice to have further children.  An 
organisation originating in North Carolina and calling itself ‘Project Prevention’ 
has sought to address the problems associated with children born to drug 
addicted mothers,11 by offering payment to the mother on the condition that 
she undergo a sterilisation operation or is fitted with a long-term contraceptive 
implant.12  Project Prevention has recently established itself in the United 
Kingdom13 and has been heavily criticised by drug addiction charities.14  One of 
the principal criticisms is that this organisation offers money to vulnerable 
woman in exchange for them giving up their fundamental procreative rights.15  
Wolf describes the work of Project Prevention as ‘a program that targets 
desperate women whose fundamental right to procreate is stripped away in 
exchange for a paltry, yet coercive, sum of money’ which ‘imposes a serious 
                                                     
11 The medical term for these problems is known as Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.  The 
syndrome includes drug withdrawal symptoms at birth and possible developmental delay. There 
are of course also well-documented issues surrounding neglect of children born to drug-
addicted mothers. 
12 See http://www.projectprevention.org (accessed 3 March 2012). 
13 The Daily Record, Mum's fury after being approached in the street and offered £200 to get 
sterilised, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/mums-fury-after-being-
approached-1059660 (accessed 12 March 2012). 
14 See fn. 9 - Andrew Horne, the Director of Addaction described the practices of Project 
Prevention as ‘morally reprehensible and repugnant’. 
15 A. B. Wolf, What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to C.R.A.C.K., University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 1999-2000, 33, 173. 
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limitation on individuals’ and society's ability to assert fundamental claims to 
personhood’.16  Project Prevention is by no means the only organisation to 
suggest that the procreative choice of fertile women who have failed in the 
past to safeguard the welfare of their children should be restricted.  One Dutch 
MP recently proposed legislation which would allow courts to order a proven 
‘unfit mother’ to receive a long-term contraceptive implant without her 
consent, thus preventing her from having more children whom she may place at 
risk of significant harm.17  It would appear that the growing concern 
surrounding the welfare of children, particularly those children born to women 
with substance abuse problems, has led to the procreative liberty of these 
women to be curtailed in certain circumstances. 
 
This thesis simply raises the question of the possible impact upon fertile 
individuals arising from the lack of respect for the right to procreative liberty 
of the infertile in passing because the way that the infertile are currently being 
treated by the State should act as a warning light for those who do not see the 
potential for the erosion of respect for a right to procreative liberty more 
generally.  It is right to question the appropriateness of the child welfare 
principle in areas which are not concerned with making decisions about what is 
best for an existing child, but strays into areas relating to pregnancy, 
contraception and ART.  Whilst to date the State has only felt able to place 
restrictions on access to ART, having done so it may make it easier to argue for 
restrictions to be placed on certain fertile individuals in an active sexual 
relationship - possibly because they will not satisfy the future child's need for 
supportive parenting.  When the language of restriction on a fundamental right 
has already been adopted in one are and applied, it is often an easier step to 
apply it in other areas.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 Ibid., 175 
17 See http://www.marjovandijken.pvda.nl/ (accessed 3 March 2012). 
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6.7 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of the thesis was to focus upon the parenting capability and 
environment aspects of section 13(5).  The reason for doing so was because it is 
parental capability and environment questions that are invariably addressed by 
the courts when applying the child welfare principle in family law cases.  
Therefore, the impact of the child welfare principle upon questions surrounding 
access to ART is brought sharply into focus.  There are numerous other child 
welfare concerns which this thesis has not touched upon to a significant extent 
such as the controversy surrounding ‘designer babies’, a term, Professor 
Stephen Wilkinson noted ‘evokes thoughts of parents unhealthily obsessed with 
their child’s appearance or who want to enhance their children to create...a 
kind of demigod race that will be taller, healthier [and] better-looking’,   or 
child welfare concerns in regards to sex selection of embryos prior to 
implantation and the impact this may have on the future child.   As interesting 
as these areas of concern are, they are somewhat removed from the questions 
that confront family courts when deciding what course of action would be in 
the child’s best interests.  This thesis has added to the body of academic 
knowledge in this area by carrying out a thorough examination of how the 
development, growth and implementation of the child welfare principle as 
applied in family law has influenced, and continues to influence, the 
assessment of patients seeking access to ART, an assessment which in effect is 
seeking to explore whether or not the patient(s) would be in a position to fulfil 
their parental responsibilities towards the child to be born. 
 
The bulk of the work analysing the difficulties which the implementation of 
section 13(5) creates was done prior to the amendments brought about by the 
HFE Act 2008.  The focus prior to the amendments tended to be on the 
discriminatory nature of the requirement to take into account the child’s ‘need 
for a father’.  This thesis has revisited the analysis of the appropriateness of 
section 13(5) since the removal of the ‘need for a father’ criteria which was 
roundly criticised as being discriminatory to single woman and lesbians.  This 
thesis concludes that the discriminatory nature of section 13(5), whilst 
removed from single woman and lesbians specifically, still persists more 
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generally in the fact that section 13(5) imposes requirements on the infertile 
which are not asked of the fertile. 
 
One thing that seems certain in the field of ART is that new techniques and 
methods to assist women to get pregnant or to ensure that a child is born free 
from genetic disease will continue to be developed.  It also seems likely that as 
each new technique is developed a new ethical controversy will arise.  The 
very latest technique to make the news is womb transplantation where donated 
wombs of living women have been used to assist woman to get pregnant.18  
Academics have published a paper on the implications of womb transplantation 
for post-operative male to female transsexuals becoming parents and the 
potential child welfare implications.19  The rare studies which have looked the 
welfare of children show that such children do not fare any less well than 
children reared in other family units.20  Even so one can postulate whether or 
not transsexuals might be denied access to ART on child welfare grounds such 
as ‘any other aspects of your life or medical history which may pose a risk of 
serious harm to any child you might have’. 
 
It seems unlikely then that the questions and controversies raised in this thesis 
will disappear anytime soon.  It is all the more important that the UK 
reassesses the way in which patients’ procreative choices are respected when 
they seek access to treatment.  Currently the reference to ‘the need for 
supportive parenting’ and the factors which the treating clinic are advised by 
the HFEA in the Code of Practice to take into account present significant issues 
for proper respect for a right to procreative liberty.  There are serious question 
marks hanging over section 13(5) surrounding its fairness in terms of 
                                                     
18 The Guardian, Four women given pioneering womb transplants impregnated via IVF, 3 March 
2014 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/mar/03/women-pioneering-womb-
transplants-impregnated-ivf (accessed on 19 March 2014). 
19 S. McGuinness and A. Alghrani, Gender and Parenthood: The Case for Realignment, Medical 
Law Review, 16, Summer 2008, pp. 261–283. 
20 R. Green, ‘Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents’ 
(1978) 135 American Journal of Psychiatry 692–697; R. Green, ‘Transsexuals’ Children’ (1998) 2 
The International Journal of Transgenderism. http://www.symposium.com//ijt/ijtc0601.htm 
(accessed on 13 August 2015). 
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discrimination, proportionality as a child welfare measure and its 
meaningfulness. 
 
Whilst the State’s mandate to protect children from harm is a vitally important 
aspect of our society and can justifiably be exercised in regard to a child who is 
at risk of harm from parental abuse or neglect, it can not be justifiably 
exercised in regard to a future yet-to-be-conceived ‘child’ whose welfare it is 
suspected might be at risk from parental abuse or neglect and where the ‘child 
protection measure’ to prevent that child's existence entirely.  That is why this 
thesis calls for the amendment of section 13(5) to remove any reference to 
‘the need for supportive parents’ and significant changes to the Code of 
Practice removing parental environment factors as valid considerations in 
determining whether or not patients should be provided with access to ART.  
Such a move would see the right to procreative liberty of the infertile being 
accorded the same level of respect that is enjoyed by the fertile. 
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